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listing legitimate sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8 The performance metrics in results of Näıve Bayes Classifier after
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SUMMARY
Low quality information such as spam and rumors is a nuisance to people
and hinders them from consuming information that is pertinent to them or that they
are looking for. As social networks like Facebook, Twitter and Google+ have become
important communication platforms in people’s daily lives, malicious users make them
as major targets to pollute with low quality information, which we also call as Denial
of Information (DoI) attacks. How to analyze and detect low quality information
in social networks for preventing DoI attacks is the major research problem I will
address in this dissertation.
Although individual social networks are capable of filtering a significant amount of
low quality information they receive, they usually require large amounts of resources
(e.g, personnel) and incur a delay before detecting new types of low quality informa-
tion. Also the evolution of various low quality information posts lots of challenges
to defensive techniques. My work contains three major parts: 1). analytics and de-
tection framework of low quality information, 2). evolutionary study of low quality
information, and 3). detection approaches of low quality information. In part I, I pro-
posed social spam analytics and detection framework SPADE across multiple social
networks showing the efficiency and flexibility of cross-domain classification and asso-
ciative classification. In part II, I performed a large-scale evolutionary study on web
page spam and email spam over a long period of time. In part III, I designed three
detection approaches used in detecting low quality information in social networks:
click traffic analysis of short URL spam, behavior analysis of URL spam and infor-
mation diffusion analysis of rumors in social networks. Our study shows promising




With networks like Facebook, Twitter and Google+ attracting audiences of millions
of users a month, they have been important communication platforms in everyday
life of people. This in turn attracts malicious users to the social networks as well,
causing an increase in the incidence of low quality information.
Such information, is a nuisance to people and hinders them from consuming infor-
mation that is pertinent to them or that they are looking for. It has diverse formats
in social networks such as user profile spam, message spam and web page spam. User
profile spam employs text such as attractive words and multi-media such as pictures
or videos to capture other users’ attention or clicks in the purpose of redirecting users
to phishing or spam web pages or increasing account reputations by more clicks or fol-
lowings. Message spam appears in the instant message communications among users.
Web page spam mainly contains false information such as phishing web page or low
quality information such as irrelevant advertisings. Figure 1 shows the examples of
low quality information in social networks. Individual social networks are capable of
filtering a significant amount of low quality information they receive, although they
usually require large amounts of resources (e.g, personnel) and incur a delay before
detecting new types of low quality information.
Due to the ease of sharing information, social networks provide more efficient
and numerous channels for the growth of low quality information. For example, web
spam links in friend requests, in-box messages, and news feeds, are redirecting users
to advertisement web sites or other types of malicious web sites. Further, social media
sites have redefined the way links are shared with a tendency to share links using URL
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(a) Example of user profile
spam
(b) Example of message
spam
(c) Example of web page
spam
Figure 1: Examples of low quality information in social networks
shortener [15].
Apart from evolution of web and applications on the web being one of the reasons
driving changes in low quality information, there is a constant evolution of low quality
information as a reaction to defensive techniques introduced by researchers [46,193].
Researchers have spent lots of efforts in studying the evolution of low quality infor-
mation as well. Fetterly et al. [66] presented their work on a large-scale study of the
evolution of web pages through measuring the rate and degree of web page changes
over a significant period of time. They focused on statistical analysis on the degree of
change of different classes of pages. Youngjoo Chung [46] studied the evolution and
emergence of web spam in three-yearly large-scale of Japanese Web archives which
contains 83 million links. His work focus on the evolution of web spam based on sizes,
topics and host-names of link farms, including hijacked sites which are continuously
attacked by spammers and spam link generators which will generate link to spam
pages in the future. Irani et al. [98] studied the evolution of phishing email messages
and they classified phishing messages into flash attacks and non-flash attacks and
analyzed transitory features and pervasive features.
Owing to the evolution of low quality information and advancing techniques used
in spreading low quality information, we need more novel detection approaches to
address the low quality information filtering problem. More researchers have done
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a lot of work on low quality information detection in social networks. Benevenuto
et al. [23] presented an approach to detect spammers on Twitter. Lee et al. [121]
had a long-term study on content polluters on Twitter. Zhang [207] detected spam
through analyzing automated activity on Twitter. Thomas et al. [173] presented a
real-time system Monarch that detects URLs. Ghosh et al. [71] investigated link
farming in the Twitter network and then explored mechanisms to discourage the
activity. Benevenuto et al. [164] approached the problem of detecting trending-topic
spammers who include unrelated URLs with trending words in tweets. Since short
URL is used often on social media recently, spammers also adopted it for camouflaging
the spam URLs [15]. Klien et al. [108] proposed geographical analysis of spam in
short URL spam detection. Chhabra et al. [43] presented the method to detect
phishing through short URLs. Maggi et al. [130] presented security threats and
countermeasures of short URLs on Twitter.
In this thesis, we mainly focus on the analysis and detection of low quality in-
formation in social networks. Specifically, we introduce our social spam detection
framework SPADE across multiple social networks showing the efficiency and flex-
ibility of cross-domain classification and associative classification. For evolutionary
study of low quality information, we present the results on large-scale study on web
page spam and email spam over a long period of time. The reasons why we choose
web page spam and email spam are as follows: 1) web page spam is the most popular
and common spam on Internet; 2) email system is the fundamental communication
system supporting social networks and the trend of email spam shows the direction of
low quality information to some extent. Furthermore, we provide one novel detection
approach used in filtering out URL spam in social networks: click traffic analysis and
behavior analysis. It involves monitoring and analysis of collective activities of legit-
imate users and spammers in social networks using machine learning and intrusion
detection techniques. For proposed work, we will spend efforts on behavior analysis
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of URL spam and information diffusion analysis of rumor in social networks.
1.1 Dissertation Statement and Dissertation Contributions
Before proceeding to the concrete contributions of my thesis, my thesis statement can
be formulated as follows:
Thesis Statement: Analysis and detection of evolving social spam and rumors
in social networks requires evolution-resistant approaches that can be effectively ac-
complished through collaborative social spam detection framework, and activity-based
analysis on click traffic, user behavior, and information diffusion.
To support my thesis statement, we make the following three contributions:
• Various types of low quality information results in high cost of analysis and
detection when we deal with them in an isolated manner. To reduce the cost
and improve the performance, we propose a collaborative social spam analytics
and detection framework for multiple social networks – SPADE (Section 2). It
converts diverse types of low quality information into uniform models and also
provides platform for cross-domain classification and associative classification to
enhance detection performance. Through intensive experimental study on real
dataset, we demonstrate the feasibility of SPADE and measured the effectiveness
of cross-domain classification and associative classification.
• The second contribution is the evolutionary study of low quality information on
large scale datasets over a long period of time, which shows interesting trends.
The evolution trends of web spam are: 1) spammers manipulate social media
in spreading spam; 2) HTTP headers and content of web spam also change
over time; 3) spammers have evolved and adopted new techniques to avoid
the detection based on HTTP header information. The evolution trends of
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email spam are: 1) more email spam have main content type in text instead
of multi-part and more URLs are embedded in email spam instead of HTML
and image; 2) topic of email spam drifted a lot from “Business News” to “Ac-
count Information” and more email spam contain social engineering attacks; 3)
sender-receiver routing network of email spam becomes more complex over time
showing spammers are using complex routing to avoid detection.
• The third contribution is that we propose activity-based detection approaches
to defend against malicious users. Malicious users camouflage low quality infor-
mation by obfuscation techniques such as good word stuffing and short URLs.
Besides, malicious users create or compromise a collection of user accounts in
social networks to propagate low quality information. Through collective activ-
ities, they maximize the usage of those user accounts without being detected.
The first approach is click traffic analysis of short URL spam filtering on Twit-
ter. In this work, we generate a large-scale click traffic dataset for short URL
spam. Also, we find that the majority of the clicks are from direct sources
(email, Instant message, Apps) and that the spammers utilize popular websites
to attract more attention by cross-posting the links. Through experimental
study, we demonstrate the feasibility of detecting short URL spam by classifi-
cation based on the click traffic features.
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
We split each contribution into a separate part, which contains chapters that illustrate
the details of research work, to emphasize the steps for analysis and detection of
low quality information in social networks. We attempt to keep each chapter an
independent unit with its own evaluation and related work.
Part I: Analytics and Detection Framework of Low Quality Information
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• Chapter II: SPADE: A Social-spam Analytics and Detection Frame-
work
Part II: Evolutionary Study of Low Quality Information
• Chapter III: Evolutionary Study of Web Spam - With over 2.5 hours a
day spent browsing websites online [168] and with over a billion pages [101],
identifying and detecting web spam is an important problem. Although large
corpora of legitimate web pages are available to researchers, the same cannot
be said about web spam or spam web pages.
We introduce the Webb Spam Corpus 2011 — a corpus of approximately 330, 000
spam web pages — which we make available to researchers in the fight against
spam. By having a standard corpus available, researchers can collaborate better
on developing and reporting results of spam filtering techniques. The corpus
contains web pages crawled from links found in over 6.3 million spam emails.
We analyze multiple aspects of this corpus including redirection, HTTP headers
and web page content.
We also provide insights into changes in web spam since the last Webb Spam
Corpus was released in 2006. These insights include: 1) spammers manipulate
social media in spreading spam; 2) HTTP headers also change over time (e.g.
hosting IP addresses of web spam appear in more IP ranges); 3) Web spam
content has evolved but the majority of content is still scam.
• Chapter IV: A Study on Evolution of Email Spam Over Fifteen Years
- Email spam is a persistent problem, especially today, with the increasing ded-
ication and sophistication of spammers. Even popular social media sites such
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as Facebook, Twitter, and Google Plus are not exempt from email spam as
they all interface with email systems. With an “arms-race” between spam-
mers and spam filter developers, spam has been continually changing over the
years. In this chapter, we analyze email spam trends on a dataset collected by
the Spam Archive, which contains 5.1 million spam emails spread over 15 years
(1998-2013). We use statistical analysis techniques on different headers in email
messages (e.g. content type and length) and embedded items in message body
(e.g. URL links and HTML attachments). Also, we investigate topic drift by
applying topic modeling on the content of email spam. Moreover, we extract
sender-to-receiver IP routing networks from email spam and perform network
analysis on it. Our results show the dynamic nature of email spam over one
and a half decades and demonstrate that the email spam business is not dying
but changing to be more capricious.
Part III: Detection Approaches of Low Quality Information
• Chapter V: Click Traffic Analysis of Short URL Spam on Twitter -
With an average of 80% length reduction, the URL shorteners have become the
norm for sharing URLs on Twitter, mainly due to the 140-character limit per
message. Unfortunately, spammers have also adopted the URL shorteners to
camouflage and improve the user click-through of their spam URLs. In this
chapter, we measure the misuse of the short URLs and analyze the characteris-
tics of the spam and non-spam short URLs. We utilize these measurements to
enable the detection of spam short URLs. To achieve this, we collected short
URLs from Twitter and retrieved their click traffic data from Bitly, a popular
URL shortening system. We first investigate the creators of over 600,000 Bitly
short URLs to characterize short URL spammers. We then analyze the click
7
traffic generated from various countries and referrers, and determine the top
click sources for spam and non-spam short URLs. Our results show that the
majority of the clicks are from direct sources and that the spammers utilize
popular websites to attract more attention by cross-posting the links. We then
use the click traffic data to classify the short URLs into spam vs. non-spam
and compare the performance of the selected classifiers on the dataset. We de-
termine that the Random Tree algorithm achieves the best performance with
an accuracy of 90.81% and an F-measure value of 0.913.
• Chapter VI: BEAN: a BEhavior ANalysis approach of URL spam
filtering in Twitter - Social websites, like Twitter and Facebook, strive to
detect and remove URL spam in order to keep their users happy and coming
back. Although researchers have already proposed many filtering approaches
such as SpamRank and TrustRank, most of which detect URL spam using con-
tent analysis on the Web pages behind or link analysis on Web graph, it is
challenging to automatically detect URL spam in social media as spammers
keep evolving and advancing their techniques, such as cloaking based on the
IP addresses, using multiple user accounts and redirectors. In this chapter, we
introduce BEAN, a behavior analysis technique, which detects URL spam by
capturing the anomalous message sending behaviors of spammers. Twitter is
an ideal place for our analysis due to its popularity and real-time properties.
We collect over 2.4 million tweets from around a million users based on Twitter
trending topics for 4 months. We apply our behavior analysis approach derived
from a Markov Chain model to the Twitter dataset, and achieve a precision of
0.91 and recall of 0.88. In doing so we detected a lot of URL spam that cannot
be filtered out by conventional approaches such as SVM and TrustRank, indi-
cating that our approach is a good complement to existing URL spam detection
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techniques. Also, we further investigate anomalous behavior patterns of spam-
mers in spreading URL spam to confirm our assumption.
• Chapter VII: Information Diffusion Analysis of Rumor Dynamics over
a Social-interaction based Model - Rumors may potentially cause undesir-
able effect such as the widespread panic in the general public. Especially, with
the unprecedented growth of different types of social and enterprise networks,
rumors could reach a larger audience than before. Many researchers have pro-
posed different approaches to analyze and detect rumors in social networks.
However, most of them either study on theoretical models without real data ex-
periments or use content-based analysis and limited information diffusion anal-
ysis without fully considering social interactions. In this chapter, we propose a
social interaction based model FAST by taking four major properties of social
interactions into account including familiarity, activeness, similarity, and trust-
worthiness. Also, we evaluate our model on real data from Sina Weibo (Twitter-
like social network in China), which contains around 200 million tweets and 14
million Weibo users. Based on our model, we create a new metrics Fractional
Directed Power Community Index(FD-PCI) derived from µ-PCI to identify the
influential spreaders in social networks. FD-PCI shows better performance than
conventional metrics such as K-core index and PageRank. Moreover, we find
influential features to detect rumors by comparison between rumor and real
news dynamics.
• Chapter VIII: Conclusion - In this chapter, we wrap up the dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
SPADE: A SOCIAL-SPAM ANALYTICS AND
DETECTION FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we will introduce a social spam analytics and detection framework
(SPADE) which can be used by any social network to detect spam. Generally, social
networking sites have their own spam detection mechanism and hire anti-spam per-
sonnel to develop and maintain the system. SPADE will help each social network to
avoid the cost and cooperate together in the battle of spam detection. Meanwhile,
SPADE will be able to identify a new type of spam automatically on all participat-
ing networks once the spam is detected on one network. Additionally, by using the
framework, new social networks can quickly protect their users from social spam.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the system. SPADE can be split into three main
components and we provide a brief explanation for each part here:
• Mapping and Assembly: we use mapping techniques to convert a social network
specific object into a framework-defined standard model for the object (e.g.,
profile model, message model, or web page model). If associated objects can be
fetched based on this object, it is assembled here;
• Pre-filtering: we use fast-path techniques (e.g., blacklists, hashing, and similar-
ity matching) to check incoming objects against known spam objects;
• Classification: we use supervised machine learning techniques to classify the
incoming object and associated objects. In the final labeling decision (spam or
non-spam), we could use different combination strategies such as AND, OR, ma-
jority voting or Bayesian model to aggregate the classification results according
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Figure 2: Overview of the spam detection framework
to certain system requirements.
More concretely, we make the following contributions in details:
• Build a social-spam detection framework to filter spam on multiple social net-
works. We illustrate the three main components of the system and experimen-
tally demonstrate the use of the system on data from Twitter, MySpace, and
the Webb Spam Corpus.
• Demonstrate cross social-corpora classification and measure the effectiveness.
Namely, we can build a classifier for a particular model on one social network
and apply it to another social network. After that, we approximate the accuracy
of this technique by using existing datasets.
• Demonstrate associative classification in which the results depend not only on
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the object being classified, but also on objects associated with it. For instance,
classification of a message object takes into account classification results of
the associated web page objects that may be linked inside the message. The
feasibility of this technique is measured as well.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce related work in
Section 2.1 and motivate the problem further in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides the
structure and implementation of the framework. Section 2.4 describes the experimen-
tal setup used to evaluate our framework and Section 2.5 presents our experimental
results. We conclude the chapter in Section 2.6.
2.1 Related Work
Most previous work on social spam has focused on spam prevention on a single so-
cial network (e.g., Facebook [76, 163], MySpace [99], Twitter [23]). A number of
techniques are employed in these papers including classification, user-report-based
filtering, behavioral analysis, and in some cases friend-graph analysis. But, more
researchers proposed social spam detection framework for social network sites using
various techniques [32,63,87,104]. Our work differs from them on efficient information
integration solution and cross-domain classification using the relationship between ob-
jects on social media. Although aspects of previous research have been incorporated
into our framework to improve results. For example the study by Webb et al. [193]
on automatically detect web spam using email spam on detecting Twitter spam using
web pages inspired us to classify incoming social spam by taking into account clas-
sification of associated content. And we also incorporated Web spam classification
methods used by Webb et al. [194] and social profile spam detection (as demonstrated
on MySpace) methods used by Irani et al. [99] in our framework [184, 185, 188]. A
large number of classifiers have been used in spam detection but choosing the right
classifier and the most efficient combination of them is still a problem. Previous work
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by Byungki et al. [35] proposes a Bayesian framework, which is theoretical efficient
and practically reasonable method of combination, when investigating the integration
of text and image classifiers.
Web spam detection has been over-studied by lots of researchers(see a survey
in [161, 186, 189]). All existing algorithms can be categorized into three categories
based on the type of information they use: content-based methods [64–66,144], link-
based methods [20], and methods based on non-traditional data such as user be-
havior [127], clicks [153], HTTP sessions [194, 196]. Also, some URL spam filtering
technique for social media has been proposed by Kurt Thomas et al. [173] to better
address different web services such as social networks. They presented a real-time
URL spam filtering system named Monarch and demonstrated a modest deployment
of this system on cloud infrastructure and its scalability.
Text classification (also known as text categorization, or topic spotting) is to au-
tomatically sorting a set of documents into classes (or categories, or topics) from pre-
defined set [160]. It has attracted a booming interest from researchers in information
retrieval and machine learning areas in decades. Recently, several novel classification
approaches are proposed and implemented in cross-domain text classification. Pu
Wang et al. [191] presented semantics-based algorithm for cross-domain text classifi-
cation using Wikipedia based on co-clustering classification algorithm. Elisabeth Lex
et al. [123] described a novel and efficient centroid-based algorithm Class-Feature-
Centroid Classifier(CFC) for cross-domain classification of web-logs, also they have
discussed the trade-off between complexity and accuracy. Pan et al. [145] proposed
a spectral feature alignment (SFA) algorithm to align domain-specific words from
different domains into unified clusters, with the help of domain independent words
as a bridge. Zhen et al. [208] propose a two-stage algorithm which is based on semi-
supervised classification to address the different distribution problem in cross-domain
classification. Also, another perspective is relational classification [100,138,212] used
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in text classification, which could boost the overall performance greatly.
2.2 Motivation
As social networks rise as an important communication platform [198], spammers have
increasingly targeted social networks with spam. Social spam is spam directed at users
of Internet social networking services such as MySpace, FaceBook or Twitter. One
major form of social spam is profile spam which contains sexual words or attractive
images in their profiles. Meanwhile, updates among friends in social networks, such as
comments,feeds,messages, and friend requests,all may be used to spread spam. Also,
users of social networking services can send notes, that may include embedded links
to other social network locations or even outside sites, to one another [99].
Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and other major social networks have their own
anti-spam team to fight spam on their network [118]. Most of them are employing
techniques such as user-report-based filtering (where users report objects that are
spammy) and behavioral analysis (where logs of interactions are used to detect spam-
ming patterns). Such dynamic methods may be eventually able to detect social spam
with requiring a non-trivial amount of lag time to accumulate sufficient evidence.
In addition, social networks will also employ classification based techniques which
use labeled training data to find similar occurrences of spam on the social network.
Due to the evolving nature of spam and changing on-line environment [98, 149, 156],
these classification based techniques need to be retrained and adapted to newer
spam [150].
Although techniques to propagate spam may vary from one social network to
another, anecdotal evidence suggests that spam generally fall into the category of
pharmaceutical, pornographic, phishing, stocks, and business promotion campaigns
due to specificities of each social network. Bot-nets have already been shown to
use templates to send varying spam campaigns messages (similar to the campaigns
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previously mentioned) [110] to different targets. It is only a matter of time before
bot-nets and spammers also employ such techniques with approaches to distribute a
legitimate message across multiple social networks already implemented in [94,174],
To address heterogeneity issue of spam, we propose a social spam detection frame-
work – SPADE that uses general models for profile, message, and web page objects
to perform classification across social networks. Also we use misclassification or feed-
back via other methods to update the classification models which apply across social
networks. This will allow new types of spam detected on one social network to be
detected across social networks, and also reduce the burden of the social network
spam teams for keeping the classifiers up to date. Furthermore, new social networks
which do not have any spam detection solutions can use the SPADE to protect their
users from spammers immediately .
2.3 Social-Spam Analytics and Detection Framework
In this section, we present the SPADE and the three main parts in the following
subsections. An overview of the framework is shown in Figure 2.
2.3.1 Mapping and Assembly
For the objects within the social network, we have to create a standard model to
build a framework that is social network agnostic. A model of an object as a schema
includes the most common attributes of the object across social networks. Once
a model is defined, we need to map incoming objects from the social network into
objects of the model. We discuss both these steps in more detail below.
2.3.1.1 Models
In the SPADE, we define three basic models: profile model, message model, and web
page model, which represent the most important objects in social networks. Other
models are omitted as they are not required to demonstrate the feasibility of the
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framework.
The profile model has 74 attributes, which are derived from the Google Open
Social Person API [74]. Those attributes cover attributes most commonly used in
user profiles across websites like Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and Flickr.
The message model has 15 attributes based on common attributes used in mes-
sages – such as “To”, “From”, “Time-stamp”, “Subject”, and “Content”. We also
add a few attributes which would be common across social-network messages and
e-mail messages, such as, “Sender-IP”, and other header attributes.
The web page model has attributes based on common HTTP session header infor-
mation (see work done by Steve et al. [196]) and content. For instance, “Connection”,
“Server” and “Status” et al. are common features in HTTP session header. For the
content of web pages, we extract visible text (after striping out HTML tags) that will
be used on text classification.
A model is akin to a class, and an object is an instance of the model. For the
purpose of extensibility and scalability, all models are stored in XML.
Data Types: An attribute can be one of four types: Numerical, String, Categor-
ical (Nominal), and Date namely. These types are standard attribute types found in















After the definition of models, we use mapping process to transform incoming social
network objects into the respective object model in the framework. In this mapping
process, it automatically provides to the SPADE a list of incoming attributes and
their attributes in the respective model. Due to easy updatability and simplicity, the
mapping relationships are specified in an XML file.
It is easy to handle the name mappings and also straight-forward for type map-
pings except in illegal cases that we disallow such as “Date” to “Categorical”. An
example of name mappings is shown in Table 1 (shown in table format for simplicity).
For some data types such as categorical type, we need to specify the mapping for each
value in the domain of the data type. While for semantic mapping, we handle it using
manual code written within a special XML tag to perform the necessary conversion.
Table 1: The name mapping between Twitter profiles and our profile model. Empty
mappings are omitted








As we obtained uniform models from the mapping process, assembly is the next
process which probes each model object for associated objects and then subsequently
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fetches those model objects. For instance, when we are dealing with a message object,
if the content contains URLs, we fetch the web pages associated with those URLs and
create web page objects which are then assembled together with the message object.
As it can provide a rich source of information for the further stages, this additional
information is often critical for spam detection .
2.3.2 Pre-filtering
To reduce classification cost, we adopt fast-path techniques to quickly filter out pre-
vious classified or similar spam in incoming social network objects. Some of these
techniques are listed as follows:
• Blacklists: lists of entries, such as URL, DNS, and IP address, which are to be
immediately rejected due to prior spamming or bad behavior.
• Similarity matching: Hashing and shingling can be used to quickly calculate
similarity against previous spammy entries. The number of previous spammy
entries can be limited to avoid high lookup costs.
These techniques may have shortcomings for their lag-time in detecting new spam,
but they significantly reduce classification cost.
2.3.3 Features
Based on the attributes of our models, we chose the common attributes as features in
classification. But the datasets from different domains may share different common
attributes. To preserve all the common information, we keep all attributes in the
models as features. If the dataset from certain social media doesn’t have a subset of
features, we will only use the common features to do the classification and predication.
For example, Twitter profile doesn’t have the attribute “age” and “sex” but it has
attribute “bio” then we will use the feature “AboutMe” which is shared by Twitter
and MySpace datasets in classification.
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Meanwhile, we adopt bag of words model to generate word features for textual
attributes of each model. Bag of words model takes each word as features and use the
appearance of the words in document as value of corresponding features. For instance,
we apply bag of words model to the content of web page which may generate hundreds
of word features. Considering performance and accuracy of classification, we reduce
the size of feature set by adding constrains such as frequency of word features and
remove the stop words such “the”, “a”, and “an”.
2.3.4 Classification
For each model, we build one classifier using over 40 different types of supervised ma-
chine learning algorithms implemented in the Weka 1 software package [84], including
standard algorithms such as Näıve Bayes [157], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [60]
and LogitBoost [36,68].
We retrieve associated objects for incoming objects to be classified in the Assembly
stage (see Section 2.3.1.3). Thus, it will involve the classification of different objects.
This process is illustrated in Figure 3. For instance, a profile is passed to the profile
classifier for classification followed by associated messages being passed to message
classifier to do the classification. If the message object contains a URL (such as a
Tweet), then the associated object will be a web page object which will be passed
to the web page classifier. We apply combination strategies to the results of the
classifiers after obtaining all results.
After the classifier for each model involved returns a decision, it is passed on to the
combiner. We have four different combination strategies available for us to adopt in
our framework: AND strategy, OR strategy, Majority voting strategy, and Bayesian
model strategy.
1Weka is an open source collection of machine learning algorithms that has become a standard
tool in the machine learning community.
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Figure 3: Using associated objects to assist in classification.
• AND strategy classifies an object as spam if all classifier, for each model, clas-
sifies it as spam.
• OR strategy classifies an object as spam if any classifier, for each model, classifies
it as spam.
• Majority voting strategy classifies the object as spam only when majority of
classifier, for each model, classifies it as spam.
• Bayesian model strategy is a slightly modified version of a strategy from previous
research on creating an anti-spam filter combination framework for text-and-
image emails [35].
Bayesian model strategy may need more details to explain. We use a subscript i
to distinguish different models and t to denote incremental learning cycles at time t.
Suppose we receive a object x and ω is the class associated with x, either being spam
or legitimate. Then, assuming a hidden variable Z for an event to select one model, a
probability for a class ω given x, P (ω|x), can be expressed as a marginal probability




P (ω, Zi|x) =
∑
i
P (ω|Zi, x)P (Zi|x) . (1)
Here, we use external knowledge P (Zi|x) to express each classifier’s confidence
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given x. For instance, if a certain classifier model becomes unavailable, the corre-
sponding P (Zi|x) will be zero. Also one could assign a large probability for the
corresponding P (Zi|x) if one classifier dominates over other classifiers. Most data
types are supported directly by the classifiers we use, except for the String data type.
Using bag of words model, we convert the string into a list of boolean attributes
(where each boolean attribute represents the presence or absence of a word) through
stemming and removing stop words. Before classification, we represent each object
(or model instance) as a attribute vector f of n attributes: 〈f1, f2, ..., fn〉. All of
attributes are boolean; hence, if fi = 1, the attribute is present in a given object;
otherwise, the attribute is absent in a given object.
2.4 Experimental Plan
In this section, we first discuss the datasets used to demonstrate our framework,
followed by the implementation of our framework, and finally detail our evaluation
plan.
2.4.1 Datasets
The datasets contain raw profiles or messages from the social networks. And later we
parse them into their respective XML objects which are submitted to the SPADE.
We use these datasets as sample input to perform experiments and measure the
performance of the SPADE.
MySpace Profile Dataset: It is a previously collected sample of over 1.8 million
MySpace profiles [40] from June to September 2006. Besides, approximately 1,500
spam MySpace profiles were also gathered from a previous study [195] on honey-pots
in MySpace collected in late 2007. We summarize the strategies used to collect the
MySpace profiles as follows:
• Legitimate Top 8 Crawl: the top 8 most popular friends were crawled in a breath
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first search manner starting with a seed list of random (legitimate) profiles,
which resulted in a collection of over 890,000 connected profiles.
• Random Crawl: profiles were crawled by generating random UserId’s and re-
trieving the profile represented by that user, which resulted in a collection of
over 960,000 profiles.
• Honey-pot Spam: Social honey-pot accounts were configured across the U.S. and
were used to crawl profiles that initiated contact with them and were identified
as spam accounts.
Twitter Profile, Message, and Web Page Datasets: Irani et al. [99] collected
over 900,000 Twitter users, over 2.4 million Tweets and fetched any links in the
Tweets. Twitter users are represented in the profile model, Tweets can be represented
in the message model, and web pages associated with the links in the web page model.
These tweets were gathered by querying the top trending topics every minute and
represent a over 600 topics over a span of November 2009 to February 2010. Twitter
users and Tweets (messages) marked as suspended or removed due to Twitter terms
of service violations were marked as spam and there were over 26,000 Twitter such
users and 138,000 such Tweets.
TREC Email Datasets: the TREC 2007 [181] corpus contains over 50,000
spam emails and over 25,000 legitimate emails. Spam messages in this dataset was
collected from various email honey-pots, with legitimate messages being donated by
various users. We include the use of emails in our social-spam detection study to have
additional data for the message model.
Webb Spam corpus and WebBase dataset: The Webb Spam corpus [193]
is a collection of nearly 350,000 spam web pages, crawled from spam links found in
email messages between November 2002 to January 2006. As there were no legitimate
pages in the Webb Spam Corpus, we augmented it with a dataset from the WebBase
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Web Page Repository [93]. We downloaded and used December 2005 crawl of the
WebBase corpus and used a stratified random sample of over 392,000 legitimate web
pages.
2.4.2 Experiment Implementation
2.4.2.1 Mapping and Assembly
In mapping process, we create a mapping file from attributes in the dataset to at-
tributes in the model for each of the datasets earlier presented. The assembly process
takes care of retrieving associated object models if required.
Specifically, mapping/assembling MySpace and Twitter (users) to the profile model
demonstrates the mapping and assembly in relation to the profile model. Map-
ping/assembling TREC and Twitter (tweets) to the message model demonstrates the
mapping and assembly in relation to the message model, whereas mapping/assembling
Twitter (web-pages linked in tweets) and Webb Spam Corpus/WebBase to the web
page model demonstrates the mapping and assembly in relation to the web page
model.
2.4.2.2 Pre-filtering
Due to the lack of historic blacklists to apply to our data and the likelihood that
using new blacklists on older data would skew the results, we do not use blacklists in
our experiments.
2.4.2.3 Features
We chose the most common features across different social media for each model as
examples. The common attributes are listed in Table 2. We could expand the feature
set to include social network related features such as number of friends/followers.
The framework is capable to embrace more features. For simplicity, we illustrate the
classification in our framework only based on textual attributes.
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Web page Model Content
From Table 2, the most common attributes are all textual attributes. Thus, we
need to convert them into word features using bag of words model. After that, we
select discriminative word features for classification.
Features Selection: The purpose of features selection is to remove noisy features
and select powerful features in terms of information gain. The measures we have
adopted in the process can be separated into two steps:
• The first step is to set up the frequency of token threshold for all features. For
example, if the times of one token appearing in all documents are fewer than
10 times, we will not consider it as a word feature in the classification.
• The second step is to filter out stop words using stop word list. For those popular
and semantically no-meaning words, we will not take them into account when
doing classification. For example, “a”, “and”, and “the”.
χ2 test: It is a statistical test which used to compare real data with data we
would expect to obtain according to a specific hypothesis. In a classification problem,
we generate predicted labels and compare them to real labeled data to obtain the
deviation between them. The value of χ2 test will tell us the significance of difference




(r − p)2/p (2)
That is, chi-square is the sum of the squared difference between real(r) and the
predicted(p) data(or the deviation, d), divided by the predicted data in all possible
categories.
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In our experiments, we use χ2 test to rank out the usefulness of each feature. Top
features ranked by χ2 test could tell us the trends/strongest features of spam objects
in different datasets.
2.4.2.4 Classification
Cross social-corpora classification and associative classification are the two core parts
of our detection framework SPADE. To evaluate the effectiveness of cross social-
corpora classification, we build a web page model classifier using the Webb Spam
Corpus and WebBase dataset, followed by classifying the web page part of Twitter
dataset. Next, for incoming objects, we retrieve their associated objects and use cross
social-corpora classification for each object model. For the profile classifier, we use
the MySpace profile dataset for training and evaluating the cross classifier on the
Twitter profile dataset. For the message classifier, the TREC 2007 dataset is used
for training and evaluating the cross classifier on the Twitter message dataset. We
then combine the results from web page model and message model classifications to
obtain the final predicted labels of message objects. Finally, the incoming profiles
classification labels are obtained by the combination of the labels of message model
and profile model classification.
We use classifiers implemented in the Weka software package [84]. Most data types
used in our models can be directly used by classifiers in Weka except for the String
data type. As previously mentioned, we use bag of words after using stemming and
removing stop words. The StringToWordVector filter performs this transformation for
us and includes applying the Snowball Stemming algorithm (variation of the Porter
stemmer) and removing a built-in list of stop words.
Once the object is in an amenable form, steps to build a classifier model include
re-sampling and classifier selection. When re-sampling, we use stratified random
sampling to balance the spam and legitimate classes in order to avoid any biases that
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may arise from imbalanced classes.
2.4.3 Evaluation
We use several criteria evaluate the classifiers’ performance, namely F1-Measure and
Accuracy. In our framework SPADE, F1-measure (also F1-score) is calculated based
on precision and recall. Before introducing the details of precision and recall, we
review the relationship between true positive, true negative, false positive, and false
positive which is shown in Table 3.




Positive True-Positive (TP) False-Negative (FN)
Negative False-Positive (FP) True-Negative (TN)
The definitions of precision(P), recall(R), F-measure(FM), and accuracy(A) for
classification are based on above terms, and are given by the following formulas.
P =
TP









(TP + TN + FP + FN)
(4)
Precision is obtained by the number of true positives divided by the sum of true
positives and false positives. Recall is obtained by the number of true positives divided
by the sum of true positives and false negatives. F1-measure is the Harmonic mean
of precision and recall (traditionally F-measure is represented in terms of precision
and recall). Accuracy represents the number of instances correctly classified and is




In this section, we present the results of the two core parts of our detection framework,
namely the cross social-copora classification and associative classification.
2.5.1 Baseline
Before the details of two main classifications, we first introduce baseline for compar-
ison purpose. The baseline here is single domain classification. In the classification,
the feature sets are from our uniform models. Meanwhile, we applied 10-fold cross-
validation for all the classifications. For simplicity, we only use Näıve Bayes algorithm
in classification. For Twitter dataset, we listed the classification result in Table 4.
Table 4: The results of single domain classification using Naive Bayes
Classification Category TP FP F-Measure Acc.
Twitter Web Page 61.5% 24.56% 0.6611 68.47%
Twitter Message 60.83% 23.01% 0.6618 68.91%
Twitter Profile 89.54% 57.90% 0.7237 65.16%
Table 4 shows the results of classification on dataset from Twitter domain. We also
show the precision and recall for each model in Figure 4. Twitter profile classification
shows high recall but low precision.Precision and recall of Twitter web page and
message classification are very close but the overall performance is lower than we
expected.
Figure 4: Precision and Recall in Twitter single domain classification
The results are not promising due to a number of factors. In the following sections,
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we will use cross social-corpora classification and associative classification to perform
classification and compare them with the baseline. Also, we will discuss the reasons
for errors in classification.
2.5.2 Cross Social-Corpora Classification
During practical usage of our framework, we expect our classifier models to be built
using a number of social networks. Incoming objects from the same social network
or other social networks can then be classified using these models. We evaluate an
extreme case of this classification, where we build a classifier using one social-network
dataset and test the results using another dataset.
2.5.2.1 Classification Process
The purpose of cross-domain classification is to prove that spam information across
different domains is from common spam sources. We have three basic models and
datasets from several different social media so the process of classification is illustrated
in detail in the following. Meanwhile, for easy illustration, we have listed the process
of our classification experiments in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The process of cross social-corpora classification
For the web page model, we use the Webb Spam Corpus dataset combined with
the WebBase web pages dataset as training dataset. The Twitter web page dataset
is used as testing dataset.
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For the message model, we use TREC 2007 as training dataset and take Twitter
message dataset as testing dataset.
For the profile model, we use MySpace Profile dataset which contains both spam
profiles and legitimate profiles as training dataset and take Twitter profile dataset as
testing dataset.
In the process of classification, we compare different algorithms in Weka package
to see which algorithm can achieve best accuracy and performance. We also test
out whether the classifier model built using a dataset from one domain can test the
dataset from another domain. The performance of classification indicates the effect
of common spam sources. If the classification performs well, it implies that the
datasets from two different domains share common spam sources. The results of the
experiments are listed in the following sections.
2.5.2.2 Classification Experiments
We first show cross social-corpora classification based on web page model as the web
page model can be used in conjunction (via associated objects) with both profile
and message models in our framework. We will use the web page model classifier to
improve the accuracy of the other models.
To build (train) the web page model classifier, we use the Webb Spam Corpus
(spam web pages) and WebBase (legitimate web pages). We apply the classifier to
labeled web pages associated with Tweets from the Twitter dataset. These datasets
previously described in Section 2.4.1 consist of HTTP session headers and content
web pages.
Previous work [194] used HTTP session headers to detect spam for web pages, but
based on our datasets we found that HTTP session headers are not robust to tempo-




































Figure 6: Information gain values of 7,000 features for Webb Spam Corpus and
WebBase web pages
headers containing transitory features that become exiting due to the arms-race be-
tween spammers and spam-researchers [98, 149]. We therefore perform classification
on content of web pages for cross-corpora and cross-temporal datasets.
Figure 7: The performance metrics results for Webb Spam Corpus and WebBase web
pages classification
Using a bag of words approach on the content of web pages results in over 50,000
words (after stripping HTML tags, removing stop words, and removing words which
occur less than 10 times). As this attribute set is too large to use practically, we
explore the impact of feature set size and corpus sample size on the effectiveness of
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our classifiers. We vary the dataset size between 2,000 and 20,000, based on the
features with most information gain, and varied the corpus sample size similarly
in the range between 1000 and 10,000, with a unified random sample of spam and
legitimate instances to generate an equal class distribution (thereby minimizing the
class-specific learning biases). The size of total features in datasets influences the size
of feature set we choose. After performing this evaluation, we found the majority
of our classifiers consistently exhibited their best performance with 7,000 retained
features (information gain values shown in Figure 6) and a corpus sample size of
16,000 instances. The performance metrics of the most four effective classifier are
shown in Figure 7. We use these settings for the rest of our experiments involving
the web page model.






















Figure 8: Classifier performance results for Cross-corpus learning on web page model
Using the sample size and feature size above we evaluated the performance of 40
classifiers in Weka. The performance metrics for a sample of the four most effective
classifiers from our evaluation are shown in Figure 8. We can see that all of our
classifiers preformed adequately, with Näıve Bayes performing the best overall in
terms of average accuracy (Table 5 shows the confusion matrix that resulted from the
Näıve Bayes classification choosing 7000 features).
We also ranked the Top 10 positive and negative attributes by χ2 Test shown in
Figure 9 — positive attributes are those words which appear more in legitimate web
pages than spam web pages. Negative attributes are those words which appear more
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Table 5: The confusion matrix in results of Näıve Bayes classifier
Predicted Legitimate Predicted Spam
True Legitimate 3286 1714
True Spam 830 4170
Figure 9: Top 10 positive and negative attributes for Webb Spam Corpus and Web-
Base.
in web spam than legitimate web pages.
2.5.2.3 Result Analysis
To investigate the misclassification, we manually reviewed the 1,714 misclassified
legitimate web pages from Twitter and put them into several categories based on
their content (shown in Table 6). Non-text category mainly were web pages primarily
consisting of pictures, flash, video, audio, radio, TV, and other types, which usually
contain very little visible text content. Foreign language category is misclassified due
to unrecognized words, such as web pages in Japanese, Germany, and Chinese. Short
text category mostly is from the messages or comments in social network (e.g. Twitter
messages the length of which is under 140 characters). Comments list category is
represented by web page which contains a list of comments following an object in
social network like an article or blog. Download links category includes web pages
which link to file downloads. Search engine category contain index pages for search
engines like Google or Bing. Shopping/advertisement sites category contains pages
which are filled with many descriptions and pictures of products.
The classification of these types of web pages can be fixed by white-listing the
some legitimate sites. The white-list is from WebBase project and contains about
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Table 6: The Categories of Misclassified Legitimate Web Pages
Categories Amount Ratio
Non-text 543 32.7%
Foreign language 366 21.4%
Short text 188 11%
Comments list 51 3%
Download links 137 8%
Search engine 57 3.3%
Shopping/advertisement sites 17 1%
Unidentified 355 20.7%
6,300 domain names. After white-listing these sites, we obtained better results using
Näıve Bayes classifier. The F-Measure and accuracy achieved 0.9244 and 91.27%
respectively.




True Legitimate 2890 121
True Spam 561 4242
Table 8: The performance metrics in results of Näıve Bayes Classifier after white-
listing legitimate sites
Algorithm Name TP FP F-Measure Acc.
Näıve Bayes 88.32% 4.02% 0.9244 91.27%
We performed the same cross social-corpora experiments above on message model.
We used the TREC email corpus to build the message model classifier and the Twit-
ter message dataset for testing. Through similar setup as web page cross-domain
classification, we obtain the results (shown in Table 9) using Näıve Bayes algorithm.
The results achieved were not as good as those achieved with the web page model.
The accuracy and F-measure are both showing that the classification contains lots
of errors. After further investigation, we found the reasons as follows. Firstly, Twit-
ter messages have a limit of 140 characters and are very short. In addition, a large
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number of messages contain short-hand, abbreviated words, or contain URLs, which
reduce the amount of content available for classification. For TREC data, the length
of most email messages is longer than 140 characters and the lexicon is vastly dif-
ferent from Twitter’s. To address the short-form and abbreviation issues in Twitter
message dataset, we use lexicon normalization technique [86] to process the dataset
firstly. The basic idea is to replace those popular short-form and abbreviation words
with normal words in our dictionary. Then, we compare top 20 word features of two
datasets based on information gain.
Table 9: The results of message and profile cross-domain classification using Naive
Bayes
Classification Category TP FP F-Measure Acc.
Message 39.11% 3.7% 0.5164 66.18%
Profile 56.76% 22.46% 0.6334 67.15%
Table 10 shows the top 20 word features of two datasets based on information
gain. It shows that two datasets have different top 20 word features sets. Therefore,
if we use TREC data to test Twitter message data based on text content, a lot of
Twitter messages may be misclassified.
Table 10: Top 20 word features for Twitter message data and TREC data
Rank TREC Twitter Rank TREC Twitter
1 org episode 11 statistics ties
2 list season 12 math history
3 mail watch 13 minimum justin
4 wrote pilot 14 reproduct bieber
5 listinfo fool 15 project children
6 code tube 16 ethanks saves
7 mailman rt 17 unsubscrib jumped
8 comment enemy 18 check voices
9 post turning 19 guide lost
10 read point 20 provide funny
Another cross-corpora experiment we performed was using the user profile model.
We use the MySpace corpus for building the user profile model classifier and the
34
Twitter user dataset for testing. Still we used Näıve Bayes algorithm and the same
setup in profile cross-domain classification. We find that the results that shown in
Table 9 are not good as previous achieved for web page classification.
After investigating the difference between MySpace and Twitter profile. we found
that each Twitter profile only has five attributes: “Picture”, “Name”, “Location”,
“Web”, and “Bio”, whereas a MySpace profile has 11 attributes. We compared the
spam and legitimate profiles on Twitter, expecting that spam profiles would use
“Web” URLs and “Bio”s to propagate spam URLs (based on an observation made
in a previous study [40]), but we find the percentage of empty values in “Web” URL
and “Bio” attributes for spam profile is higher than the percentage of empty values in
legitimate profiles. Meanwhile, the length of “Bio” attribute on Twitter also contains
a small amount content due to a limit of 160 characters (enforced by Twitter). These
reasons all result in performance not being as good as when training using MySpace
profiles to test Twitter profiles.
Table 11: Statistics on “Web” and “Bio” fields in Twitter profile
Web and Bio Total Percentage
(not empty)
Total Profiles 536291 938190 57.16%
Spam Profiles 4675 26818 17.43%
Cross-domain classification proves that web page classification has good results in
our case. Our error analysis shows that the major reason of poor results for message
and profile datasets is different lexicons and special format. Thus, cross-domain
classification is limited by common parts among multiple social networks. Some
of the challenges faced with cross-temporal and cross-dataset issues can be helped
by using the associative classification component of our framework to deal with the
issues. In the following section, we introduce the associative classification.
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2.5.3 Associative classification
Associative classification takes advantage of models that may be associated with
a model being classified. Previous studies have shown that the integration of di-
verse spam filtering techniques can greatly improve the accuracy of classification [35].
Spammers are typically interested in advertising, which is usually done via links
to websites hosting the spam. Thus, spammers usually post URLs whereas non-
spammers post messages or status updates without URLs. To take advantage of the
web page model, we use the associated URL information from our message model
and profile model.
2.5.3.1 Classification Process
For easy illustration, we listed the process of our classification experiments in Fig-
ure 10. To simplify the experiments, we use OR combination strategy in “Result
combination I” and “Result combination II” which means the entry will be labeled
as spam whenever one classification shows positive result.
Figure 10: The process of associative classification
Taking the message model, as an example, the classification process works as
follows. If a new message arrives with a URL in it, we extract the URL and fetch
the associated web page content. Using the web page model classifier, we can then
classify the web page and use the result to assist in making a determination of the
classification of the message — combination strategies for different classifier results
have been described in Section 2.3.4.
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For messages which do not contain URLs, we classify them using the message
model classifier. Previous research has achieved accurate classification results using
content attributes and user behavior attributes [39, 82]. Under our data constraints,
we only perform classification based on the content of messages.
For profile classification, we also combine the results from message classification
and non-message profile text classification. The combination strategy is straightfor-
ward: The results from message classification are processed to use in threshold system
for identifying profile spam. After finishing all the classification, we sum the results
and obtain the final decisions whether the user profile is spam or not.
2.5.3.2 Classification Experiments
We demonstrate associative classification using the profile model as an example. We
randomly choose 3,000 spam and legitimate Twitter profiles, also retrieving the asso-
ciated messages. For messages, if they have an associated URL, we retrieve it using
our crawler. Finally, we obtain all objects needed to help us in the profile classifica-
tion. This amounts to 6,000 profiles, 28,841 messages, and 43,905 URLs (of which
17,211 are non-redirection). Using the WebbSpam corpus and WebBase corpus, the
F-measure and accuracy of our associative classifier is 0.90 and 91% respectively.
Table 12: The results of web page model using Näıve Bayes Classifier
Algorithm Name TP FP F-Measure Acc.
Näıve Bayes 94.43% 15.42% 0.9000 90.98%
The result is shown in Table 12. We once again manually checked the misclas-
sification and find they fall into similar categories as previously described. Some
web pages contain sparse text or mainly non-text content and some are in foreign
languages. The results of Twitter messages classification also have two parts: one
is for messages which contain URLs, in which we use the content of the messages
as well as web page model classifier to help us predict the final classification label
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for the message. The other is for messages which do not contain any URLs, we use
the content only to do the classification. We use the TREC 2007 corpus to train the
message model (the training of the web page model has been previously described).
Combining results from both classifiers, we obtain the final results of Twitter message
classification for which F-measure value is 0.8955 and the accuracy achieved is 89.31%
shown in Table 13.
Table 13: The results of message classification
Classification Category TP FP F-Measure Acc.
Non-URL message 69.96% 9.59% 0.7792 86.84%
Combined result 90.68% 11.84% 0.8955 89.31%
Using the above to obtain the results of messages associated with profiles, we
perform threshold-based classification of Twitter profiles (akin to reputation systems).
We apply threshold-based classification and vary the threshold between 1 and 10,
depending on how many messages have been sent by users. We choose the threshold
1 to obtain the largest spam profiles for our dataset, although this also leads to
the largest number of false-positives. The results of which are shown in Figure 11.
One of the possible reasons for errors is that some spam profiles may have not been




































Figure 11: Using messages to identify spam profiles
suspended at the time we collected data (thus leading to the labels on the profiles
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being legitimate instead of spam). Another reason is that for the Twitter dataset,
there are some profiles which do not have any messages associated with them.
2.5.3.3 Result Analysis
Finally, we combined the results from text classification for profiles and message
classification. From Table 14, we see the F-measure value is 0.8725 and the accuracy
achieved by the profile classifier is 86.42%.
Table 14: Results of profile classification
Classification Category TP FP F-Measure Acc.
Message associated profile 86.82% 0.80% 0.9255 93.16%
Non-message associated profile 98.53% 39.53% 0.8278 79.94%
Combined result 92.93% 20.10% 0.8725 86.42%
The FP Rate in the final result of profile classification is higher than 20%. The
majority of error classification is from the error classification of text classification.
If we look at the associative learning using message to obtain spam profiles, the FP
rate will be less than 0.9%. While the underlying reason for high FP rate for text
classification is that user profiles don’t contain much textual content, it would not be
able to avoid the noises in the textual features of dataset for our classifiers. However,
our associative classification shows its capability of improving the accuracy by 7%
and FP rate by about 20%.
2.5.4 System Performance Evaluation
In this section, we use two metrics to measure the system performance of our frame-
work: one is latency and the other is throughput. Here, latency means the time
interval to process all the requests. Throughput means the number of items being
processed in a period of time. The hardware setup is shown in Table 15.
Social networks generate huge amount of new information(e.g. Twitter generates
about 5000 messages per second) over time. They have back-end data centers and
high-speed network infrastructure to support. But we have limited resources so that
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Table 15: Hardware setup of system performance experiments
Model Dell PowerEdge R610
CPU Six-core Intel Xeon processors 5500 and 5600 series
Memory 96 GB
Storage 1TB
we only can simulate the real-time scenarios proportionally. In the experiments, we
use web page model as example, in which the dataset contains around 1 million web
pages. By adjusting the workload (number of web pages), we have obtained the result
of system performance evaluation shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Result of system performance evaluation
Figure 12 shows that system throughput increases as the increasing of workload
until it achieves the bottleneck. The bottleneck of throughput is around 60 web pages
per second. The latency also increases as the increasing of workload, which shows
linear increasing trend. Since our system performance heavily relies on the hardware
setup of the experiments, we will need more computation resources to overcome the
bottleneck.
With enough computation resources, we will adopt existing approaches of parallel
classification such as parallel implementation of classification algorithms based on
MapReduce [91] and parallel SVM algorithm based on MapReduce [128]. Those
approaches need the supports of MapReduce framework and system resources. Also,
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one active open source project named Apache Mahout, which is to build a scalable
machine learning library, is a good source of ideas for our framework and algorithm
design. The implementation of the parallel classification system will be considered as
future work.
2.5.5 Discussion
We measured the efficiency and feasibility of cross-domain classification and asso-
ciative classification in our experiments. It shows that combination of cross-domain
classification and associative classification could improve the overall performance of
the common objects in social networks. Also, we observed that cross-domain clas-
sification is not suitable for the objects which have few common parts while the
associative classification could boost the performance of other objects’ classification
by using the good result from web page cross-domain classification. Even that we
used very simple combination strategies such as majority voting and OR, the result is
still promising. For more details of comparisons among different combination strate-
gies, it is out of the scope of our work. Here, we will discuss more about data sharing
among multiple social networks, real-time deployment and adjustment to new spam
in our framework.
2.5.5.1 Data Sharing among Multiple Social Networks
First challenge for our framework is data sharing among multiple social network. One
possible concern is user privacy. Our framework only uses public information such as
messages sent out to the trending topics or public user profiles on social networks.
In addition, we will adopt data anonymization technique to preserve users’ privacy
by anonymizing their personal information such as name and user id. In this way,
privacy should not become a concern for our framework.
Also, another concern is the willingness of sharing data for social networks service
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providers. The anti-spam collaboration among multiple social networks will be ben-
eficial to all parties including the users on social networks. Under the condition that
preserving users’ privacy, they are likely to cooperate with each other. In addition,
we could propose a volunteer program that allows users to voluntarily share data to
our framework. But we have to admit that it will take time for social networks realize
the benefits of collaborative framework.
2.5.5.2 Real-time Deployment
The real-time deployment of our framework acquires cooperations from social net-
works. Besides this, we need three main steps to achieve it. The first step is to
launch our framework as a web service that provides data sharing APIs and spam no-
tification mechanism to social network providers. The second step is to create a data
storage center (e.g. data server) to hold all the incoming data from social networks.
The last step is to design efficient machine learning classification algorithms on big
data (e.g. using Mahout 2 from Hadoop framework). Meanwhile, we still need to do
more work to evaluate the system performance of our framework.
2.5.5.3 Adjustment to New Spam
New spam detected by our framework will be added into pre-filtering module for
filtering out similar spam in the future. Meanwhile, the framework will send the
feedback to participating social networks making them aware the new type of spam
and block it. Also, participating social networks may report some kind of spam from
users to our framework. We also will add them into the pre-filtering module so that
any similar or same type of spam will be filtered out quickly in our framework. In
the end, the pre-filtering module will build up a common spam pool for all existing
spam, which will greatly reduce the overall cost of spam detection.
2https://mahout.apache.org/
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2.5.6 Countermeasures for Spam Evolution
Spammers will likely not stop evolving and wait us to be caught. In addition to
building up the framework for all social media, we also established an anti-evolution
component in framework. In the following, we outlined the possible attacks from
spammers which may be applied to avoid our classification, followed by our counter-
measures dealing with attacks.
2.5.6.1 Possible Attacks from Spammers
One possible attack is to crack our cross-domain classification by propagating distinct
spam in different domains. Here, we consider every independent social medium as
one domain. The important assumption of our cross-domain classification is that
there exists common spam across domains. So if spammers know our strategy and
send different types of spam to different domains, then it will be difficult for us to do
cross-domain classification.
Another possible attack targets the associative classification by cut off or change
the relationship among different objects in social media. Spammers change the strat-
egy to put the spam URLs in pictures and videos instead of putting spam URLs in
message and profile. In this way, our classifiers will not be able to detect them unless
we discover those changes in advance and have corresponding detection techniques.
Third one camouflages spamming behaviors by stuffing legitimate objects. For
instance, spammers send normal messages using spam user account and insert legiti-
mate URLs in messages and profiles. All those legitimate objects in this case become
noise in dataset. How to ignore those noise and obtain high accuracy is the critical
part for us to address.
Here, we just list a few possible attacks which may established by spammers for
avoiding our detection. In fact, we cannot predict all possible attacks from spammers.
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2.5.6.2 Countermeasures
To deal with attacks from spammers mentioned above, we have the following coun-
termeasures:
For cross-domain classification, we will have a common spam pool which collects
all common spam so far. If spammer propagate different types of spam to different
domains, it will increase the cost of spamming and violate the purpose of spreading
spam in social media. After our framework is supported by enough social media, the
cost of attack one will overweight the benefit of avoiding detection since our common
spam pool will cover new types of spam from participating social media.
For associative classification, we will upgrade the relationships between objects in
our framework. A monitor will be setup for overseeing the performance of associative
classification. If there is abnormal decrease in result, an alarm will be launched. It still
require the expertise to check the new types of spam and may have some time delay
in detection. After identify new types of spam or new relationship, the framework
needs to add new relationship to classification. For example, if spammer put URL in
pictures, we need the technique to extract the URL from pictures and again use web
page model classification to identify the web spam. The new relationship should be
the picture is spam picture if the URL is spam URL.
For the camouflage attack, we will adopt multiple ways to detect spammers not
only by the content features of objects in social media. Temporal and spatial fea-
tures also will be used in spam analysis. For instance, the potential features could be
time interval of sending messages, the distance between message sender and message
retweeters (the distance could be defined as the number of users on the shortest path
between two users), and number of URL links or topics in messages. Those features
are selected based on some assumptions of spammers’ behaviors. For example, spam-
mers tend to use bots to automatically send messages in short period of time. Also
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spammers may create multiple accounts in spreading message with URL links to mul-
tiple topics. Many researchers also have proposed different approaches or systems to
address spam filtering using temporal and spatial features [88]. User behavior analy-
sis in social media is another focus of our framework. For behavior analysis, we could
use some common objects (e.g. URL link in message and profile) among objects in
social networks to detect collective spamming activities [119]. Those kinds of analysis
techniques are listed in our plan to improve our framework’s scalability. The details
of the implementation of those techniques is out of scope of this chapter.
2.6 Conclusion
The growth of social networks not only enables large-scale information sharing around
the world but also attracts large number of spammers spreading social spam. Tra-
ditional spam detection approaches such as user-report-based filtering and content-
based filtering are no longer efficient in distributed social media environment. The
goal of our framework SPADE is to detect spam on multiple social networks. In
this chapter, we introduced the definition of social spam and examples of user profile
spam, message spam, and web page spam accordingly. It enables people to better un-
derstand the current status of social spam and recognize the potential consequences
it may incur. Furthermore, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of
SPADE. It consists of three main components: Mapping and Assembly, Pre-filtering,
and Classification. Mapping and Assembly component is similar to ETL(extract,
transform, and load) tool which is to convert different input formats into uniformed
ones. Pre-filtering component is a dynamic technique integration part to speed up
filtering. Classification component is comprised of two major types: cross-domain
and associative classifications. Through the experiments, it shows that SPADE can
detect social spam on our basic models using several standard classifiers such as Näıve
Bayes with respect to high F-measure and accuracy. In possible attacks analysis, we
45
explained why SPADE can be applied to multiple social networks and be resilient
to evolution due to the spam arms-race. To overcome the limitation on the dataset,
the next step for us is to deploy and evaluate SPADE on live feeds from social net-
works. Meanwhile, we will take system performance such as throughput and latency
into account in evaluation. Also, future work will include integrating more detection
techniques such as behavior analysis of spammers to our framework.
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CHAPTER III
EVOLUTIONARY STUDY OF WEB SPAM
Web spam is defined as web pages that are created to manipulate search engines and
deceive web users [82, 83]. Email has long been the primary method to spread web
spam, although spammers are evolving with the times and quickly employing new
techniques to spread web spam. One clear trend is the move towards social media
due to the ease of sharing information providing more efficient and numerous channels
for the growth of web spam. For example, web spam links in friend requests, inbox
messages, and news feeds, are redirecting users to advertisement web sites or other
types of malicious web sites. Further, social media sites have redefined the way links
are shared with a tendency to share links using URL shortener [15].
Apart from evolution of web and applications on the web being one of the reasons
driving change in web spam, there is a constant evolution of spam as a reaction to
defensive techniques introduced by researchers [46, 193]. Improvements in defensive
techniques used in web spam are enabled by researchers having access to corpora of
web spam and being able to collaborate on developing and reporting results on web
spam filtering techniques.
Previous studies [193, 194, 196] have introduced and studied first large-scale web
spam corpus – Webb Spam Corpus 2006 through content and HTTP session analysis.
The Webb Spam Corpus 2006 [193] is a collection of nearly 350,000 spam web pages,
crawled from spam links found in email messages between November 2002 to January
2006. For legitimate web pages, the Standford WebBase project [162] provides topic
focused snapshots of Web sites, in which the resulting archives are available to the
public via fast download streams. After performing classification on those datasets,
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the experiments results demonstrated that good performance and high efficiency of
classification using HTTP session information.
In this chapter, we introduce the Webb Spam Corpus 2011, a new corpus of
approximately 330,000 spam web pages. We compare this corpus with the previous,
and first of its kind, web spam corpus [193] released in 2006. More concretely, we
make the following contributions:
First, we create a new large-scale Web spam corpus – Webb Spam Corpus 2011
– which is a collection of approximately 330,000 spam web pages. Web spam links
are extracted from spam email messages received between May 2010 to November
2010. Additionally, we also perform data cleansing to remove legitimate pages which
may have been inadvertently collected (similar to the data cleansing performed in the
prior Webb Spam Corpus by Webb et al. [196]).
Second, we analyze the Webb Spam Corpus 2011 from various perspectives. For
example, we evaluate the new corpus on three main aspects: redirections, HTTP
session information and content. Based on these aspects, we also make insightful
observations. For example, when investigating legitimate web link attack in data
cleansing, we found that social networks and search engines have become major tar-
gets of attacks.
Lastly, we studied the evolution of web spam by comparing Webb Spam Corpus
2011 with Webb Spam Corpus 2006. For redirections, Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has
less redirection. Specifically, it has less “302 Found” redirections and location redi-
rection but more iFrame redirections. The host names in redirection chains have new
category – social networks sites, which indicates that social media have been ma-
nipulated to spread Web spam through hosting profiles, like plug-ins, and widgets.
For HTTP session information, the percentages of hosting IP addresses for web spam
in the ranges of 63.* -69.* and 204.* -216.* have changed from 45.4% and 38.6% in
Webb Spam Corpus to 28.1% and 21.7% respectively. Additionally, we compared
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the top 10 HTTP headers in the datasets. In terms of content, there are few exact
content duplications between the datasets. We also compared the contents of the
datasets from other content aspects: most popular words, top words based on infor-
mation gain, and n-gram(n is from 2 to 3) sequences based on frequency. To evaluate
the classification performance and feature change over time, we also performed new
classification experiments on new dataset.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We motivate the problem
further in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces corpus including the data collection and
cleansing methods. Section 3.3 compares Webb Spam Corpus 2011 with Webb Spam
Corpus. Section 3.4 performs classification comparison on two datasets. We discuss
related work in Section 3.5 and conclude the chapter in Section 3.6.
3.1 Motivation
Web spam has received a lot of attention with search engines constantly adjusting
techniques to identify web spam [53] and social networks trying to prevent web spam
propagating through their networks [175]. With web links being one of the most
popular and easiest ways to share information on the web, web spam will remain a
problem.
One of the most common technique to fight web spam is using machine learning,
more specifically supervised learning techniques, to build classifiers for web spam
using headers, content, or link features. As a prerequisite to using such techniques
or researching new ones, having access to a large amount of labeled web spam is
important and thus we collect, cleanse, and release a corpus of web spam as an enabler
for researchers to improve and develop new web spam techniques. A standard corpus
released for any number of researchers to use, as is the case with our corpus, allows
and encourages collaboration between researchers to share and improve on each others
results.
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Although the release of the previous Webb Spam Corpus achieved this a number
of years ago, we found that web spam has changed significantly enough to warrant an
update to the Webb Spam Corpus. Namely, as detection techniques improve, spam-
mers evolve and introduce new techniques to avoid detection. A concrete example of
this is popular tools such as URL shortener (which reduce the length of a URL by
mapping an identifier on a standard web link to a long URL) were quickly picked-up
by spammers as a cheap method of obfuscation and redirection. Further, looking
back at the year of 2006, social networks such as Facebook do not exist or are in early
stage of startup or microblog sites such as Twitter. Thus, not only do we release the
Webb Spam Corpus 2011, with real-time data collection, we also provide an analysis
of evolution and major changes we have observed between the 2006 and 2011 version
of the Webb Spam Corpus.
3.2 Webb Spam Corpus 2011
In this section, we introduce the data collection method, as well as the data cleansing
process for the Webb Spam Corpus 2011.
3.2.1 Data Collection
3.2.1.1 Collection Method
We introduce the Webb Spam Corpus 2011 which is available for download for col-
laborative research investigation and reporting as an .arff file (Weka file format1) at
the Webb Spam Corpus’ home page—http://www.cc.gatech.edu/projects/doi/
WebbSpamCorpus.html. The two main parts involved in creating the Webb Spam
Corpus 2011 are data collection and data cleansing. These steps are detailed below
and a high-level overview of the process is provided in Figure 13.
1Weka: http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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Figure 13: Illustration of data collection and data cleansing process.
3.2.1.2 Source URL and Actual URL
We distinguish URL links into two groups: source URLs and actual URLs. Here,
source URLs are the original URLs extracted from email messages and are typically
what the end user will see in the email message. Actual URLs are the final URLs or
the URL of the web page that the user finally sees in their browsers. That is, this
is the final URL after all redirects (HTTP redirects, Javascript redirects, meta-tag
redirects, and more) have been followed. If a web page does not redirect a user, the
actual URL could be the same as the source URL. To clarify this, the relationship
between source URL and actual URL is shown in Figure 14:
Figure 14: The relationship between source URL and actual URL.
The relationship between source URL and actual URL has the following charac-
teristics:
a). One redirection chain leads from source URL to actual URL;
b). Many source URLs may redirect/map to a single actual URL;
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c). Source URLs which were successfully accessed without resulting in a redirect is
actual URL.
3.2.1.3 Source URL links
We start with a set of source URLs extracted from 6.3 million spam emails collected
between May 2010 to November 2010 to a moderately sized email service provider.
We only extract HTTP and HTTPS URLs (although HTTPS links make up only
0.2% of all the spam links we extracted), using Perl’s URI::Find::Schemeless and
Html::LinkExtor modules to extract URLs from text and HTML respectively. We
end up with 30.7 million web links (15.1 million unique links). Figure 15 shows the
distribution of URL links in months. We also investigate the top level domains in
source URLs and list top 10 TLDs in Table 16. “RU” is top level domain for Russian
Federation and “DE” is top level domain for Federal Republic of Germany. In this
study, we focus on English language web pages only, which are about 1.7 million web
pages (before cleansing) which were crawled in March 2011.
Figure 15: Distribution of source URL links in months.
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Table 16: List of Top Level Domains in Source URLs.











3.2.1.4 Web spam downloading
Once we have a set of source URLs, we proceed to download all the web pages. We
use a custom crawler written using Perl’s LWP::Parallel::UserAgent module to down-
load corresponding web pages. We then follow any iFrame-redirects, http-redirects,
Javascript redirects (using Mozilla’s Rhino), or meta-tag redirects. More details can
be found in [193] which uses similar techniques. We keep the raw headers and HTML
content of the page, and do not crawl or spider links from it. We downloaded a total
of 1.7 million pages (including redirections) and in-total collected over 1 GB of data.
3.2.2 Data Cleansing
Data cleansing on Webb Spam Corpus 2011 is split into two parts:
3.2.2.1 Removing False-positives
False-positives in corpus include legitimate URLs and error pages. Spammers often
include legitimate URLs in spam emails to avoid spam rules or to appear legiti-
mate [196]. Using Alexa’s top 500 site list2, we list top 10 legitimate actual URLs in
Webb Spam Corpus 2011 shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16 shows that 4 social networks websites (www.facebook.com, support.
2http://www.alexa.com/topsites
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Figure 16: Top 10 legitimate actual URLs in Webb Spam Corpus 2011.
twitter.com, www.in.com, and www.myspace.com), 5 search engines (groups.yahoo.
co.jp, explore.live.com, dogandcatanswers.yahoo.com, www.about.com, and
www.indeed.com), and 1 information portal (www.msn.com) are in the top 10 list. It
indicates that spammers are using popular social networks and search engines in legit-
imate URL attack. We removed 6, 175 legitimate actual URLs and 6, 494 legitimate
source URLs in this process.
Besides legitimate URL links in spam emails, the downloaded web pages also
contain other false-positives. Although these actual URLs may have been spam URLs,
due to the delay in setting up our downloading and cleansing system, the spam URLs
were crawled a few months after the source URLs were extracted. This resulted in a
number of 404 HTTP errors or custom served “404 error web pages”.
We eliminate such pages as well as previously mentioned false-positives leaving us
with 673, 489 spam web pages in the corpus.
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3.2.2.2 Removing Non-Textual Web Pages
Approximately 98% of web pages identify their “Content-type” as text/html. After
cleansing false-positives in corpus, we discard non text/html pages. By removing
non-textual web pages based on the attribute “Content-Type” in HTTP header in-
formation, we kept 673, 313 web pages including 342, 478 redirections.
3.2.3 Data Statistics
After finishing downloading all web pages, we investigate the distribution of top level
domains and HTTP status codes. The purpose is to find which top level domain hosts
the most web spam and the most common HTTP responses when we click through
those spam URL links.
Figure 17: Top 10 top level domains.
To obtain popular top level domains, we process the dataset in the following
steps. First, we collect all top level domains from IANA Data3, which contains 313
top level domains (last updated Jun 20, 2012 ). By matching all the source URLs in
downloaded files with the top level domains list, we aggregated the count of web pages
in the same top level domain. The 10 most popular top level domains are shown in
Figure 17. We see that the three most popular top level domains COM, ORG, and
3http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by-domain.txt
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Figure 18: Distribution of HTTP status codes.
NET almost represent more than 80% of the TLDs. Especially, the percentage of web
pages which are belonging to top level domain COM is over 60%.
For HTTP status codes, we aggregate all status codes based on the number of
web pages and list the distribution of status codes shown in Figure 18. It shows that
“200 OK” is the most common of status code in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 – over 70%.
Also other status codes which are primarily used in redirection, such as “302 Found”,
“301 Moved Permanently”, and “302 Moved Temporarily”, are quite popular.
3.3 Comparison between Two Datasets
We compare the Webb Spam Corpus 2011 with Webb Spam Corpus 2006 in three
dimensions: redirections, HTTP session information, and content.
3.3.1 Redirections
Redirections are normally used by spammers to camouflage the actual spam URL
links and avoid being blocked by URL blacklists. We look into redirections returned
by source URLs in the Webb Spam Corpus 2011 shown in Table 17.
To compare fairly with redirections in the Webb Spam Corpus 2006, we compute
the percentage of source URLs versus number of redirections shown in Figure 19. It
shows that Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has more source URLs returning no redirects
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Table 17: Number of redirects returned by source URLs.















(more source URLs which are also the actual URLs). The possible reasons are as
follows: a) spammers are using less redirections for camouflaging actual spam URLs;
b) Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has more URL links than Webb Spam Corpus 2006; c)
there may exist false positives in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 before data cleansing.
Figure 19: Comparison based on percentage of source URLs vs number of redirec-
tions.
We also aggregate source URLs based on the actual URLs they are mapping to
and generate the distribution of number of source URLs that point to the same actual
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URL shown in Figure 20. It shows similar trend as the distribution of the number of
source URLs that point to the same actual URL in Webb Spam Corpus 2006.
Figure 20: Distribution of the number of source URLs that point to the same actual
URL.
Redirections have different categories including HTTP redirect, frame redirect,
iFrame redirect, meta-refresh redirect and location redirect [196]. For HTTP redirect,
it also has some subcategories based on response status such as “301 Moved” HTTP
redirect and “302 Found” HTTP redirect. We compare the redirection distribution
of two datasets which is shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Comparison between redirection distributions of the two datasets.
58
Figure 21 shows HTTP redirect in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 still occupies the
majority of redirections, accounting for 41.7% of the redirections (25.6% for “Found”
redirects, 12.1% for “Moved Permanently” redirects, and 4.0% for other HTTP redi-
rects). HTML frame and HTML iFrame redirects account for 14.8% and 28.4%
respectively. Redirection using meta-refresh tags account for 15.0% and location
redirect accounts for less than 1% of all redirects.
We observe that Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has fewer “302 Found” redirections and
location redirection. But it has more iFrame redirections. Meanwhile, we found that
Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has other HTTP redirects which occupies 4% redirections.
The response status examples of other HTTP redirects includes: a) “302 Object
moved”; b) “302 Moved Temporarily”; c) “302 Redirect”.
Besides showing the distribution of redirections, we also look into the common host
names in redirection chains which will tell us what kinds of websites have been taken
advantage of by the spammers. The most common host names in redirection chains
including HTTP redirection, frame redirection, iFrame redirection, and meta-refresh
redirection are shown in Table 18.
From Table 18, we investigated all the host names and found that there are
three major categories: domain parking websites, social networks websites, and ad-
vertiser websites. For example, bodisparking.com and sedoparking.com are do-
main parking websites. facebook.com and in.com are social networks websites.
ad.doubleclick.net is advertiser websites. The first set of counts represent the
view of all of the HTTP, HTML, and JavaScript redirection techniques. This list
consists of 3 domain parking services, 1 advertiser, and 1 social networks. The top
5 HTTP redirect host names consist of 1 domain parking service, 3 advertisers and
1 social networks. The top 5 frame redirect host names consist of 3 domain parking
services, 2 advertisers. The top 5 iFrame redirect host names consist of 1 domain
parking services, 3 advertisers, and 1 social networks. The top 5 meta refresh redirect
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Table 18: Most common host names in redirection chains.



































host names consist of 3 domain parking services, 1 advertiser, and 1 social networks.
Domain parking for idle domains is used to display advertisements and earn money.
It is easy to understand that spammers are using these domains for monetary bene-
fit. Advertisers are similar to domain parking services on displaying advertisements
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which may not be useful for users . For social networks websites, we studied in detail
about Facebook URLs in Webb Spam Corpus 2011. We found that the majority of
redirections from Facebook belongs to iFrame redirection, meta-refresh redirection
and HTTP redirection. In iFrame redirection, there are three types of URL redi-
rections based on the sub path of URL links: “connect”, “plugins”, and “widgets”,
which accounts for 72.6%, 24.4%, and 3% respectively. Also the “connect” URL link
redirects users to the profiles hosted Facebook. In our dataset, 10,820 “connect”
URL link redirects to “t35.com” profile hosting in Facebook. “t35.com” is a domain
parking services website. For 3,655 “plugins” URL links, 3,379 of them are “like” box
plug-in and 140 of them are “activity” plugin. Normally, if you click on “like” box
plugin, you will become a fan of events, products, or profiles so that you will be kept
updated with news feeds and status changes. For “activity” plug-in, you will join
the activity if you click on it. “Widgets” URL links are similar to “plugins” URL
links. 444 “widgets” URL links provide “like” button for users to click. Therefore, we
can conclude that spammers are using the power of social networks to spread spam
information.
3.3.2 HTTP Session Information
Webb Spam Corpus 2011 also contains the HTTP session information that was ob-
tained from the servers that were hosting those pages. In this section, we compare
two datasets focusing on the most common server IP addresses and session header
values.
3.3.2.1 Hosting IP Addresses
Hosting IP address is the IP address that hosts a given web spam page. Figure 22
shows the distribution of all of the hosting IP addresses over network number in Webb
Spam Corpus 2011. Here network number is the first 8 bits of IPV4 address. Previous
study [196] said that the 63.* -69.* and 204.* -216.* IP address ranges account for
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45.4% and 38.6% of the hosting IP addresses respectively in Webb Spam Corpus.
While in Webb Spam Corpus 2011, the percentages of IP addresses in those two
ranges change to 28.1% and 21.7% respectively. Another two IP address ranges 70.*
-100.* and 170.* -203.* account for 21.3% and 14.0% of the hosting IP addresses
respectively in Webb Spam Corpus 2011.
Figure 22: Distribution of hosting IP address.
It implies that spammers are comprising more various hosting IP addresses to
spread web spam. The reason may be the IP blacklists used in popular anti-spam
filters which force spammers to use new IP addresses for hosting web spam. To
investigate most popular hosting IP addresses in Webb Spam Corpus 2011, we list
top 10 hosting IP addresses based on the count of web pages. Meanwhile, through
whois service, we obtain the server location and ISP (Internet service provider) for
every hosting IP address.
Table 19 shows 4 IP addresses from 63.* -69.*, 2 IP addresses from 204.* -216.*,
and 4 IP addresses from other ranges. Also, it shows that 4 IP addresses from US
servers, 2 IP addresses from France servers, and 4 IP addresses from other countries
(Australia, Korea, Netherlands, and Germany). We can see that all servers are le-
gitimate servers which does not mean those legitimate servers are the spammers. It
only means the web services provided by those servers are used by the spammers for
the spamming purpose.
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Table 19: Top 10 hosting IP addresses.
Hosting IP Address Count Server Location ISP
208.073.210.029 23,785 Los Angeles, CA USA Oversee.net
065.055.011.238 21,205 Redmond, WA USA Microsoft Hosting
213.186.033.019 17,543 France Ovh Systems
066.196.085.048 16,542 Sunnyvale, CA USA Inktomi Corporation
069.043.160.174 13,289 Beaumaris,Victoria In Australia Castle Access
066.045.237.214 10,834 Secaucus, NJ USA Interserver
222.122.053.065 9,090 Seoul, Republic of Korea Korea Telecom
217.016.006.170 9,073 France AB Connect
195.189.117.037 8,624 Nijmegen, Gelderland Bluedome Internet
in Netherlands Application Services BV
188.040.054.131 8,538 Germany Hetzner Online AG
3.3.2.2 HTTP Session Header
Previous study [194] has shown that HTTP session information is used for predict
web spam efficiently. As the evolution of web spam, we intend to see whether HTTP
session information of web spam has changed over time. To obtain most popular
HTTP session information, we rank out top 10 HTTP session headers based on the
count of web spam which those headers are associated with, shown in Table 20.
Table 20: Top 10 HTTP session headers.
Header Total Count Unique Count Most Popular Value (Count)
CONTENT-TYPE 379,721 120 text/html(147,428)
SERVER 369,985 919 Apache(82,004)
CONNECTION 359,786 5 close(312,186)
CONTENT-LENGTH 271,654 12,004 77(22,039)
X-POWERED-BY 148,944 191 ASP.NET(70,088)
CACHE-CONTROL 141,062 585 private(70,712)
SET-COOKIE 134,063 116,522 parkinglot=1;domain=.potentbusy.com;
path=/;(3931)
LINK 122,352 5,012 http://l.yimg.com/d/lib/yg/css/
dynamic_200602130000.css;rel=
“stylesheet”; type=“text/css” (15,446)
P3P 92,591 248 policyref=“http://www.dsnextgen.com/
w3c/p3p.xml”(24,180)
EXPIRES 90,915 7,668 Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT(25,641)
Compared with top 10 HTTP session headers, Table 20 shows some changes as
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follows: a). new header P3P appears in top 10 list and old header PRAGMA has
been removed from the list; b) the most popular values for the header SERVER and
CONTENT-LENGTH have changed from “microsoft-iis/6.0” to “Apache” and from
1, 470 to 77 respectively; c). the order of the header CONTENT-LENGTH moves
before X-POWERED-BY but the others keep the same relative order. Also, we find
that 79.1% of the web spam pages with a SERVER header were hosted by “Apache”
(60.5%) or “Microsoft IIS” (18.6%). In Webb Spam Corpus, 94.2% of the web spam
pages with a SERVER header were hosted by “Apache” (63.9%) or “Microsoft IIS”
(30.3%). Most popular value for the header CONTENT-LENGTH is not able to show
the trend of content length so we also obtain the distribution of content length shown
in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Distribution of content length.
Figure 23 shows the average value of content-length is between 1, 000 and 1, 0000
although the most popular value is 77 bytes. As more multimedia used in web spam,
the content length of web spam text gradually becomes shorter. Another thing we
also need to check is whether the content of web spam also evolve over time.
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3.3.3 Content
In this section, we compare two datasets on duplications and syntax changes between
them. For duplications, we try to find the overlap between them based on MD5 hash
values of content of web spam. For syntax changes, we intend to obtain the evolution
of web spam syntax by comparing information gain of words and n-gram phrases.
3.3.3.1 Duplications
We compute MD5 hashes on the content of HTML web pages when we crawl the
URL links. After evaluating these results, we find that there are 122, 618 unique
MD5 values in Webb Spam Corpus 2011. Thus, 247, 367 of the web spam pages
(66.9%) have the same HTML content as one of 122, 618 unique web spam pages.
The percentage of exact content duplicates is much higher than the percentage (42%)
in Webb Spam Corpus 2006 [193]. One possible reason is more URL duplications in
the Webb Spam Corpus 2011.
To check the duplications between the two datasets, we iteratively compared MD5
codes of every web spam in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 and Webb Spam Corpus. The
result of comparison is that 7, 257 web spam in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 are overlap
with 2, 834 web spam in Webb Spam Corpus 2006. The percentages of duplications
between two datasets are 2.0% and 1.3% in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 and Webb Spam
Corpus 2006 respectively. Therefore, there are very few exact content duplicates
existing between the two datasets.
3.3.3.2 Syntax Analysis
We analyze syntax of Webb Spam Corpus 2011 by computing the information gain of
words in the content of web pages. Information gain, which is also called Kullback-
Leibler divergence [111] in information theory, is calculated based on entropy as fol-
lows:
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IG(T, a) = H(T )−H(T |a) (5)
Here, T denotes a set of training examples and a presents the ath attribute of instance.
H(T ) is the entropy of T and H(T |a) is the conditional entropy of T with knowing
the value of a.
Figure 24: Top 20 most popular words in Webb Spam Corpus [2006/2011] vs. per-
centage of documents that contain them in two datasets.
Taking every web page as document, we adopt a bag of words model [122] to
generate document instances in binary features. First, we need to tokenize the docu-
ments. Tokenization is the process of splitting the document up into words, phrases,
symbols, or other meaningful elements called tokens. The features are the tokens in
all documents and the value of feature is false if the token appears in the document
or true if not.
For the words in web pages, we first list top 20 most popular words in Webb Spam
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Corpus and their appearance as a percentage of documents that contain them, shown
in Figure 24.
Figure 24 shows that some words in the top 20 list appear less than in Webb
Spam Corpus 2011 such as “free”, “web”, “home”, “search”, and “software”. Some
words appear more frequently than in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 such as “information”,
“online”, “internet” and “price”. It indicates the trend of spammy words and changes
over time.
Besides most popular words, we also look into the discriminative words which
distinguish two datasets. We ranked them by the value of their information gain ac-
cording to the formula and used different labels to mark the instances in two datasets.
The result of top 10 words based on information gain is shown in Figure 25.
Figure 25: Top 10 words based on information gain.
Figure 25 shows top 10 words based on information gain. We further found that
all words except “playlist” appear in Webb Spam Corpus 2006 while only four words
including “playlist” , “vault”, “cio”, and “advertisement” present in Webb Spam
Corpus 2011. Since we transformed all words into lower case format, words such
as “cio” and “itworld” should be “CIO” and “ITworld”. Word “playlist” normally
appears in multimedia section of social media. For example, user profile has the
embedded radio player which has a playlist for visitors.
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Table 21: Top 20 n-gram (n is from 2 to 3) sequences based on frequency in the two
datasets (first 20 rows for Webb Spam Corpus 2006).
2-gram Frequency 3-gram Frequency
of the 149,029 just a few 26,585
in the 88,505 〈N〉 x 〈N〉 26,488
V 〈N〉 77,254 is just a 26,016
to the 77,050 the links below 25,910
on the 72,948 links below to 25,834
〈N〉 A 71,207 for your favorite 25,801
v 〈N〉 66,725 a few clicks 25,799
X 〈N〉 64,701 the search box 25,750
a 〈N〉 63,490 the Web for 25,723
〈N〉 x 63,019 looking for is 25,705
〈N〉 D 60,603 to search the 25,689
B 〈N〉 59,164 search the Web 25,658
x 〈N〉 58,455 below to search 25,636
A 〈N〉 57,568 few clicks away 25,633
may be 57,522 Use the search 25,632
〈N〉 GB 56,328 search box above 25,632
〈N〉 a 55,437 above or the 25,625
Price 〈N〉 55,424 Whatever you re 25,623
〈N〉 B 55,153 or hte links 25,622
〈N〉 s 53,330 Web for your 25,619
of the 212,626 w 〈N〉 org 138,162
http www 169,180 http www w 126,770
w 〈N〉 140,524 www w 〈N〉 126,770
〈N〉 org 138,247 〈N〉 org 〈N〉 92,935
Price 〈N〉 127,091 org 〈N〉 〈N〉 91,219
www w 126,770 mg x 〈N〉 73,110
in the 126,273 〈N〉 mg x 73,110
USD 〈N〉 117,108 〈N〉 〈N〉 xmlenc 69,898
Related Searches 103,259 〈N〉 USD 〈N〉 63,904
Save 〈N〉 100,710 Found The doument 58,506
x 〈N〉 99,327 Found Found The 58,424
org 〈N〉 93,803 〈N〉 Found Found 58,424
Privacy Policy 93,328 You Save 〈N〉 58,127
to the 91,951 〈N〉 You Save 58,103
hair loss 77,774 Price 〈N〉 You 56,065
Internet Bellen 77,544 Admin Page Insights 54,726
〈N〉 mg 74,103 Retail Price 〈N〉 54,400
mg x 73,110 〈N〉 Retail Price 54,058
on the 71,891 Download Price 〈N〉 54,049
for the 70,177 Price 〈N〉 Retail 53,986
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Moreover, we compared n-gram (n is from 2 to 3) sequences in the two datasets.
After using Perl’s Text::Ngrams module4, we list top 20 n-gram (n is in the range of
from 2 to 3) in two datasets based on frequency shown in Table 21.
In Table 21, 〈N〉 denotes any number sequence. Also we have removed redirections
and the grams which only contain number sequences. Webb Spam Corpus 2011
has 22, 894, 416 2-gram sequences and 14, 223, 621 3-gram sequences, compared with
17, 049, 809 2-gram sequences and 6, 488, 343 3-gram sequences in Webb Spam Corpus
2006. Table 28 shows that there are more numeric sequences appearing in 2-gram
sequences in Webb Spam Corpus 2006 than in Webb Spam Corpus 2011. 3-gram
sequences in Webb Spam Corpus 2006 are more related to links and search while
those in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 are more related to price and money.
3.4 Classification Comparison
Previous research [194] shows that web page spam could be detected using HTTP
header information efficiently. To further investigate the difference between two
datasets, we compare them in terms of classification features and performance. Through
the comparison, we try to find out whether the HTTP header information features
still are discriminative and how well those classifiers perform on new dataset. To use
the results in previous research as control, we adopted similar feature selection and
experimental setup in our experiments.
3.4.1 Feature Generation and Selection
In our experiments, we adopt the traditional vector space model [158] (or ”bag of
words” model) to represent data in a consistent format. Also, this model has been
quite effective in previous information retrieval and machine learning research. In the
model, it uses a feature vector f of n features: < f1, f2, ..., fn > to represent each
4http://search.cpan.org/dist/Text-Ngrams/Ngrams.pm
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data instance. Since all of our features are Boolean, we obtain that the feature is
present in a given instance if fi = 1; otherwise, the feature is absent. Meanwhile,
we borrow three types of feature representations(phrases, n-grams, and tokens) from
previous research [194] for each unique HTTP information header value. The feature
generation process is: 1) we keep the header value as an uninterrupted phrase; 2) we
tokenize the header value using whitespace and punctuation characters as delimiters;
3) we perform n-gram(n is from 1 to 3) generation from the tokens; 4) we prepend
the header name to each of feature values. One example of feature representations is
illustrated in Table 22 [194].














The feature selection process is based on a well-know information theoretic mea-






p(f, c) · log p(f, c)
p(f) · p(c)
(6)
where fi is a feature in the feature vector, cj is one of the classes(i.e., spam
or legitimate), p(f) is the probability that f occurs in the training set, p(c) is the
probability that c occurs in the training set, and p(f, c) is the joint probability that
f and c occur in the training set [194].
Information Gain quantifies the predictive power of features. If feature has a
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higher Information Gain value, we say that it has more predictive power. We selected
and used the features which have the highest Information Gain scores to train the
classifiers.
3.4.2 Classifiers
We perform the classification using the various classifiers implemented in the Weka
software package [84]. Weka is an open source collection of machine learning algo-
rithms and has become the standard tool in the machine learning community. The
classifiers used in the our experiments include decision trees (e.g., C4.5, Random
Forest, etc.), rule generators (e.g, RIPPER, PART, etc.), logistic regression, radial
basis function (RBF) networks, HyperPipes, multilayer perceptions, K Star, SMO (an
algorithm for training a support vector classifier), Simple Logistic, and näıve bayes.
3.4.3 Classification Setup and Cross validation
We download legitimate web pages from the Standford WebBase project [162], which
categorizes its data based on crawling time. To avoid the time factor influence, we
only use the web interface provided by the project to fetch web pages on March
2011 the same crawling time as Webb Spam Corpus 2011. We requested 100,000
web pages and obtained about 53,000 legitimate web pages with HTTP status code
equals 200 (called WebBase 2011). In the classification, we randomly choose the same
amount of legitimate web pages as spam web pages to eliminate any prior probability
influence. Therefore, the training dataset used in our experiments is consisting of
53,000 legitimate web pages and 53,000 spam web pages randomly selected from
Webb Spam Corpus 2011.
Based on the methodology mentioned in Section 3.4.1, we retain about 5,000
features which have the high predictive power on the basis of information gain. In
addition, we employed the machine learning classifiers previously mentioned using
10-fold cross-validation model. Cross validation is a technique for protecting against
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over-fitting in a predictive model. Specifically, the data is randomly divided into k
groups and the classifier is re-estimated k times, holding back a different group each
time. The overall accuracy of the classifier is the mean accuracy of the k classifiers
tested.
3.4.4 Result Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the classifiers, we adopt the F-measure and accuracy
as evaluation metrics. Previous study shows that there are five algorithms which
achieved the best performance in the web spam detection using HTTP header infor-
mation [194]. The algorithms include C4.5, HyperPipers, Logistic regression, RBF
network, and SVM. The results on Webb Spam Corpus 2006 and WebBase 2006 are
shown in Table 23 [194]. For comparison, we list the performance results of those five
algorithms on our new dataset in Table 24.
Table 23: Classifier performance results for Webb Spam Corpus 2006 and WebBase
2006.
Classifier TP FP F-measure Accuracy
C4.5 88.5% 4.6% 0.916 91.9%
HyperPipes 88.2% 0.4% 0.935 93.9%
Logistic Regression 88.2% 2.0% 0.927 93.1%
RBFNetwork 87.1% 0.8% 0.927 93.2%
SVM 89.4% 2.3% 0.933 93.6%
Table 24: Classifier performance results for Webb Spam Corpus 2011 and WebBase
2011.
Classifier TP FP F-measure Accuracy
C4.5 80.1% 0.0% 0.890 90.0%
HyperPipes 73.5% 0.0% 0.847 86.7%
Logistic Regression 80.0% 0.0% 0.889 89.9%
RBFNetwork 44.5% 36.1% 0.494 54.2%
SVM 80.1% 0.0% 0.889 90.0%
By comparing the results in two tables(Table 23 and Table 24), it shows that
the overall performance of the five algorithms under-performs on new dataset (Webb
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Spam Corpus 2011 and WebBase 2011). HyperPipes is no longer the best algo-
rithm in terms of F-measure and accuracy. C4.5 algorithm which is one kind of
decision tree algorithm outperforms others. RBFNetwork algorithm has surprising
poor performance which has lowest TP rate and highest FP rate. FP rates for C4.5,
HyperPipes, Logistic Regression, and SVM algorithm are nearly zero which means
very few legitimate web pages have been mislabeled as spam. However, TP rates for
those algorithms are all below 85%. The difference between two classification results
indicates that spammers have evolved to avoid the detection based on HTTP header
information over time.
Table 25: Top 10 features for Webb Spam Corpus 2011 and WebBase 2011.
Rank Feature Rank Feature
1 p3p cp = 6 p3p xmlcp =
2 set-cookie gmt 7 link type =
3 link rel = 8 p3p ind
4 p3p policyref = 9 cache-control no-cache
5 p3p xml 10 x-powered-by php/5
Table 26: Top 10 features for Webb Spam Corpus 2006 and WebBase 2006.
Rank Feature Rank Feature
1 accept-ranges bytes 6 expires 0000gmt
2 x-powered-by php/43 7 64.225.154.135
3 x-powered-by php/4 8 server fedora
4 content-type text/html; charset = utf -8 9 pragma no-cache
5 content-type text/html; charset = iso-8859-1 10 p3p cp =
To investigate the feature change over time, we rank the features based on infor-
mation gain and list top 10 features in Table 25. Comparing with previous top 10
features shown in Table 26, we have the findings as follows: 1) new top 10 features are
from the HTTP header fields including “P3P”, “LINK”, “SET-COOKIE”, “CACHE-
CONTROL”, and “X-POWERED-BY”, while the features in previous top 10 list
are from the HTTP header fields including “ACCEPT-RANGES”,“X-POWERED-
BY”,“CONTENT-TYPE”,“EXPIRES”,“IP address”,“SERVER”,“PRAGMA”, and
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“P3P”; 2) the features from the header “P3P” show high predictive power on new
dataset; 3) only one feature “p3p cp =” remains in top 10 list.
In those popular HTTP headers, “P3P” header is designed to give users more
control of their personal information when browsing. “SET-COOKIE” header stores
an HTTP cookie. “LINK” header is used to express a typed relationship with another
resource, where the relation type is defined by RFC 5988 [97, 199]. It shows that
spammers have changed their attack strategy using new and advanced techniques
such as cross-site scripting (XSS) [169] and cookie spoofing, which arise up a serious
protection issue to user privacy on the Internet.
3.4.5 Computational Costs
Besides our evaluations on the effectiveness of HTTP session classification, we also
consider the computational cost of HTTP session classification on new dataset since
the timing requirements of the real-time spam detection system needs efficient clas-
sifier.
We perform timing experiments using the 5 classifiers mentioned in Section 3.4.4
to investigate the computational cost of HTTP session classification on Webb Spam
Corpus 2011 and WebBase 2011. For each classifier, we compute the training time
and per instance classification time to perform a stratified tenfold cross-validation
evaluation. The experiments are conducted on a eight process (Intel Xeon 2.67 GHZ)
system with 96 GB of memory, and the results for the five classifiers are shown in
Table 27.
Table 27: Classifier training and per instance classification times.
Classifier Training Time (s) Classify Time Per Instance (s)
C4.5 727.75 0.0068
HyperPipes 10.85 0.0001




Table 27 shows that HyperPipes is still the most efficient classifier in terms of
training time (10.85 s). The training times of C4.5 (727.75 s), Logistic Regression
(1,688.7 s), and SVM (499.96 s) are all more than one order of magnitude larger than
the corresponding training time for HyperPipes. RBFNetwork still shows efficient in
terms of training time (275.44 s) but it has poor performance in classification on new
dataset.
3.4.6 Discussion
The finding of our classifications shows that the discriminative power of features in
spam detection changes over time and the performance of classifiers differs between
two datasets, which inspires our researchers to learn new strategies being adopted
by spammers and possible countermeasures. Here, we listed several possible attacks
from spammers and countermeasures for those attacks.
3.4.6.1 Possible attacks from spammers
One possible attack is to camouflage the links using short URLs and hidden links.
Spammers take advantage of the popularity and fuzzy property of short URLs to
lead vulnerable users to spam web pages. As social media are having an enormous
growth, short URL spam becomes more serious problem. Also, hidden links behind
the text or in the Javascript codes post real challenges to spam detection system.
For example, the text for link is the URL to some websites you know well such as
Facebook. However, the real destination redirected by hidden links may be a phishing
website in the end.
Another possible attack is to embed the URL links in non-text medium such as
image or video. It is also the reason why spam web pages show less text in our dataset.
Spam URL link may appear in one or many images which is not covered by common
text-based spam detection system. Moreover, spam URL links in images require the
spam detection system to do image processing first that results in high cost and low
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accuracy as well. Those image spam also are spreading in different channels such as
user profile in social media and multimedia messages in mobile phones. Spreading
spam in video streaming is similar as the network bandwidth is not the bottleneck
any more today.
Third one is cross-site scripting (XSS) and cookie spoofing attacks. Spammers
inject their malicious codes into web pages viewed by other users in cross-site scripting
attack which may help spammers to bypass access controls. Browser cookie is a
small piece of data storing the users’ previous activity such as logging in or clicking
particular buttons. After spammers obtain cookies, they could steal legitimate users’
identities for spreading spam which could help them to earn clicks through the trust
built among friends.
Of course, we cannot predict all possible attacks from spammers since the spam-
ming strategies are always involving.
3.4.6.2 Countermeasures
To deal with attacks from spammers mentioned above, we may have the following
countermeasures:
For camouflage attacks, we need to obtain the redirections and the destination
URL through the short URL and hidden links. Meanwhile, other kinds of analysis
such as behavior analysis could be used in social media. Spammers may have collective
behavior pattern which differs from normal users. For example, spammers repeatedly
send the same URL links to popular trending topics using a group of user accounts
in Twitter.
For non-text spam attacks, we need to process those non-text media first to extract
the embedded text out of them. But it becomes harder and harder to eliminate the
noise in the process. Another way to defend against those attacks is simply to disable
image showing and let the users make the decisions. However, it is still an open
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problem to classify those non-text spam.
For cross-site scripting (XSS) and cookie spoofing attacks, we need to do source
code checking and prevent back-doors in our browsers. Also, if possible, we should
use SSL instead of normal HTTP requests. Meanwhile, disabling JavaScript may help
you prevent those attacks with the cost of not being able to run normal JavaScript
programs.
To sum up, due to evolving spamming strategies and growing Internet in terms
of size and complexity, we need to spend more research efforts in exploring security
vulnerabilities and preventing web spam.
3.5 Related Work
Webb et al. [193] introduced the first large-scale dataset – the Webb Spam Corpus
which is a collection of approximately 330,000 web spam pages. It addressed the
challenge of the lack of publicly available corpora in previous Web spam research [14,
21, 42, 57, 59]. Further, they conducted intensive experimental study of web spam
through content and HTTP session analysis on it [196]. They categorized Web spam
into five groups: Ad Farms, Parked Domains, Advertisements, Pornography, and
Redirection. Besides, they performed HTTP session analysis and obtained several
interesting findings. After that, Webb et al. [194] presented a predicative approach to
Web spam classification using HTTP session information (i.e., hosting IP addresses
and HTTP session headers). They found that HTTP session classifier effectively
detected 88.2% of the Web spam pages with low a false positive rate 0.4%. Our
work is to further experimental study on evolution of web spam through content and
HTTP session analysis on new Webb Spam Corpus. By comparing the two large-scale
datasets in different time ranges, we obtained the trend of Web spam and behavior
changes of spammers. Also, we perform the classification experiments on Webb Spam
Corpus 2011 and WebBase 2011 and evaluate the performance and computational cost
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of classifiers.
Fetterly et al. [66] presented their work on a large-scale study of the evolution
of web pages through measuring the rate and degree of web page changes over a
significant period of time. They focused on statistical analysis on the degree of change
of different classes of pages. Youngjoo Chung [46] studied the evolution and emergence
of web spam in three-yearly large-scale of Japanese Web archives which contains 83
million links. His work focus on the evolution of web spam based on sizes, topics and
host-names of link farms, including hijacked sites which are continuously attacked by
spammers and spam link generators which will generate link to spam pages in the
future. Irani et al. [98] studied the evolution of phishing email messages and they
classified phishing messages into flash attacks and non-flash attacks and analyzed
transitory features and pervasive features. In our work [186, 187], we also studied
the evolution of web spam but there are two important ways which are different
from his work: First, we focus on redirection techniques, HTTP session information
and content not link farms. Second, the majority of the datasets we study on is in
English language not in Japanese. It may have common features between them but
our datasets are more representative than his dataset in terms of the popularity of
web spam in English language.
In previous research, we proposed a social spam detection framework for social
networks [184,185,188]. We studied three popular objects in social networks including
profile, message, and web page objects. The classification of web page model shows
promising results for associative learning. The classification results of web page model
also improve the classification of other objects using the relationship between web
page model and other models.
We collected new web spam corpus and studied the evolution of web spam. Our
work addresses the lack of publicly available dataset for research and shows the trend
of web spam in social media. In addition, we investigated the feature and performance
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change in web page spam classification over time.
3.6 Conclusion
We introduced new large-scale web spam corpus – Webb Spam Corpus 2011 which
is a collection of approximately 330,000 web spam pages. Adopting the automatic
web spam collection method [193], we crawled the Internet through more than one
million URL links in spam email messages during the time range between May 2010
and November 2010. In data cleansing of new dataset, we found that legitimate URL
attacks by spammers are using more URLs in social media and search engine domains.
In addition to introducing new dataset, we also performed intensive study on
Webb Spam Corpus 2011 through redirection, HTTP session analysis, and content.
In the redirection analysis, we found that fewer redirections appear in the Webb Spam
Corpus 2011 (about 70% source URLs returning no redirection). Another observation
is Webb Spam Corpus 2011 has less 302 “Found” redirections and location redirection
but it has more iFrame redirections. Also Webb Spam Corpus has 4% redirections
which are other types of HTTP redirections. For most common host names in redi-
rection chains, we obtained a interesting finding that social networks are used for
hosting web profile spam and the widgets and plug-ins of social networks become
convenient spamming traps to attract click traffic. Furthermore, we investigated the
HTTP session information of Web spam in Webb Spam Corpus 2011. For hosting IP
addresses, the percentages of IP addresses in ranges 63.* -69.* and 204.* -216.* have
been reduced from 45.4% to 28.1% and from 38.6% to 21.7% respectively. For HTTP
session headers, new header P3P appears in top 10 list and old header PRAGMA
has been removed from the list. The most popular values for the header SERVER
and CONTENT-LENGTH have changed from “microsoft-iis/6.0” to “Apache” and
from 1, 470 to 77 respectively. Also we generated the distribution of content length of
Web spam and found the content length of web spam text gradually becomes shorter.
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Moreover, we analyzed duplications and syntax changes in Webb Spam Corpus 2011.
66.9% web spam pages in Webb Spam Corpus 2011 have the same HTML content as
one of 122, 618 unique web spam pages, which is much higher than the percentage
(42%) in Webb Spam Corpus. Two datasets have very few percentage of exact content
duplicates in common (2.0% for Webb Spam Corpus 2011 and 1.3% for Webb Spam
Corpus). For content analysis, we listed the trend of top 20 most popular words in
Webb Spam Corpus and top 10 words based on information gain to distinguish the
two datasets. Also we compared n-gram (2-3) based on frequency in the two datasets.
Also, we have done classification comparison between Webb Spam Corpus 2011
and Webb Spam Corpus 2006 with respect to classifier performance, feature analysis,
and computational cost three aspects. Poorer performance results of new experiments
imply that spammers have evolved to avoid the detection based on HTTP header
information over time. Different top 10 feature list also tells us that spammers have
changed their attack strategy using new and advanced techniques. Computational
cost computation shows HyperPipes classifier still has the highest efficiency but its
accuracy dropped a lot in classification.
To sum up, we collected a new Webb Spam Corpus of approximately 330,000 web
pages. We derive insights from this dataset as well as do an evolutionary study by
intensive analysis and comparison between Webb Spam Corpus 2011 and Webb Spam
Corpus 2006. Also we obtained lots of interesting findings between them.
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CHAPTER IV
EVOLUTIONARY STUDY OF EMAIL SPAM
Email is used everyday as a method to communicate, both for individuals and busi-
nesses, but also as an information management tool [197]. What started primarily as
a person-to-person communication medium has spread widely to one-to-many (e.g.
mailing-lists) and many-to-one (e.g. forwarded traffic) communication medium [48].
As social media has grown dramatically, email also enhances the functionality pro-
vided by them. For instance, users are sometimes given pseudo-email addresses which
can be used to receive email on the social network as well as email can sometimes be
used to interact with the social network using specially crafted email addresses.
Spam is unsolicited and unrelated content sent to users, which most commonly is
associated with email, but also applies to several different domains including instant
messaging, websites, and Internet Telephony [49, 82, 89, 146, 157]. Spam degrades a
user’s experience as, by definition, it is an annoyance and gets in the way of users
consuming non-spam content. In an extreme case, spam can be seen as a denial of
information preventing user’s from finding non-spam content.
In August 1998, Cranor et al. [50] described the rapidly growing onslaught of
unwanted email and since then the volume of spam has grown even more as the
amount of all email sent has grown exponentially. Constituting an annoyance, email
spam has increased to as much as 90% today [129] from approximately 10% of overall
mail volume in 1998, which results in an enormous burden on the thousands of email
service providers (ESPs) and millions of end users on the Internet [73].
In addition to being on the receiving side of spam, ESPs need to invest in devel-
oping filters to combat the spammers and likewise spammers evolve to avoid spam
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filters. The co-evolution nature of spammers and spam filters is an “arms-race”, which
has resulted in numerous publications employing adversarial strategies to tackle the
spam problem [25, 44, 55]. Pu et al. [149] and Fawcett [62] developed techniques for
characterization and measurement of email spam trends and researchers have also ex-
amined other types of spam including phishing [98] and Web spam [186]. In addition,
Guerra et al. [79] compared the effectiveness of old and recent filters over old and
recent spam to obtain spam trends on email spam dataset.
In this chapter, we investigate the trends of email spam in terms of content, topics,
and sender-receiver network over 15 years by performing an evolutionary study on
the Spam Archive dataset [9]. We aim to answer the question of whether the email
spam business is dying. More concretely, we make the following contributions:
• First, we perform a long-term evolutionary study on a large email spam dataset,
which includes statistical analysis, topic modeling and network analysis.
• Second, we demonstrate the changes of email spam over time with respect to
contents and spammer behaviors.
• Lastly, we prove that email spam business is not dying but is becoming sophis-
ticated.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We motivate the problem
further in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 introduces the Spam Archive dataset used in
our study. Section 4.3 presents the analysis performed on the dataset and findings
derived from the results. Section 4.4 discusses the future of email spam business and
the limitations of our study. We talk about related work in Section 4.5 and conclude
the chapter in Section 4.6.
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4.1 Motivation
The chapter is inspired by an article by Kaspersky labs [5] named “The dying business
of email spam” [155], which stated that “Spam email is on the wane. And no one on
God’s green Earth is going to miss it”. The conclusions were based on their annual
report [78] citing that the share of spam in email traffic decreased steadily throughout
2012 to hit a five year low.
We are excited by the decline in the volume of email spam but it also raises
the question as to whether the email spam business is dying and will continue to
decline. Besides the volume change, we also consider the quality of email spam and
the impact, which may be constituting a new trend of email spam business. For
instance, spammers may post email spam in a more complicated way using spoofed
email addresses and changing email relay servers. Those kind of email spam may
slip away under the inspection of spam filters. Thus, it motivated us to investigate
the evolution of email spam using advanced techniques such as topic modeling and
network analysis. We try to find out the real trend of email spam business through
email content, meta information such as headers, and sender-to-receiver network over
a long period of time.
4.2 Data Collection
In this section, we introduce the Spam Archive dataset and show the overview of the
dataset used in our study.
Spam Archive dataset [9] is collected by Bruce Guenter since early 1998 using
honey-pot addresses. The project is still ongoing with monthly releases of new email
spam. Since it provides a continuous long-term email spam data source from a con-
sistent source, it is an excellent dataset for our investigation into spam trends. The
volume of email messages received over the 15 years is shown in Figure 26, with the
date on the x-axis and log-scale volume of email messages received per month on the
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y-axis. From the figure we see that email spam volume grows steadily over time. For
the spike of email spam during 2006, Bruce Guenter has attributed this to one of
the spam traps having a wild-card address which received increasingly large amounts
of spam which was subsequently disabled after 2006, since most of the spam was
duplicates of other spam received.
Besides showing the trend of overall volume of email spam (shown in Figure 26),
we also present the volume changes monthly for different years in Figure 27, with
the month of the year on the x-axis and the log-scale volume of spam messages per
month on the y-axis. It shows volume trends over the previous 15 years. The volume
of email spam is not always increasing over time such as the email spam volume
changes during 1999. Some years’ volumes also shows fluctuations over time. For
instance, during 2002, the volume first went up in May and decreased dramatically
afterward until July. Several factors may have contributed to this change such as
new strategies used by spammers (e.g. image spam is introduced in emails), improved
spam filters (e.g. URL analysis tool is adopted) and even political influence from
governments (e.g. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 [2]). We
investigate the details and potential reasons of these changes in more detail in the
following sections.
Figure 26: Number of email messages (per month) over time
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Figure 27: Number of email messages in month order for different years
4.3 Data Analysis
In this section, we start with content analysis of Spam Archive dataset, followed by
topic modeling and network analysis.
4.3.1 Content Analysis
The two main types of email message content are “Text” and “Multipart”. Messages
in type “Text” are simple text messages while messages in type “Multipart” have
parts arranged in a tree structure where the leaf nodes are any non-multipart content
type and the non-leaf nodes are any of a variety of multipart types [1]. To have a
better sense of the distribution of main types in email spam, we show the main type
distribution in different years in Figure 28.
Figure 28 demonstrates that the distribution of two main types in our dataset
changed over time. For instance, before 2003, more email spam had the message
format in the main type “Text”. After that, the two main types almost occupied the
same percentage until 2010. The new trend is that email spam is using more messages
in main type “Text” (e.g. the percentage of email spam in main type “Text” is over
80% for the half year of 2013).
Next thing we are interested in is the embedded items in email spam such as
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Figure 28: The distribution of main types of message content
HTML web page, images, and URL links. After scanning all email spam in our
dataset, we present the distribution of embedded items in email spam over time in
Figure 29.
Figure 29: The distribution of embedded items in email spam over time
Figure 29 shows that low percentage of email spam, which was always less than
5% in our dataset, contained image attachments. On the contrary, more email spam
had embedded HTML web pages and URL links. But the percentages of email spam
containing HTML web pages and URL links changed dramatically over time. Several
peaks and valleys appeared over 15 years in the Figure 29. For instance, HTML pages
had peaks in 2003, 2007, and 2009 and valleys in 2006 and 2008. While for URL links,
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peaks appeared in 2004, 2008 and 2012 and valleys appeared in 2006 and 2011. Since
HTML page normally carries URL links, they should have similar fluctuations along
the time. However, we observe that an exception occurred after 2011. The percentage
of email spam containing HTML web pages decreased suddenly after 2009. While the
percentage of email spam containing URL links dropped down along with HTML
web pages until 2011 and it increased sharply afterwards. One possible reason is that
more URL camouflage techniques, which are quite efficient in avoiding spam filters,
appeared such as shortened URLs and hidden URLs in recent years. To investigate
further the trend of URL links, we aggregate all URL links on a yearly basis for email
spam that contain URL links and show the cumulative distribution of URL links in
email spam in Figure 30 (1998 – 2012). The data of 2013 is not included due to that
it only contains half year data.
Figure 30: Cumulative distribution of URL links in different years
Figure 30 shows the number of URL links for the majority of email spam is below
10. Only a small portion of email spam have more than 1,000 URL links which may
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be embedded in different depths of email messages. Even though the densities of URL
links in email spam changed variously, email spam contained more and more URL
links over time.
Table 28: List of top-10 n-grams every 5 years on a monthly basis (n ranges from 1
to 3)











〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉
email bait euro euro garden 〈N〉
august 〈N〉 super active 〈N〉 garden
market information active euro media screen
world leader tabs doses important media
auction records kinder dass important important
remove email autopilot dass dark skin
reply message original stress screen class
link work stress angst class important
leader market angst dass rights reserved
〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉 garden 〈N〉 garden
world leader market euro euro euro 〈N〉 garden 〈N〉
leader market information active euro euro 〈N〉 〈N〉 〈N〉
case link work super active euro important media screen
demander plus figurer dass kinder dass media screen class
allow mail removed dass autopilot dass important important media
removed thank operation dass dass kinder class important media
modifier sera effective autopilot dass dass screen class important
message modifier sera original stress angst limited become member
effective coop demander kinder dass super become member soon
In addition to looking into embedded items, we also investigate the top n-grams
in email spam over time. The tool we used for obtaining n-grams of email spam is
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Perl’s module Text::Ngrams [8]. First, we need to clean our dataset by filtering out
stop words and striping out HTML tags. And then we calculate top-10 n-grams (n
ranges from 1 to 3) on a monthly basis over 15 years. Due to space limit, we only list
the top-10 n-grams starting from June 2003 to June 2013, which is shown in Table 28.
In Table 28, 〈N〉 denotes any number sequence. Top-10 n-grams set contained
different words or word sequences along the time, showing different topics as well.
For instance, The n-grams set in June 2003 was about marketing and market leaders
leading people to click external URL links. The n-grams set in June 2008 was about
DASS (Defensive Aids Sub System) [3] which is a fighter system from European
countries. After checking the original email, it is a trap news or game to attract
the email receivers to enter into. The n-grams set in June 2013 was more related
to new media announcement and membership registration. Moreover, the differences
indicate the topic drift in email spam over time (e.g. from fake advertising to fake
registration services). To learn more about the topic drift of email spam, we will
apply topic modeling on the dataset next.
4.3.2 Topic Modeling
Topic modeling is defined as a technique that looks for patterns in the use of words and
it is an attempt to inject semantic meaning into vocabulary, in which a “topic” consists
of a cluster of words that frequently occur together [135]. The tool we used in our
topic modeling is a machine learning toolkit for language named “MALLET” [135]. It
provides an efficient way to build up topic models based on Latent Dirichlet Allocation
model (LDA) [28].
To simplify the illustration, we set up the number of topics to 10 in the data pro-
cessing. After the calculation, we obtain the word (also called term) lists associated
with topics and topic composition for different months over time, which is shown in
Table 29 and Figure 31.
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Table 29: List of topics and associated terms
Topic Samples of Most Related Terms
Name
Account Information email important pass check account
address information
Order Information click message privacy online policy
information address view order receive required
Business News click information price free professional
time link business work
Sales News price life money make time today offer year
online real world women retail deal credit people
Adult Product world price penis back people product
degree patch life make great experience enlarge
Software Product price professional click software
company copy softwares read suite online site office
Official News united states world state national city view
university government international people population
Free Product online pills price click quality save products
email item prices service offer free
Medical Product generic save price time products medications
order pharmacy home service product
Newsletter mail click email privacy newsletter message receive
view offers link receiving policy subscribed
Figure 31: Topic drift in time order (time unit: month)
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In Table 29, it shows the topic name and the samples of most related terms. After
the topic modeling, we only have the word or term clusters for each topic which has not
been labeled. Based on associated terms with each topic and experience with email
spam, we label the topics as “Account Information”, “Order Information”, “Business
News”, “Sales News”, “Adult Product”, “Software Product”, “Official News”, “Free
Product”, “Medical Product”, and “Newsletter” separately. Due to the space limit,
we just list sample of most related terms for each topic in Table 29.
Figure 31 shows the topic drift in our dataset. We observe that the popular topics
drifted along the time. Before 2004, the topic “Business News” was the most popular
topic in email spam. After that, the most popular topic changed more frequently
than before. First, the most popular topic changed to “Software Product” for around
a year. And then it changed back to the topic “Business News” again. And later on,
the most popular topic changes happened in the following order: “Adult Product”,
“Free Product”, “Sales News”, “Free Product”, “Newsletter”, “Official News”, “Order
Information”, “Medical Product”, and “Account Information”. For each topic, it
contains certain features that are attractive to certain group of users. For instance,
topic “Free Product” is more attractive to users who like free stuff. Topic “Medical
Product” is more attractive to users who need medical service or special medical
products. Topic “Sales News” and “Order Information” are more attractive to users
who like shopping. Meanwhile, as social media have interfaces with email systems
normally and gain increasing popularity, email spam which have the content related to
social media are growing rapidly. For instance, by investigating the content of email
messages which belonging to the recent most popular topic “Account Information”,
we observe that a lot of email spam have associations with social media. One example
is that social media account registration email spam which contains spam URLs that
camouflaged as confirmation URL links. Another example is social media account
notifications. For example, it informs you that your account has been changed by
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someone and needs immediate action to reset the password, followed by the spam
URL links. Thus, one possible reason why the topic “Account information” becomes
popular is that a lot of spammers try to impersonate the support team of social media
to steal sensitive information, such as credential and credit information, or lead users
to spam or phishing web pages for further actions.
4.3.3 Network Analysis
Besides content analysis and topic modeling, we also try to find out the sending be-
havior changes of spammers over time through analyzing the routing network between
sender and receiver. Before entering into the detail of network analysis, we will talk
about data processing and some findings during the process.
For the data processing, we need to process the headers of email message to obtain
the information about routing between sender and receiver. The headers which are
related to the routing info are “From”, “To”, “CC”, “BCC” and “Received”. The
header “From” and “To” provide the sender and receiver email addresses. The header
“CC” and “BCC” show the recipient lists in carbon copy and blind carbon copy mode.
The header “Received” contains routing information from sender and receiver. First,
we look into the headers “From” and “To” and intend to use them to extract the
sender-to-receiver network. However, the fact is that we cannot use them in our
study since most of the messages in the dataset contain forged “From” headers in
one form or another, which is also mentioned in the Spam Archive dataset homepage.
Although “From” header should not be trusted, we still extract top-10 domains from
the “From” header to find out what are those popular domains used by spammers to
set up social engineering traps for users. It is hard for users to recognize fake senders
based on senders’ email address especially when the email address is belonging to the
domains they trust. The list of top-10 domains is shown in Table 30.
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Table 30: List of top-10 domains
1998 1999 2000 2001
hotmail.com yahoo.com yahoo.com hotmail.com
yahoo.com hotmail.com hotmail.com yahoo.com
msn.com aol.com earthlink.net excite.com
usa.net usa.net aol.com msn.com
earthlink.net ibm.net usa.net aol.com
worldnet.att.net msn.com excite.com btamail.net.cn
aol.com iname.com mail.com earthlink.net
mailexcite.com hotbot.com bigfoot.com mail.com
juno.com bigfoot.com email.com pacbell.net
prodigy.com mailcity.com postmark.net mail.ru
2002 2003 2004 2005
yahoo.com yahoo.com yahoo.com yahoo.com
hotmail.com hotmail.com hotmail.com hotmail.com
aol.com aol.com msn.com msn.com
msn.com msn.com yahoo.co.kr yahoo.co.kr
excite.com artauction.net aol.com gmail.com
link2buy.com earthlink.net attbi.com yahoo.co.jp
eudoramail.com excite.com yahoo.co.jp 163.com
flashmail.com artaddiction.com excite.com msa.hinet.net
netscape.net juno.com seznam.cz mail.com
btamail.net.cn artists-server.com netscape.net 126.com
2006 2007 2008 2009
yahoo.co.jp yahoo.com dyndns.org dyndns.org
hotmail.com dyndns.org yahoo.com homeip.net
mail.ru hotmail.com adelphia.com lists.untroubled.org
0451.com yahoo.co.jp hotmail.com gmail.com
em.ca paran.com gmail.com hotmail.com
yahoo.com gmail.com wikipedia.org yahoo.com
0733.com 163.com earthlink.net untroubled.org
aol.com msn.com att.net ezmlm.org
infoseek.jp msa.hinet.net 163.com em.ca
msn.com so-net.ne.jp cox.net mail.ru
2010 2011 2012 2013
dyndns.org yahoo.com yahoo.com yahoo.co.jp
yahoo.com dyndns.org garden.md li-brooz.jp
homeip.net ymail.com yahoo.co.jp yahoo.com
untroubled.org gmail.com ageha.cc mixi1mega.biz
lists.untroubled.org mail.ru peach.6060.jp netstar-inc.co.uk
ezmlm.org msn.com ts5558.com garden.md
em.ca bk.ru momoiro.cc for-dear-2013.mobi
comcast.net qip.ru koikoilkoii.com wakuwaku06.info
gmail.com list.ru wakuwaku-happy.net greemmix.info
pfizer.com aol.com get-c.com docomo.ne.jp
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From Table 29, we observe that several popular email domains are used by spam-
mers such as “yahoo.com”, “hotmail.com”, “msn.com”, and “gmail.com”. Also some
top domains are related to receiver domains such as “untroubled.org” and “dyn-
dns.org”. It reveals that spammers were camouflaging themselves coming from the
same domains as the users’ domains. In addition, some domains in the top-10 list
are from countries outside US such as “163.com” which is the largest email service
domain in China. In 2013, the top domains list contains more special domains such
as “.biz” which is intended for registration of domains to be used by businesses and
“.mobi” which is used by mobile devices for accessing Internet resources via the Mo-
bile Web. It indicates that spammers were spoofing the sender addresses targeting
business and mobile users. Meanwhile, it proves that spammers recognize the trend
of information flow in the Internet and evolve to take advantage of the trending.
Next, we investigate the header “CC” and “BCC” in email message to know
whether spammers use those functions to spread email spam. The trends of “CC”
and “BCC” are shown in Figure 32.
Figure 32 shows that spammers used more “CC” and “BCC” in the early years
(1999-2004) and less in the recent years (2011-2013). One possible reason is that
most spam filters have taken the number of “CC” and “BCC” as important features
Figure 32: Cc and Bcc trends
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to detect spam. Meanwhile, people become alert to email message which contains a
long recipient list in the header “CC” and “BCC” so that this type of email spam
lost markets gradually.
Based on observations above, we realize that the header “From”, “To”, “CC”,
and “BCC” are not helpful in extracting routing network from email spam. To better
understanding the changes in terms of spammers’ behaviors, we still need to find a
way to extract the real sender and the routing information. The study of header
“Received”, which is much harder to be forged, provides us the routing information
such as hops’ IP addresses between sender and receiver. Therefore, we will use the
header “Received” to extract sender-to-receiver IP routing information and construct
routing network. The tool we used in extraction is the email module in Python [7] and
the network analysis tool is the open source network visualization software Gephi [4].
During the process of extracting networks, we also collect two extra features:
average hops between sender and receiver and the Geolocation distribution of sender
IP addresses. The list of average hops and the Geo-location distribution of sender IP
addresses over time are shown in Figure 33 and Figure 34 respectively.
Figure 33 presents the trend of average hops between sender and receiver. We
observe that the number of hops was increasing over time. For instance, the average
hops for 1998 was only two while it became almost eight in 2013. One possible reason
Figure 33: Average hops between sender and receiver
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Figure 34: Geo-location distribution of senders’ IP addresses every two years (in log
scale and normalized)
is that it increased the cost for spam filters to detect or trace back the senders of email
spam as spammers used more hops through intermediate proxies. It also indicates
that the sender-to-receiver network becomes more complicated.
Figure 34 shows the Geo-location distribution of senders’ IP addresses over time.
Due to space limit, we only present the Geo-location maps every two years based
on the normalized number of IP addresses coming from different countries. We use
the GeoIP service provided by MaxMind [6] to do the mapping between IP address
and Geo-location. Also, we employ Google Geo Chart APIs [10] to implement the
map drawing. The number of IP addresses from different countries has been put
into log scale and then normalized into the same range from 1 to 100. Also we use
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green color to label countries who had the fewest sender IP address and red color to
label countries who had the more sender IP addresses. White color means that no
sender IP address came from the country. Observing the maps, we have the following
findings in our dataset: 1) the sender IP addresses almost come from all over the
world; 2) United States has the largest number of sender IP addresses along the past
fifteen years; 3) Besides United States, the distribution of sender IP addresses shows
dynamic changes over time. For instance, the number of sender IP addresses coming
from China kept increasing until 2007 and grew again in 2013. Also, some countries
had sudden increase of sender IP addresses in particular years. For example, Canada
and France had sudden increase in 2003. India had sudden increase in 2011. And
Japan had sudden increase in 2013. It indicates that spammers used global email
service servers and also kept changing the traffic from different countries.
Next, we extract the networks from our dataset for each year and use three major
metrics to measure the complexity of them. The three metrics are network diameter
(the longest of all the calculated shortest paths in a network), average degree (average
number of edges connected to or from one node), and average clustering coefficient (a
measure of degree to which nodes in a network tend to cluster together). The result
of measurement is shown in Figure 35. Since the data for 1998 and 2013 does not
cover the whole year, we only list the results from 1999 to 2012.
Figure 35: The comparison of three metrics from 1999 to 2012
Figure 35 shows the three metrics comparison from 1999 to 2012. The values
of them have the increasing trend overall but fluctuations existed along the time.
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Network diameter became more stable after 2007 and it is the same for the metrics
average degree and average clustering coefficient. Those metrics kept staying at high
value in terms of complexity of network.
For the purpose of better visualization, we remove those nodes whose degree is
lower than certain threshold. And also due to the space limit, we only present the
network graph every five years (1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013) in Figure 36. For 1998
and 2003, we keep the nodes whose degree is greater than 3. While for 2008 and 2013,
we keep the nodes whose degree is greater than 10. The reason is that too many node
overlaps occur if we choose the threshold 3 for 2008 and 2013.
Figure 36: Sender-to-receiver routing networks every five years from 1998 to 2013
Figure 36 shows the sender-to-receiver routing network based on the IP addresses
extracted from email header “Received”. We observe that the complexity of graph
increases explicitly along the time. For 2013, even that it only contains half year
data, the routing network has already shown much more complicated than the routing
network in 2008.
4.4 Discussion
Our large-scale evolutionary study on email spam dataset in a long period of time
shows the trend of email spam business. Although the volume of email spam had a
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slight drop in recent years, we cannot conclude that email spam business is dying and
email spam filters have won the battle against spammers. Through intensive analysis
including content analysis, topic modeling and network analysis, we demonstrated
that the battle is still ongoing and even worse since spammers become more sophis-
ticated and capricious. Moreover, our study still have the following limitations and
future work to do.
The dataset we used does not cover all the email spam over the fifteen years,
which may influence the accuracy of our results, especially for the portion in the
early years such as 1998-2000 that contains small number of email spam. Also, the
bait email addresses used in data collection may cause some biases in the dataset. For
example, the domain of the email address may result in that spammers forge their
email addresses to the same domain.
Besides the limitation on dataset, we also have limitation on our analysis. In the
topic modeling analysis, we set up the number of topics to 10 that may influence
the result of topic modeling . If we change the number of topics to larger value, the
result may be more accurate and fine-grained. But it should not conflict with our
conclusion that the topic drift occurs frequently over time. We will take the fine-
grained analysis as future work. Additionally, in the network analysis, we used the
study of the header “Received” to extract sender-to-receiver network. But we cannot
guarantee that no forged information exists in the header “Received”. Spammers
also have some techniques to spoof the header “Received” but the portion of forged
headers is low since it costs spammers a lot and has certain strict requirements to
meet. We will also look into the further validation work in the future.
4.5 Related Work
Our work mainly involves three lines of research work: email spam detection, analysis
approach on email data, and evolutionary study of spam.
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Email spam detection has been studied by lots of researchers in different directions.
For instance, Carreras et al. [36] applied boosting trees to filter out email spam. Wang
et al. [192] used heuristic feature selection techniques to improve the performance
of email spam filtering. Chan et al. [41] co-trained with a single natural feature
set in email classification. Liu et al. [125] adopted multi-field learning for email
spam classification. Sculley et al. [159] used relaxed online SVMs for email spam
filtering. Besides those machine learning techniques, more researchers tried other
kinds of detection methods. Attenberg et al. [17] introduced collaborative email
spam filtering with the hashing trick. Balakumar et al. [18] offered ontology based
classification of email. Dasgupta et al. [56] combined similarity graphs to enhance
email spam filtering. Jung et al. [105] used DNS black lists and spam traffic to
detect email spam. Ramachandran et al. [154] filtered email spam with behavioral
blacklisting. Clayton et al. applied extrusion detection in stopping email spam by
observing distinctive email traffic patterns. Xie et al. [202] provided an effective
defense approach against email spam laundering. Additionally, researchers also have
used email spam to help detecting other types of spam. For instance, Zhuang et
al. [210] developed an approach to map botnet membership using traces of spam
email. Webb et al. [193] identified an interesting link between email spam and Web
spam and used it to extract large Web spam samples from the Web. Wang et al. [185]
demonstrated the relationship among different formats of social spam including user
profile spam, message spam and Web spam, in which message spam contain email
spam.
Analysis approach on email data is another focus of researchers. Bird et al. [26]
constructed social networks of email correspondents to address some interesting ques-
tions such as the social status of different types of participants and the relationship
of email activity and other activities. McCallum et al. [134] illustrated experimental
study on Enron and academic email to discover topic and role in social networks
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from emails, in which the model builds on Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and the
Author-Topic (AT) model. Culotta et al. [52] presented an end-to-end system that
extracts a user’s social network and its members contact information given the user’s
email inbox.
Research work on evolutionary study of spam is close to this chapter. Pu et
al. [149] presented a study on dataset collected from Spam Archive and focused on two
evolutionary trends: extinction and existence. Irani et al. [98] studied the evolution
of phishing email messages and classified them into two groups: flash attacks and
non-flash attacks. Wang et al. [186] compared two large Web spam corpus: Webb
spam corpus 2006 and Webb spam corpus 2011 and shown the trending of Web spam.
Chung et al. [46] and Fetterly et al. [66] also have done intensive study on evolution
of web spam. Guerra et al. [79] investigated how the popularity of spam construction
techniques changes when filters start to detect them and determined automatically
techniques that seemed more resistant than others.
The evolution of spamming techniques shows the increasing sophistication of
spammers. Our work focuses on tactics changes of email spam over time and in-
spires more researchers to work on email spam detection collaboratively.
4.6 Conclusion
We introduced a long-term evolutionary study on large scale email spam corpus –
Spam Archive dataset, which contains over 5 million email messages from 1998 to
2013. Besides content analysis of email spam including n-grams analysis, we adopted
topic modeling and network analysis techniques to investigate topic drift and increas-
ing complexity of sending behaviors of spammers.
In the topic modeling, we clustered our dataset based on LDA model and catego-
rized them into ten topics: “Account Information”, “Order Information”, “Business
News”, “Sales News”, “Adult Product”, “Software Product”, “Official News”, “Free
101
Product”, “Medical Product”, and “Newsletter” based on the most related terms
associated. The result shows spammers changed topics over time and also made the
topics attractive to users. In the network analysis, we presented social engineering
attacks from spammers by observing senders’ domains. After studying the header
“Received”, we extracted sender IP addresses and the sender-to-receiver routing net-
works from the dataset. The Geolocation distribution of senders’ IP addresses shows
that spammers employed the servers all over the world and dynamically switched
locations among different countries. Moreover, we chose three metrics: network di-
ameter, average degree, and average clustering coefficient to measure the complexity
of routing networks, showing that the sending behaviors of spammers are becoming
more complicated and harder to track.
To sum up, email spam business is becoming more sophisticated along the time




CLICK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF SHORT URL
FILTERING ON TWITTER
Twitter, a popular social network, has over 400 million members and it allows them
to post 140-character tweets (messages) to their network of followers. Given the lim-
ited length of a tweet, URL shorteners have quickly become the de facto method to
share links on Twitter [77]. Twitter, due to its large audience and information reach,
attracts more and more spammers [22,23,69,77,164,173,183,205]. Even though spam-
mers have limited flexibility with the 140-character limit for a tweet, they utilize URL
shorteners to camouflage their spam links [43, 71, 142, 166]. This enables spammers
to hide the true domain of the URL, thereby might prevent Twitter from effectively
applying blacklists to filter out such spam.
The popular URL shortener websites such as Bit.ly (henceforth referred to as
Bitly) provide interfaces that allow users to convert long URLs into short URLs [15,
130]. After receiving a long URL, the services typically use a hash function to map
the long URL to a short string of alphanumeric characters, which is then appended to
the domain name of the shortener and returned as the short URL. For instance, the
long URL http://www.google.com might be shortened as http://bit.ly/olDmsz.
The hash function takes into account several factors, such as whether the long URL
has already been mapped to a short URL. In this case, the shorteners typically return
the existing short URL rather than generating a new one for the input long URL.
In this chapter, we perform an analysis on short URL spam by investigating their
click traffic with the following goals. First, we aim to determine the feasibility of ef-
ficiently collecting the click traffic of short URLs. This is important because a social
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network typically contains a massive number of short URLs and an efficient mech-
anism is needed to collect their click traffic. Second, we aim to discover significant
patterns in the click traffic of a given set of spam short URLs. Third, we aim to
determine the feasibility of detecting short URL spam effectively. This is particularly
important because spam can lead to loss and damage [104,185].
The highlights of our work can be summarized as follows:
• We generate a large-scale click traffic dataset for short URL spam;
• We obtain several findings about short URL spam through an in-depth analysis
of creators and click sources of short URLs;
• We demonstrate the feasibility of detecting short URL spam by classification
based on the click traffic features.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We motivate the problem
further in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 introduces the approach developed for collecting
the short URLs and the datasets used in the experiments. Section 5.3 provides the
results of the statistical analysis of the short URLs. Section 5.4 describes our approach
of classifying short URLs based on their click traffic features. Section 5.5 presents
the evaluation metrics and classification results using different classifiers. Section 5.6
discusses the limitations and challenges of our approach. We survey the related work
in Section 5.7 and conclude the chapter in Section 5.8.
5.1 Motivation
Existing studies have focused on URL spam detection and revolved primarily around
blacklists and domain reputation. Blacklists are typically built for previously-classified
URLs, domains, or IP addresses, and incoming URLs are simply checked against
them [75]. These techniques do not work effectively when spammers employ short
URLs. This is because blacklists based on domains and IP addresses incorrectly flag
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the short URL generated by the URL shortening service instead of the long, mali-
cious URL behind by the short URL, and furthermore, spammers generate a new
short URL as soon as the previous one is blacklisted. One solution to this problem
might be to resolve each shortened URL and fetch the web page associated with it.
Previous studies [64,144] on web page content classification have shown high accuracy,
however these techniques, although highly accurate, result in high classification cost
and incur significant delay due to the fact that they need to download the content.
Additionally, these techniques do not work for some malware customized web pages
that are capable of dynamically changing content to confuse the content-based spam
filters.
Similar to traffic analysis approach used in network anomaly detection [115], we
aim to investigate short URL click traffic in order to detect patterns for short URL
spam. Also, Las-Casas et al. [117] have efficiently used network metrics to detect
spammers at the source network instead of content. In this chapter, we assume that
spammers propagate spam URL in different way from legitimate users and that it
should be less probable for people choosing to click spam URL. Next, we describe
how we obtained the short URLs and their click traffic using public APIs.
5.2 Data Collection
In this section, we first describe the approach used for data collection and the prop-
erties of the datasets. And then, we discuss the ground truth labeling of the datasets.
5.2.1 Collection Approach
To collect data, we use two APIs: Twitter APIs [176] and Bitly APIs [201]. Twitter
APIs provide two types of objects: a user profile and a tweet. We extract URL links
from the tweets and filter out all the short URLs. Bitly APIs provide four major
types of meta-data for each short URL: info, clicks, countries, and referrers. Info
contains the properties of the short URL, such as the long URL behind the short
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URL. Clicks contains the total amount of clicks for the short URL. Countries and
referrers record the number of clicks from various countries and referrers, respectively.
Here, “referrers” correspond to the applications or web pages that contain the short
URLs.
5.2.2 Datasets
The details of our datasets are as follows:
Twitter Dataset: We collected data of over 900,000 Twitter users, about over
2.4 million tweets, fetching any links in the tweets. The tweets were gathered by
querying the top trending topics every minute and they represent about 600 topics
over the span of November 2009 to February 2010. Twitter users or tweets marked
as suspended or removed due to terms of service violations are explicitly marked as
spam in the dataset. There are over 26,000 such users and 138,000 such tweets.
We extracted all the short URLs from the Twitter dataset and then ranked the
short URL providers based on the total number of URLs created by the providers.
The result is shown in Table 31.
Table 31: Top-10 short URL providers in the Twitter dataset











We observed that Bitly generated the majority of the short URLs in the dataset,
achieving about 57% of the total URLs. As Bitly also has public APIs that enabled
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us to download click traffic meta-data of the short URLs, we decide to focus on the
Bitly short URLs and generate the Bitly dataset as follows.
Bitly Dataset: We extracted all the Bitly short URLs from the Twitter dataset
and fetched their click traffic using the Bitly APIs. The click traffic dataset consists
of four types of meta-data:
• Basic information containing five attributes: id (identification number of the
short URL), url (short URL address), long url (URL that the short URL points
to), title (title of the web page), created by (creator of the short URL);
• Number of user-level and global clicks containing three attributes: url id
(identification number of the short URL), user clicks (total number of clicks
received), global clicks (total number of clicks received globally1);
• Country click distribution containing three attributes: url id (identification
number of the short URL), countries (list of countries), and clicks (number of
clicks from the countries);
• and Referrer click distribution containing three attributes: url id (identi-
fication number of the short URL), referrers (web pages or applications that
referred the short URL), clicks (number of clicks from the referrers). The to-
tal number of short URLs is 641, 423, including 18, 496 spam short URLs and
622, 927 legitimate short URLs.
We have to admit that Bitly is no longer the default link shortener on Twitter [12].
However, our work is independent to the shortening service provider since almost all
shortening service providers could provide the similar information above for each
short URL. Therefore, our research methods could be adapted easily by any other
shortening URL providers. Next, we explain the labeling of the short URLs.
1There may be multiple short URLs pointing to the same long URL. This attribute records the
total number of clicks received for all the short URLs pointing to the same long URL.
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5.2.3 Data Labeling
As mentioned earlier, the tweets marked as removed due to terms of service violations
are explicitly marked as spam in the Twitter dataset. We utilized this information
as ground truth and assumed that these tweets contain malicious content, hence we
labeled them as spam tweets.
The average account suspension rate is about 3% in the Twitter dataset. Account
suspension by creation date is shown in Figure 37.
Figure 37: Account suspension by creation time in the Twitter dataset (time unit =
day)
Based on previous work which has shown that URL links in spam messages have
a high probability to be spam URLs [193], we labeled the short URLs in the spam
tweets as spam short URLs.
We also checked the short URLs (including the final URLs and URLs in the redi-
rection chain) against several public blacklists to validate the ground truth. The pub-
lic blacklists included Google Safe Browsing, McAfee SiteAdvisor, URIBL, SURBL,
and Spamhaus [75, 133, 165, 170, 179]. Google Safe Browsing allows users to query
URLs against Google’s constantly updated lists of phishing and malware pages.
McAfee SiteAdvisor provides safety test results for the websites and shows a warning
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when the URL links to spam. URIBL, SURBL and Spamhaus are using similar mech-
anisms; they all contain suspicious websites appeared in spam emails. If the URLs
were listed in any of the blacklists, we labeled them as spam. Since there was a delay
between the time we generated the dataset and the time we labeled the dataset, the
lag effect of blacklist validation was not a problem.
5.3 Data Analysis
In this section, we start with our analysis by focusing on the various attributes in the
Bitly dataset, performing a statistical creator analysis and click source analysis.
5.3.1 Creator Analysis
We first focus on the creators of the short URLs. On Bitly, a creator is either a
regular user or an enterprise user who generates the short URL for its services [27].
Through the creator analysis, we try to find out whether it could reveal the real
spammers behind the scene. In our dataset, the total number of creators are 32, 452.
Figure 38(a) depicts the top-10 creators of legitimate short URLs. Of these creators,
twitterfeed is a utility allowed to feed content to Twitter, tweetdeckapi is the API
service for tweetdeck, which is a social media dashboard application for management
of Twitter, penguinfb is a service for sending status updates to Twitter from Facebook,
niburutech is the software company behind a widely used Twitter client, roflquiz is
a website offering funny Twitter quizzes, addthis is a social bookmarking service for
Twitter, and tweetmeme is a service that determines the popular links on Twitter.
We were not able to obtain accurate information about flocktome and therealtwitter.
Similarly, Figure 38(b) depicts the top-10 creators of the spam short URLs. Of these
creators, assetize is an advertising network for Twitter. We were not able to obtain
accurate information about techgle and geeks101. We further observe that the total
number of spam URLs created by the top-3 legitimate creators (i.e., twitterfeed,
bitly, and tweetdeckapi) accounts for more than 31% of all the spam short URLs in
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(a) Top-10 creators of legitimate short URLs (b) Top-10 creators of spam short URLs
Figure 38: Creators of the short URLs
the dataset.
We subsequently computed the percentage of the spam short URLs created by
each creator. We observe that the number of creators who have created 80% or more
of short URL spam in all URLs is 344. This corresponds to over 1% of the creator
population. The total number of short URLs created by these creators corresponds
to more than 31% of all the spam short URLs in the dataset.
Also, we notice that some creators that are assumed to be legitimate (e.g., twit-
terfeed) created spam short URLs. One reason for this might be the fact that these
legitimate creators are not individual creators in the sense that they automatically
shorten the URLs posted by the Twitter users. Moreover, it tells us that we cannot
determine whether the creator is a spammer based on spam URLs they may create
when the creator is an enterprise user. However, If the creator is individual user
who generates spam URLs, we could track it back through the URLs and block it
away. Furthermore, if the enterprise user has the mapping record which indicates
who is the original creator for the spam URL, the enterprise user could cooperate
with shortening service provider to lock down the culprit.
Another thought about creators is that whether we could determine that they are
spammers by calculating out the percentage of spam URLs in all URLs that have
been created by particular creators. Generally speaking, we believe that legitimate
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users should create more legitimate URLs than spam URLs. Therefore, we rank the
creators based on the percentage of spam URLs and the total number of spam URLs
they created in the decreasing order.
Table 32: Top-10 creators that created only spam short URLs











Table 32 lists the top-10 creators that created only spam short URLs, sorted by
the total number of short URLs created. We observe that the short URLs created
by these 10 creators account for more than 3.4% of all the spam short URLs, which
is a significant portion considering the total number of creators in the dataset. We
were not able to obtain additional information about these creators from Bitly in
order to decide whether all the short URLs they created are spam or not, nonetheless
we believe that this kind of ranking is useful to classify whether a user of a URL
shortening service is a spammer or not.
Meanwhile, prior research [112] has concluded that Twitter is mostly a news prop-
agation network, with more than 85% of trending topics reflecting headline news. It
is also interesting to see that many creators in Table 32 have news-related names
(e.g., newswatchphilly, breakingnewssource and onlinenewsblast), showing that spam-
mers are likely using this fact in order to increase their success rates. In addition,
it means that spammers may employ URL shortening services by registering as en-
terprise users with trustworthy business names, which is really hard for those URL
shortening service providers to distinguish them from legitimate enterprise users.
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5.3.2 Click Source Analysis
In addition to creator analysis, we also investigated the sources of click traffic which
may shed light on special patterns in click traffic of spam URLs. There are two
types of click sources available in the Bitly dataset, namely the country click source
and the referrer click source. Each short URL is associated with a country list and a
referrer list, which contain click distributions coming from the countries and referrers,
respectively. For example, short URL http://bit.ly/olDmsz has country list (US:
9 clicks) and referrer list (direct (email, IM, apps): 8 clicks and bitly.com: 1 click
). This short URL is created for the long URL http://www.google.com for test
purpose.
5.3.3 Country Source Analysis
The country list of short URL tells us the clicks from each country, which will help us
find out those countries which generate high click traffic for spam URLs and legitimate
URLs as well. We first aggregate the country click source by country name and list
the top-10 countries based on the clicks to spam URLs and legitimate URLs. The
results are shown in Figure 39. Here, “None” country source means that the country
source is unknown to URL shortening service provider – Bitly in this case.
(a) Top-10 countries based on clicks to spam
URLs
(b) Top-10 countries based on clicks to
legitimate URLs
Figure 39: Country click sources of the short URLs
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From Figure 39(a) and Figure 39(b), we have the following observations: (i) United
States (US), Japan (JP), Great Britain (GB), Germany (DE), Brazil (BR), Canada
(CA), France (FR), and Australia (AU) are in the lists for both spam and legitimate
URLs, (ii) Thailand (TH) is ranked the second in the list for spam URLs but it is not
in the list for legitimate URLs, and (iii) Concerning the relative order of the countries,
Canada swaps positions with Germany in the list for legitimate URLs compared to
that for spam URLs. The others remain in the same order.
For the second observation, after checking the clicks from Thailand, we determined
that the reason is the spam URL http://www.uggdiscount.co.uk/, for which the total
number of clicks is 2, 554, 121. The creator of the short URL in Bitly is mysocial. It
shows that spam URL may generate heavy traffic using URL shortening service.
Therefore, the observations shows some differences in terms of click traffic from
source countries between spam URLs and legitimate URLs. But from spam detection
perspective, we also need to look into click distribution of countries for each URL.
Sophisticated spammers may spread spam URLs across the world that results in that
more country codes in the list. We will take the distribution into account in our
classification section.
5.3.4 Referrer Source Analysis
Referrer is the web page or application that contain the link to the web page pointed
by the short URL. A referrer must have generated click traffic so as to appear in the
Bitly dataset. The referrer list shows how many clicks come up from each referrer
after the short URL is posted on them. We aggregate the referrer click source by
referrer and list the top-10 referrers of the spam URLs and legitimate URLs based on
clicks in Tables 33 and 34, respectively. Here, “direct” referrer means that referrers
such as email messages, instant messages, and Apps.
From Tables 33 and 34, we make the following observations: (i) The majority of the
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clicks are from direct sources such as email clients, instant messages and applications,
and (ii) The spammers utilize popular social media such as Twitter and Facebook for
short URL spam to attract more attention.
The observations shows that short URLs are very popular not only on social media
but also on other kinds of media such as traditional emails and mobile phones.The
reason is that social networking sites connect those media together like the prediction
that everything will be connection in twenty years [116] . Moreover, spammers should
know that all those media are connected and propagate spam across them through
short URLs.
The same to the country source analysis, we need to look into click distribution of
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referrers for each URL as well. We believe that spammers try to use different channels
as many as possible. And we will take it into account in the classification section. In
addition, the referrer list exposes the places where spammers post short URL spam.
Thus, after short URL spam are detected, spam detection team on social media could
use the referrer list to track all the places having the short URL spam except direct
source since it does not or cannot provide specific addresses in the URI form.
5.4 Classification
In this section, we first introduce the features used in short URL classification . Then,
we describe the data filtering process and the classifiers used in our classification
framework.
5.4.1 Classification Features
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, there are four types of meta-data available in the Bitly
dataset. We keep most of the attributes in the tables as features and additionally add
aggregate features for classification. All following features are Twitter-independent
features so that our classifier could be easily adapted to detect short URL spam on
any other social media.
For each short URL, we have chosen the following features for classification:
• Clicks: user clicks (total number of clicks received), global clicks (total number
of clicks received globally), and the ratio between user clicks and global clicks;
• Countries: country count and features of click distribution (mean and standard
derivation);
• Referrers: referrer count and features of click distribution (mean and standard
derivation).
Clicks features provide us the quantitative measure of click traffic over the lifetime
of short URLs in big picture. Countries features show us click distribution from source
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countries and referrers features give us click distribution from source referrers. We
use those features to test our assumption that spammers are propagating spam across
multiple countries using many referrers as they can. Also, we try to find out which
feature could express the most discriminative power in short URL classification.
5.4.2 Machine Learning Classifiers
We use the various classifiers implemented in the Weka software package [84]. Weka is
an open source collection of machine learning algorithms and has become the standard
tool in the machine learning community. The classifiers used in the classification
framework include Random Forest, Decision Table, Random Tree, K*, SMO (an
algorithm for training a support vector classifier), Simple Logistic, and Decision Tree.
The reason why we choose them is that they are popular and also represent different
categories of classification algorithms. Through those algorithms, we could find out
which algorithm is the best fit for our short URL classification.
5.4.3 Classification Setup and Cross Validation
We know that click distributions from countries or referrers have no meaning if the
user clicks is less than 2. Thus, our experiments will only focus on short URLs having
that user clicks value is larger than or equals to 2 at least.
Several reasons have caused low clicks of URLs in our dataset. One reason for this
is that the URL may be created recently compared with our dataset creation time
so that our dataset is not able to collect more clicks. Also no interest from people
and URL filtering of websites may cause low clicks as well. If spam URL attracts
few clicks or is filtered by spam detection engine of website, that means this kind of
URL is easy to distinguish or detect. We will not focus on this kind of URL in this
chapter.
In addition, we believe that the click traffic pattern of short URL spam appear
more evidently as the increasing of user clicks. To prove that, we process dataset
116
into 7 groups based on the value range of user clicks: ≥ 2 , ≥ 5, ≥ 10, ≥ 20, ≥ 30,
≥ 40, and ≥ 50. The reason for breaking-down the data into seven groups is as
follows: first, group ≥ 2 serves the baseline group. After that, we want to increase
the threshold by the same increase interval starting with the threshold 10. Due to
that more than 30% short URLs are between threshold 2 and 10, the group ≥ 5 is
added into the list. We try to show more accurate results by split the range between
2 and 10. For each group, we randomly choose the same amount of legitimate URLs
as spam URLs to eliminate any prior probability influence.
We employed the machine learning classifiers previously mentioned using 10-fold
cross-validation model. Cross validation is a technique for protecting against over-
fitting in a predictive model. Specifically, the data is randomly divided into k groups
and the classifier is re-estimated k times, holding back a different group each time.
The overall accuracy of the classifier is the mean accuracy of the k classifiers tested.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we first introduce the evaluation metrics for short URL classification.
Then, we evaluate two major metrics that are the F-measure and accuracy of the
classification framework based on the ground truth dataset.
5.5.1 Evaluation Results
We use two major metrics including the F-measure and accuracy to evaluate the
performance of the classifiers. After performing all the classification experiments on
seven groups (≥ 2 , ≥ 5, ≥ 10, ≥ 20, ≥ 30, ≥ 40, and ≥ 50) in our dataset, we
present the results of cross validation in Figure 40. The results show that Random
Tree, Random Forest, and K star algorithms outperform other four algorithms includ-
ing Decision Tree, Decision Table, Simple Logistic, and SVM algorithms in terms of
accuracy, F-measure and false positive rate. Especially, Random Tree algorithm per-
forms the best among all seven algorithms. Meanwhile, as the number of user clicks
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increases, the performance of Random Tree, Random Forest, and K star classifiers
has improved.
(a) Spam and Non-spam URLs in Datasets (b) Accuracy
(c) F-measure (d) False Positive Rate
Figure 40: Experimental Results of Cross Validation
We also observe that the performance of some algorithms such as SVM has sharp
drop in some groups like ≥ 20 and ≥ 30 groups. One possible reason is that the
number of spam URLs has decreased a lot as we increase the threshold, which may
result in over-fitting in the classification, especially when the classifier is sensitive to
the size of training dataset. However, other classifiers such as Random Tree and K
star are stable as the increase of the threshold.
For the dataset in which user clicks number is larger than or equals to 2, we
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list four metrics for evaluating the classification performance sorted on accuracy in
Table 35. It shows that the best classification performance is from the Random Tree
algorithm but it still has high FP rate.
Table 35: Results of classification for short URL spam detection based on click traffic
features
Algorithm TP FP F-measure Acc.
Random Tree 0.959 0.143 0.913 90.81%
Random Forest 0.946 0.134 0.910 90.6%
KStar 0.949 0.171 0.895 88.88%
Decision Tree 0.806 0.372 0.740 71.69%
Decision Table 0.622 0.342 0.634 64.03%
Simple Logistic 0.657 0.528 0.601 56.43%
SVM 0.886 0.807 0.658 53.93%
By investigating the errors, we attribute them to the following possible reasons:
• Lack of features: only 9 click traffic features are used in classification, and
• Some mislabeled short URLs: Spammers might try to appear legitimate by
mixing in spam and legitimate URLs in their posts. This might be as a result of
previous spam fighting efforts by Twitter and following evolution of spammers.
In future work, we plan to investigate additional features for short URL classification
and confirm labeling of a small sample of tweet URLs manually. And we will discuss
this in more details later.
In classification, some features play a more important role than others during
classification. Thus, by using information gain in feature ranking, we listed all sorted
features in the decreasing order of information gain value (shown in Table 36). It
evaluates the discrimination weight each feature has. The top 3 discriminative fea-
tures are user clicks, standard deviation among country click sources, and standard
deviation among referrer click sources. It indicates there exists differences between
spam and non-spam URLs in terms of distributions of country click sources and re-
ferrer click sources. Number of referrers, number of countries, and ratio between user
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Table 36: Ranked features based on information gain
Feature Name Information Gain
User clicks 0.0392
Standard deviation among country click sources 0.0387
Standard deviation among referrer click sources 0.0364
Mean among referrer click sources 0.0356
Global clicks 0.0308
Mean among country click sources 0.0289
Number of referrers 0.0219
Number of countries 0.019
Ratio between user clicks and global clicks 0.0174
clicks and global clicks are the last 3 features. It implies that they did not help a lot
in short URL spam classification.
By further investigating the correlation from those features to spam URLs, we
looked into the value distributions of features in spam URLs and legitimate URLs.
We found out that with the same mean among referrer click sources, there are more
short URL spam when short URLs have low standard deviation among referrer click
sources. It implies that spammers spread spam on a lot of referrers and the click
traffic from those referrers show not much difference. Moreover, this phenomenon
becomes more evident when the short URL obtains high click traffic.
5.6 Discussion
Although our classification shows good results in applying click traffic analysis on
short URL spam detection, there are still many limitations and challenges we need
to face.
5.6.1 Limitations
We have two major limitations in our classification with respect to two aspects:
dataset collection and data labeling.
First, our click traffic dataset is based on APIs provided by URL shortening ser-
vice providers. Thus, data collection is limited by those APIs. If service providers
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block the API access or modify their APIs, our data collection will need to modify
accordingly. In addition, it is also hard for us to obtain other kinds of click traffic
features outside the APIs such as daily clicks from country click sources and refer-
rer click sources. Given daily click traffic features, we will be able to use them in
classification and explore more special patterns in click traffic of spam URLs.
Second, we have used several public blacklists such as Google safe browsing,
SURBL and URIBL in data labeling which provide strong validation of ground truth
spam labels. But it is still possible that some URL spam in the dataset are misla-
beled. One possible reason is that those blacklists keep updating and also removing
old items based on their own policies. Thus, some URLs supposed to be spam URLs
may be labeled as legitimate instead as the blacklists removed them from the list.
Additionally, those mislabeling URLs exert more influences on the results of classifi-
cation when the size of training dataset is small. Therefore, we need to obtain more
validation resources for data labeling especially when our classification is deployed in
real-time.
5.6.2 Challenges and Possible Countermeasures
In addition to limitations above, we are also facing several challenges in terms of
performance and effectiveness in practice.
One challenge is that our classifiers work when the short URLs have click traffic
(at least 2 clicks for each short URL). For those short URLs with less than 2 clicks,
we ignored them since either no one is interested in the content or people recognize
it as spam easily based on content. But only using our algorithm may be not enough
for preventing spamming activities. Combining with other layers of spam detection
may make a better result. For example, we analyze them based on content and user
behaviors for those URLs with very few clicks. As they attract more clicks, we could
combine our classification with behavior analysis like work done by Maia et al. [131]
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and content analysis [144].
Another challenge is that a spammer can setup a new URL shortener in several
minutes to the same or another long URL spam after being detected. If the long URL
is the same URL as the previous long URL or appears in the redirection chain to the
previous long URL, we could store the previous long URL and the redirection chain
to the previous long URL on our URL blacklist after we classified the short URL
as spam URL. In such way, it will force spammers to create completely new domain
to avoid detection. Our method could increase the cost of spamming activities of
spammers at least.
Moreover, another challenge is that spammers could create click traffic for spam
URL to confuse our classifier after they know our algorithm. We need to adopt
methods for click fraud detection in our data pre-filtering process to eliminate the
noise, which will be considered as future work.
5.7 Related Work
Social network spam has been investigated in several recent papers. Zhang et al. [207]
proposed a method for detecting instances of automated Twitter accounts using the
publicly available timestamp associated with each tweet. The work revealed that
automated accounts exhibit distinct timing patterns that are detectable using sta-
tistical inference. Similarly, Castillo et al. [38] discussed how to assess the level of
social media credibility of newsworthy topics from a given set of tweets, classifying
those topics as credible or non-credible. Benevenuto et al. [24] have addressed the
issue of detecting video spammers and promoters. Other recent works on spam de-
tection in Twitter include Wang et al. [183] that proposed a classification approach
to automatically identify suspicious users by (i) a directed social graph model that
captures the follower and friend relationships in the network, and (ii) content-based
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and graph-based features extracted based on the spam policy of Twitter, and Ben-
evenuto et al. [23] that introduced machine learning techniques to identify spammers
based on number of followers, number of followees, and other social interactions such
as the number of times the user was mentioned and the number of times the user was
replied to.
The popularity of short URLs has immensely increased over the years due to
micro-blogging platforms such as Twitter, where message space is limited by 140
characters. Antoniades et al. [15] has recently explored this emerging phenomenon
and presented a characterization of short URLs. Their analysis was performed on
a dataset collected by crawling Twitter for short URLs from Bitly and Owly URL
shortening services. Specifically, their results showed that (i) the maximum access to
short URLs come from emails and online social media, (ii) the click distribution of
short URLs is approximately a log-normal curve, and (iii) a large percentage of short
URLs are not ephemeral and 50% of short URLs live for more than three months.
Recently, several papers have investigated spamming on social networks via short
URLs. Grier et al. [77] presented a characterization of spam on Twitter. Their
analysis showed that (i) Twitter spam is more effective than email spam with an
overall click-through rate of 0.13%, (ii) blacklists are no optimal solution for fighting
spam on Twitter as they are too slow at identifying new threats, and (iii) spammers
use URL shortener services to obfuscate their links in tweets, negating any potential
gains even if blacklist delays were reduced. Chhabra et al. [43] analyzed phishing
attacks on Twitter using URL shorteners. Phishing is one form of spam, where the
goal is to steal personal information from users for fraudulent purposes. This work
concluded that (i) phishers use URL shorteners to hide their identity, (ii) online social
media brands such as Twitter are targeted by phishers more than traditional brands
such as eBay, and (iii) phishing URLs which are referred from Twitter are more likely
to attract victims. Klien et al. [108] studied usage logs of a URL shortener service
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that had been operated by the authors for more than a year. Their results showed
that (i) different countries differ significantly with regard to the usage of their service,
(ii) around 80% of URLs shortened by their service lead to spam-related content, and
(iii) spamming attacks via short URLs cross national borders. Maggi et al [130]
measured two years of short URLs and provided some countermeasures but it did not
offer efficient short URL spam detection approach.
Our work differs from the aforementioned research along three dimensions: (i) we
analyze a comprehensive dataset containing over 600, 000 short URLs; (ii) we consider
spam in general and do not restrict the analysis to a specific form of spam such as
phishing, and most importantly; (iii) we attempt to classify short URLs as to whether
they lead to spam or not using their click traffic information.
5.8 Conclusion
We conducted the first large-scale experimental study of short URLs through creator
and click source analysis on the Bitly dataset - a collection of 641,423 short URLs.
We first analyzed the creators of the short URLs and determined that the legitimate
creators in Bitly generate short URL spam as well. As future work, we plan to uncover
spam creators after short URL classification. We then examined the clicks to the short
URLs and found that the majority of the clicks are from direct sources such as email
clients and that the spammers utilize popular websites such as Facebook to attract
more attention. We finally performed classification of short URL spam based on click
traffic and analyzed performance change of classifiers as the increase of user clicks.
Random Tree, Random Forest, and K start algorithms outperform other algorithms.
Of them, the Random Tree algorithm achieved the best performance with an accuracy
of 90.81% and an F1-measure value of 0.913. We believe some of the classification
errors might have been caused by the lack of features and some mislabeling in the
dataset.
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Our analysis and classification work can be considered as a new approach to
classification in the ongoing battle of short URL spam detection. An interesting
direction for future research involves combing our click traffic analysis process with




BEAN: A BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS APPROACH OF URL
SPAM FILTERING IN TWITTER
URL spam is a major problem because of its popular use and redirection function.
Existing filtering methods are not efficient in detecting URL spam in collective spam-
ming activities. Public URL blacklists have large time delay in URL spam detection
in spite of their high accuracy. Content-based analysis has high false-positive rate in
addition to the length limit of content in some cases (for example, Twitter message
has the limit of 140 characters). Moreover, web page analysis that detects URL spam
through classifying downloaded web pages behind the URL links has performance
shortcomings due to the costs of downloading the URL content and, typically, text
classification.
In this chapter, we explore the URL spam detection methods focusing on a popular
social website, namely Twitter. More specifically, we focus on collecting and analyzing
data from Twitter trending topics primarily because we observe that Twitter trending
topics attract more spammers because of their high openness and popularity. Using
the above data, we make the following contributions:
• We investigate spammers behaviors in social media through an in-depth study
on URL spam in Twitter trending topics and make the following observations:
Spammers post multiple messages that contain the same URL in multiple trend-
ing topics. They also create or hack different user accounts to post multiple
messages that contain the same URL.
• We create behavior analysis approach BEAN derived from Markov Chain model
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to detect URL spam in collective spamming activities in Twitter. Applying
BEAN only requires a small number of parameters, which will be detailed later.
• We demonstrate the efficiency and scope of BEAN by an empirical study on
real data. Namely, we compare its performance with two baselines (SVM and
TrustRank), where BEAN shows better performance in terms of several metrics
including precision, re-call, and F-measure.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 introduces pre-
liminaries of our research target – Twitter trending topics. Section 6.2 describes data
collection and analysis. Section 6.3 defines our problem and gives an overview of
our methodology. Section 6.4 explains detailed methodology of the behavior anal-
ysis approach – BEAN and Section 6.5 presents our evaluation results. Section 6.6
summarizes related work. Finally, Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.
6.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the background of our work including the objects in
Twitter trending topics and the relationships among those objects. Most of the
objects commonly appear in message sending activities in social media. Thus, it
makes our approach easy to be adopted by other social media as well.
6.1.1 Objects in Twitter Trending Topics
First, we look into three major objects in Twitter trending topics (see examples in
Figure 41):
• Trend: it is a popular topic in Twitter. Normally, you could see the top 10
trending topics on Twitter homepage or your personal profile. Twitter users
could create a trend using hashtag (#) in messages they posted.
• Status: it is a message in Twitter and is also known as tweet . One status may
contain multiple URLs (or short URLs).
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• User: it is a registered user account in Twitter.
Figure 41: Examples of trends and status in Twitter
In Figure 41, it also shows a short URL example. Due to 140 characters limit of
Twitter message, people prefer using short URL instead of original long URL in send-
ing messages. Here, we define short URL as the URL generated by URL shortening
service providers such as Bitly and TinyURL. It has a corresponding expanded URL
or long URL, which is the original URL of short URL. Next, we will talk about the
relationships among those objects in Twitter.
6.1.2 Relationships among Objects
We draw the communication model for Twitter trending topics shown in Figure 42
and list the four major relationships as follows. 1) Trend – Status: one to many; 2)
Status – Short URL: many to many; 3) Short URL – Expanded URL: one to one; 4)
User – Status: one to many.
Figure 42: Communication model in Twitter trending topics
128
6.2 Data Collection and Analysis
We collect our Twitter data through Twitter APIs and the details of our dataset are
as follows:
Twitter Profile, Message, and Web Page Datasets: It consists of over
900,000 Twitter users, about over 2.4 million tweets, and all URL links in the tweets.
The tweets were gathered by querying the top ten trending topics every minute and
they represent about 600 topics over the span of November 2009 to February 2010.
6.2.1 Statistics of URLs
To investigate the usage of URLs in Twitter, we aggregate the URLs by the URL
domain names that are shown in Table 37.
Table 37: URL domains in Twitter Dataset

















We observe that the majority of URLs in our dataset are short URLs. Bitly is the
most popular URL shortening service provider in our Twitter data. Also a bunch of
other URL shortening service providers are active in Twitter. The next section will
show the labeling method of our Twitter dataset.
129
6.2.2 Data Labeling
The time delay between data collection and data labeling allows us to label the dataset
according to public blacklists. To obtain the ground truth, we automatically check
the URLs including the final URLs and URLs in the redirection chain against a list
of several public blacklists containing Google Safe Browsing, McAfee SiteAdvisor,
URIBL, SURBL, and Spamhaus [75, 133, 165, 170, 179] using public APIs or web
services. Google Safe Browsing has Google’s constantly updated lists of phishing and
malware pages to allow users to query URLs against. McAfee SiteAdvisor shows a
warning when the URL links to spam by providing safety test results for the websites.
URIBL, SURBL and Spamhaus used similar mechanism to update their spam URL
blacklists. We label the URL as spam if it is listed in any of the blacklists.
6.2.3 Analysis of URL Spam
After finishing the data labeling, we further analyze the spammy property of URLs
in correlation with trends, statuses, and users. Next, we start with introducing the
data processing, followed by the result analysis.
Data Processing: We organize the statuses in our Twitter dataset by differ-
ent trends and extract “user → status” pairs from the trends. Specifically, a trend
T consists of a sequence of k statuses, i.e., T = S1, S2, ..., Sk. Each status has a
corresponding Twitter user and also may contain URLs.
Before illustrating the details of the processing, we outline the following relevant
terms based on one unique URL: Tn: the number of trends that include the statuses
having the unique URL; Sn: the number of statuses that contain the unique URL;
Un: the number of users who send the statuses having the unique URL. To keep URL
unique, we track back to the original long URLs for short URLs and maintain an
existing URL list.
Each unique URL has one vector: 〈Tn, Sn, Un〉. We aggregate the dataset based
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on the three terms to see the characteristics of URL spam. The data processing for
Tn has the following steps:
Step 1: Group URLs by the values of Tn.
Step 2: Calculate the percentage of URL spam for each group.
Step 3: Visualize the trend of percentage of URL spam as the increasing of Tn.
For Sn and Un, we repeat the same process to see the correlations. We observe that
the percentage of URL spam in the group cannot show the trend accurately when the
size of URL group is too small. Thus, we select URL groups who contain 3 or more
URLs for illustration in the result analysis section.
Result Analysis: Figure 43 shows the percentage of URL spam in groups versus
the number of trends. It shows that the percentage of URL spam increases greatly as
the increasing of the number of trends. The percentage of URL spam achieves 100%
for most groups with 80 or more trends. It means that those groups only contain
URL spam.
Figure 43: Percentage of URL spam in groups vs. number of trends
Figure 44 shows the percentage of URL spam in groups versus the number of
statuses. It has the linear increasing trend overall. But it becomes sparser and more
fluctuated when the number of statuses is beyond 20. One possible reason is that
there are a small number of URLs in those groups.
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Figure 44: Percentage of URL spam in groups vs. number of statuses
Figure 45: Percentage of URL spam in groups vs. number of users
Figure 45 shows the percentage of URL spam in groups versus the number of
users. It has the linear increasing trend as well. But after the number of users is
beyond 30, the percentage of spam URLs is no longer stable and does not fit into the
linear increasing trend. One possible reason is that many popular legitimate URLs
also have lots of associated users.
Table 38: Four types of sending events
Name Denotation Explanation
Seeding event Se New user sends new message to
new trending topic
User joining event Ue New user joins sending new message
to existing trending topic set
Topic spreading event Te Existing user sends new message to
new trending topic
Message repeating event Me Existing user sends new message
to existing trending topic set
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Table 39: Six URL behavioral states
No. State Attributes Explanation
〈Tn, Sn, Un〉
1 First-time sending 〈1, 1, 1〉 One user sends one status
to one trend
2 Multiple messages 〈1, k, 1〉 One user sends multiple statuses
to one trend
3 Multiple topics 〈k, 1, 1〉 One user sends one status
to multiple trends
4 Multiple messages across 〈k, k, 1〉 One user sends multiple statuses
multiple topics to multiple trends
5 Group user sending 〈1, k, k〉 Multiple users send multiple statuses
to one trend
6 Group user sending across 〈k, k, k〉 Multiple users send multiple statuses
multiple topics to multiple trends
Through the analysis, we have the following observations:
• Spammers post multiple statuses that contain the same URL in multiple trends.
• Spammers create or hack different user accounts to post multiple statuses that
contain the same URL.
6.3 Overview
The section above shows that lots of collective spamming activities have happened
in Twitter trending topics. In this section, we discuss problem definition and present
the overall procedure of our solution.
6.3.1 Problem Definition
URL spam in collective spamming activities is hard to be detected by normal spam
detection approaches. We propose a behavior analysis approach – BEAN to detect
URL spam in those activities by capturing the anomalous message sending behaviors
of spammers. Our main research interest is to study how to exploit message sending
behaviors and their characteristics to detect URL spam. For ease of discussion, we
have the following definitions:
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Definition 1. Sending event. An observable occurrence of message sending
associated with one unique URL.
Definition 2. URL associated sending behavior. The range of sending
events associated with one unique URL in conjunction with its environment.
Sending event is the base unit of our behavior analysis approach. We will use
symbols to denote sending events. Let Σ denote the set of sending event symbols.
We have four types of events: seeding event, user joining event, topic spreading event,
and message repeating event. We list the major notations about sending events and
their explanations in Table 38. All events here are for the same URL spreading in
Twitter. The sending event trace of one unique URL represents URL associated
sending behavior of the URL.
Besides, the three variables (trend, status, and user) associated with one unique
URL determine the behavioral states of URLs that in fact influence the spam detection
strategies. Next, we will discuss the details of URL behavioral states.
URL Behavioral States: As mentioned in 3rd section, each URL has one vector:
〈Tn, Sn, Un〉. Based on values of the vector, we could have six different URL behavioral
states. Table 39 shows the explanations of them. We also show the transition among
URL behavioral states in Figure 46.
Figure 46 shows the dynamic transitions among different behavioral states. To
investigate spamming behaviors in our dataset, we show the distribution of spam
URLs in different URL behavioral states in terms of total amount and percentage in
Figure 47(a) and the distribution of message spam associated with those URL spam
in Figure 47(b) .
Comparing Figure 47(a) with Figure 47(b), we have the following observations:
• A large amount of spam URLs are in “First-time sending” state but the percent-
age of spam URLs over total URLs in the “First-time sending” state is about
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Figure 46: Transitions among URL behavioral states
(a) URL spam in different
behavioral states
(b) Percentage of URL spam
over total URLs in different
behavioral states
(c) Message spam associated
with URL spam in different
behavioral states
Figure 47: Distribution of URL spam in different behavioral states and associated
message spam
6%. While a small number of spam URLs are in “Multiple topics” state but
the percentage of spam URLs over total URLs in the “Multiple topics” state
is higher than 15%. It indicates that spammers try to attract more traffic by
adding multiple topics to messages.
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• In terms of percentage of URL spam in behavioral states, the descending order
is as follows: “Multiple topics”, “Group user sending across multiple topics”,
“Group user sending”, “First-time sending”, “Multiple messages across multiple
topics” and “Multiple messages”. It further indicates that spammers are becom-
ing more sophisticated than before. Instead of using one user account to post
multiple messages containing the same URL, they adopt collective spamming
activities to avoid detection.
Since message sending event is the base of our behavior analysis approach, we also
investigate the distribution of message spam associated with URL spam in different
behavior states as shown in Figure 47(c).
Figure 47(c) shows the distribution of message spam associated with URL spam
in different behavioral states . “Group user sending across multiple topics”, “Group
user sending”, and “First-time sending” states are three states having a large number
of message spam associated. It also shows the seriousness of collective spamming
activities in Twitter.
6.3.2 Overall Procedure
First, we have our URL blacklist to filter out previous detected URL spam. Then,
according to different behavioral states, we will use different strategies to detect new
URL spam:
• For URLs in “First-time sending” state, we adopt content analysis and web page
analysis through downloading. This strategy will not be discussed in details in
this chapter.
• For URLs in “Group user sending across multiple topics” and “Group user
sending” states, we detect URL spam through our behavior analysis approach
BEAN.
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• For URLs in other states, they could be easily detected and restricted by Twit-
ter. We will use BEAN if they transit to “Group user sending” and “Group
user sending across multiple topics” states later.
All detected URL spam will be added into URL blacklist.
6.4 Detailed Methodology
In this section, we describe the behavior analysis approach BEAN in details and also
illustrate how to use it effectively in URL spam detection.
6.4.1 Markov Chain Model
Since our behavior analysis approach BEAN is built on Markov Chain model, we
will introduce the Markov Chain model first. Suppose the Markov Chain Model is
denoted by 3-tuple (S, P, s0), where S is the set of states, P : (S×S)→ R denotes the
transition probabilities, and s0 ∈ S is the initial state. The probability of a transition
(s, s′) is denoted by P (s, s′). The following equality should hold for all states to keep
P a valid measure: ∑
s′∈SUCC(s)
P (s, s′) = 1 (7)
Where SUCC(s) denotes the set of successors of s. The trace of length w (also
called as window size) associated with the state s is denoted by σ(s). We define the
term event trace as a finite sequence of event symbols over event symbol set Σ. The
set of finite event traces over Σ is denoted by Σ∗. The empty trace is denoted by
ε. The set of traces of length n is denoted by Σn. Next, we will talk about how we
associate the sending event with Markov Chain model.
State set is the fundamental component of Markov Chain model. In our behavior
analysis, a state in the Markov Chain model is associated with a sending event trace
of length w over the sending event symbol set Σ ∪ {φ}. A state transition is a pair
of states. The pair (s, s′) denotes a transition from s to s′. The initial state of the
137
Markov Chain (denoted by s0) is associated with sending event trace of length w
consisting of all null symbols Φ, e.g., if w = 2, s0 is associated with the sending event
trace [Φ,Φ]. We illustrate an example of state transition in which the window size w
is equal to 2 in Figure 48.
Figure 48: Example of state transitions
Figure 48 shows the example of state transitions when the window size equals 2.
Se, Ue, Te, and Me denote four sending events: seeding event, user joining event, topic
spreading event, and message repeating event respectively. The state set grows from
the initial state [Φ,Φ] as new sending events happen. Since different probabilities are
associated with the state transitions, the final state will gain different probabilities
by multiplying the transition probability along the sending event trace.
6.4.2 Converting to Classifier from Markov Chain Model
We cannot directly use Markov Chain Model to detect URL spam. The conversion
from Markov Chain model to classifier is needed in our behavior analysis approach.
Derived from the conversion method introduced in [102], we design the conversion
algorithm in our approach.
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Algorithm 1 Calculate µ(α)
Require: Y = 0;X = 0; i = 0
while i ≤ m do
if si → si+1 is a valid transition then
Y = Y + Fy(s, (s, s
′))
X = X + Fx(s, (s, s
′))
else
if si → si+1 is not a valid transition then
Y = Y + z
X = X + 1
end if
end if
i = i+ 1;
end while
Ensure: X > 0
µ(α) = Y
X
In Algorithm 1, we define a metric µ(α) corresponding to a sending event trace
α considering α ∈ Σ∗. m is the length of the sending event trace α. Function
Fy(s, (s, s
′)) and Fx(s, (s, s
′)) are the adjustment function in the conversion algorithm
that we will introduce the details of them later. The metric µ(α) measures how well
the Markov Chain model predicts the sending event trace α.
Given a threshold r ∈ R, a classifier f can be constructed from the metric µ as
follows:
f(α) =
 1 if µ(α) ≥ r0 otherwise (8)
Here, when f(α) = 1, it means that the sending event trace is from a URL spam.
For the threshold setting, we will discuss in details in experimental evaluation section.
6.4.3 Common Functions
Depending on the choice of the common functions, we will obtain different classifiers.
Also, according to the classifier function above, sending event traces for URL spam
obtain higher value than ones of legitimate URLs in our classifiers. We will use three
different metrics for common functions Fy and Fx as follows:
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s1∈SUCC(s) P (s, s1) = 1.
• The miss-rate metric
Pmax(s) = maxs′∈SUCC(s) P (s, s
′)
Fy(s, (s, s
′)) = (P (s, s′) 6= Pmax(s))
Fx(s, (s, s
′)) = 1




s′∈SUCC(s)−P (s, s′)log(P (s, s′))
Fy(s, (s, s
′)) = LE(s) + P (s, s′)log(P (s, s′))
Fx(s, (s, s
′)) = LE(s)
In the miss-probability metric, Fy(s, (s, s
′)) equals the sum of all the probability of
the transitions from the state s that are not equal to (s, s′). It means that Fy(s, (s, s
′))
has a higher value if a sending event trace has more state transitions with low tran-
sition probability. In the miss-rate metric, every transition that is not equal to the
“maximal” transition will be penalized by 1. In the local-entropy-reduction metric,
LE(s) denotes the “residual” local entropy of the state s after removing the transition
(s, s′) or the local entropy reduction due to taking the transition (s, s′). The sending
event trace that has higher information gain will have higher µ(α) in the end.
For a better understanding of the common functions, we illustrate the calculation
of Fx and Fy choosing different metrics with example URLs (one is URL spam and
the other is legitimate URL). Suppose that the sliding window size w = 2, the state
transitions in Markov Chain model are shown in Figure 48. Besides, the sending event
trace of example URL spam σs(s) is SeTe and the sending event trace of example
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legitimate URL σl(s) is SeUe. Also we suppose that the state transition probabilities
obtained from training dataset (legitimate URLs) for [Φ,Φ]→ [ΦSe], [Φ, Se]→ [SeTe],
[Φ, Se]→ [SeMe], [Φ, Se]→ [SeSe] and [Φ, Se]→ [SeUe] are 1.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4
respectively. For state transition s0 → s1, Fx and Fy are the same for the two
examples. So we just listed out the values of Fx and Fy for the state transition
s1 → s2 for those three metrics as follows:
• Miss-probability metric:
σs(s1): Fx = 1.0 and Fy = 0.2 + 0.3 + 0.4 = 0.9
σl(s1): Fx = 1.0 and Fy = 0.1 + 0.2 + 0.3 = 0.6
• Miss-rate metric:
σs(s1): Fx = 1.0 and Fy = 1.0
σl(s1): Fx = 1.0 and Fy = 0.0
• Local-entropy-reduction metric:
LE(s1) = −0.1log(0.1)− 0.2log(0.2)− 0.3log(0.3)− 0.4log(0.4) ≈ 0.5558
σs(1s): Fx = LE(s1) ≈ 0.5558 and Fy = LE(s1) + 0.1log(0.1) ≈ 0.4558
σl(s1): Fx = LE(s1) ≈ 0.5558 and Fy = LE(s1) + 0.4log(0.4) ≈ 0.3967
6.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for URL spam
filtering in Twitter. Precision, Recall and F-measure are the three major metrics to
evaluate the performance of the classifiers.
6.5.1 Tuning Parameters
In our approach, we need to tune four parameters in experiments. These parameters
are: 1) The window size w; 2) Functions Fy(s, (s, s
′)) and Fx(s, (s, s
′)); 3) A real
number Z; 4) A threshold r. The intuition of tuning parameters is to choose the
parameters that maximize the difference between µl(α) (the average µ(α) for sending
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event traces of all legitimate URLs) and µs(α) (the average µ(α) for sending event
traces of all URL spam).
Common functions Fy(s, (s, s
′)) and Fx(s, (s, s
′)) and real number Z (must be big-
ger than 1) can be determined by iterating different function options and values since
they have limited choices. Suppose Fy(s, (s, s
′)), Fx(s, (s, s
′)), and Z are determined,
we discuss how to decide the values of the parameters w and r. We decide the window
size by keeping increasing it until the difference between µl(α) (the average µ(α) for
sending event traces of all legitimate URLs) and µs(α) (the average µ(α) for sending
event traces of all URL spam) archives the highest value. And the threshold r will
be the average of µl(α) and µs(α).
6.5.2 Dataset and Experimental Setup
In our experiments, the training dataset consists of 111,312 unique legitimate URL
entries, which are randomly chose and occupy 70% of overall legitimate URLs. The
training dataset will be used to obtain the transition probabilities in BEAN. While
test dataset contains two parts:
Part 1: legitimate URLs dataset consisting of 47,286 unique URL entries, which
are the rest of original legitimate URLs.
Part 2: URL spam dataset containing 19,589 unique URL entries.
The dataset will be updated as the changing of the window size w. For instance, if
the window size is 2, the dataset will filter out any URL the length of whose sending
event trace is less than 2.
Since common functions Fy(s, (s, s
′)), Fx(s, (s, s
′)) and Z are independent from
other parameters, we try the three options mentioned in 5th section for common
functions and increase Z by the step of 0.1 starting from 1.0 to 10.0 . We obtain the
optimal setup when the difference between µl(α) and µs(α) achieves the highest value
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with the same setup for other parameters. We find that the best result happens when
the common functions are using the miss-rate metric and real number Z equals 5.0.
After that, we increase the window size w from 1 to 10. We find that the best
result achieves when the window size w equals 3. We choose the window size that
maximizes the difference between µl(α) and µs(α). We set up initial threshold r0 =
(µl(α) + µs(α))/2. For our data, the initial threshold r0 equals 0.355. The threshold
will keep being updated as the training dataset is updated in real-time scenario.
6.5.3 Performance Comparison
To compare our approach with traditional approaches, we use two baselines in the
experiments. The first one is a machine learning classification based method. SVM-
light [171] is used as the classifier to combine features from the Twitter trending
topics. We choose overall 24 features based on trends, statuses, and user profiles
information in Twitter dataset: the number of trending topics associated, the number
of messages associated, the number of users associated, the frequency of URLs, the
statistical features of distribution of messages sent by users (mean, average, max,
and min), the statistical features of distribution of messages appeared in trending
topics (mean, average, max, and min), the statistical features of distribution of URLs
sent by users (mean, average, max, and min), the number of retweets in associated
messages, the number of replies in associated messages, total number of followers of
associated users, total number of followings of associated users, the statistical features
of distribution of ratio between followers and followings for associated users (mean,
average, max, and min), Also we use 10-fold cross-validation to prevent over-fitting in
SVM classification. The second baseline is the TrustRank method based on Web link
graph. Specifically, we employ the trust rank checker developed by seomastering.com
team [172], which is based on the TrustRank algorithm introduced in [83], to obtain
the classification results
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For simplicity, we denote the above two baselines and our proposed method as
SVM, TrustRank, and BEAN. The results of our experiments are listed in Table 40.
Table 40: Performance on spam detection
Method Precision Recall F-measure
SVM 0.73 0.81 0.77
TrustRank 0.78 0.65 0.71
BEAN 0.91 0.88 0.89
Table 40 shows that our approach BEAN performs the best among the three
approaches. TrustRank fails to identify a significant proportion of URLs in our dataset
as spam since the URLs in our dataset do not have very typical link patterns that are
detectable. We regard our proposed approach BEAN as a complementary approach
to the state-of-the-art anti-spam methods.
6.5.4 Anomalous patterns
By comparing the event sequence patterns of length 3 for URL spam and legitimate
URLs, we try to investigate the anomalous patterns in sending event traces of URL
spam. The event sequence patterns are shown in Figure 49.
Figure 49: Event sequence patterns of length 3 for spam and non-spam URLs
Figure 49 shows that only a few patterns gain popularity such as pattern UUU,
SSS and SSU. Here, for simplicity, S denotes seeding event, U denotes user joining
event, T denotes topic spreading event, and M denotes message repeating event.
Meanwhile, we observe that there exists different pattern distribution for spam URLs
and legitimate URLs. For instance, the sending event traces of spam URLs contain
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more SSS, SSU, SUS, and USS patterns. While the sending event trace of legitimate
URLs contain more UUU and MMM patterns.
(a) Length > 3
(b) Length > 100
Figure 50: CDF for length of event traces
Moreover, we compare the length distributions of sending event traces of spam
URLs and legitimate URLs of as shown in Figure 50(a) (Length > 3) and Figure 50(b)
(Length > 100). We observe that there are more URL spam with a long sending event
trace than legitimate URLs in terms of percentage.
6.6 Related Work
Lots of researchers work on detecting different kinds of spam such as email spam [148],
web spam [137] [20] [11] [54], blog spam [109], and review spam [140], just to name
a few. As URL spam has high impact on the quality of online communities, the
research communities have begun to look into the detection problem more than a
decade ago [37]. Popular URL spam detection algorithms include TrustRank [83],
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BadRank [200] and SpamRank [21].
Also, many researchers work on social spam detection [132] [95] [85] [23]. Lee
et al. [120] [121] had a long-term study on content polluters in Twitter. Zhang [207]
detected spam through analyzing automated activity in Twitter. Thomas et al. [173]
presented a real-time system Monarch that detects URLs. Ghosh et al. [71] inves-
tigated link farming in the Twitter network and then explored mechanisms to dis-
courage the activity. Benevenuto et al. [164] approached the problem of detecting
trending-topic spammers who include unrelated URLs with trending words in tweets.
Since short URL is used often on social media recently, spammers also adopted it for
camouflaging the spam URLs [15]. Klien et al. [108] proposed geographical analysis
of spam in short URL spam detection. Chhabra et al. [43] presented the method to
detect phishing through short URLs. Maggi et al. [130] presented security threats
and countermeasures of short URLs in Twitter.
Besides, our work is related to behavior analysis in information security area.
Some researchers have proposed behavior analysis approach to detect intrusion such
as [102]. It is also applicable to spam detection in some cases. Liu et al. [126] pro-
posed a spam page detection algorithm based on Bayesian Learning. Tang et al. [167]
used support vector machines and random forests modeling for spam senders behavior
analysis. Zhu et al. [209] proposed a novel approach to discover spammers in social
networks by exploiting both social activities as well as users’ social relations. Aggar-
wal et al. [13] detected spam tipping behaviors on Foursquare and Lim et al. [124]
detected product review spammers using rating behaviors.
Compared with those related work, our work differs from them as follows: 1) our
work focuses on behavior analysis instead of content analysis and link analysis in
previous URL spam detection; 2) our approach only needs a few parameters derived
from users’ message sending behaviors, while many detection approaches normally
require complex feature set; 3) our behavior analysis approach BEAN defines sending
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events and formulates URL spam detection problem into Markov Chain model. Also
it uses classification converter to create suitable classifiers.
6.7 Conclusion
We intensively analyzed URL spam in Twitter trending topics to explore useful meth-
ods to prevent URL spam pollution in social media. Our study shows spammers
evolve to use collective spamming techniques in spreading URL spam. We defined
our detection problem and explained sending events and URL associated behaviors
in social media. By investigating URL behavioral states, we provided a solution that
uses different strategies to detect URL spam in different behavioral states. For URLs
in “Group user sending across multiple topics” and “Group user sending” states, we
proposed our behavior analysis approach BEAN derived from Markov Chain model.
Through the implementation and discussion of the approach, we demonstrated the
feasibility of BEAN in URL spam detection and discovered anomalous patterns in
sending event traces of URL spam. Our experimental results have shown that BEAN
can detect a lot of URL spam that cannot be detected by conventional anti-spam
approaches such as SVM and TrustRank. Therefore, our approach BEAN is a good




INFORMATION DIFFUSION ANALYSIS OF RUMOR
DYNAMICS OVER A SOCIAL-INTERACTION BASED
MODEL
In this chapter, we will introduce the information diffusion analysis on rumor dynam-
ics in social networks. Rumor is also one kind of low quality information, which ex-
ploits trust relationships built among users and may cause serious consequences such
as the widespread panic in the general public [143]. For instance, we observed the mis-
information with fake satellite photos about hurricane Sandy blackout in 2012 [177]
and the false report that President Obama unveils new American flag in 2013 [178].
In addition, microblogging services such as Twitter and Weibo support real-time
propagation of information to a large group of users since tweets can be posted by a
wide range of services: email, SMS text-messages, and Apps on smartphones. There-
fore, microblogging services provides an ideal environment for the dissemination of
breaking-news directly from the news sources [38]. This rapid process may not be
able to separate true information from rumors. Especially, for some political or gov-
ernment related news, it requires investigation time to verify the news by authorities,
which allows rumors to reach a larger audience.
More concretely, we make the following contributions:
• We create social-interaction based social graph model FAST which constructs
a directed and weighted social graph considering social interactions. In the
model, we define and quantitatively analyze four kinds of properties of social
interactions including familiarity, activeness, similarity, and trustworthiness.
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• We create a new metric Fractional and Directed Power Community Index (FD-
PCI) to identify influential spreaders in information diffusion on microblogging
services. By comparing with baselines like degrees, k-core index, and µ-PCI,
we demonstrate that FD-PCI has the best performance in terms of correlation
with spreading ability of nodes in real data.
• We explore influential features to detect rumors in microblogs through real data
analysis. By comparing rumor dynamics with real news dynamics, it shows
significant differences in the values of influential features, which indicates that
those features could be used to efficiently detect rumors in real world.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 summarizes
related work of our research. Section 7.2 describes our social-interaction based model
FAST. Section 7.3 introduces the metrics FD-PCI for identification of influential
spreader and shows the comparison results with baselines. Section 7.4 presents influ-
ential features in rumor detection. Finally, the section 7.5 concludes the chapter.
7.1 Related Work
Many researchers have studied on rumor or misinformation detection in social net-
works [34,38,96,139,143,151,203]. Castillo et al. [38] proposed automatic methods for
assessing the credibility of a given set of tweets based on features from users’ posting
and re-posting behavior. Qazvinian et al. [151] explored the effectiveness of 3 cat-
egories of features: content-based, network-based, and microblog-specific memes for
correctly identifying rumors. Budak et al. [34] addressed the problem of influence lim-
itation where a ”bad” campaign starts propagating from a certain node in the network
and use the notion of limiting campaigns to counteract the effect of misinformation.
Nguyen et al. [143] analyzed and presented solutions including inapproximability re-
sult, greedy algorithms that provide better lower bounds on the number of selected
nodes, and a community-based heuristic method for the Node Protector problems.
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Morris et al. [139] presented survey results regarding users’ perceptions of tweet cred-
ibility and showed that users are poor judges of truthfulness based on content alone,
and instead are influenced by heuristics such as user name when making credibility
assessments. Huang et al. [96] studied the rumor spreading process with denial and
skepticism. Yang et al. [203] studied the problem of information credibility on Sina
Weibo, China’s leading micro-blogging service provider.
Information diffusion analysis enables us to understand the properties of under-
lying media and communication patterns. The information diffusion model also de-
termines how effectiveness of the approaches in rumor detection. Jin et al. [103] used
the SEIZ enhanced epidemic model that explicitly recognizes skeptics to character-
ize eight events across the world and spanning a range of event types. Apolloni et
al. [16] used a probabilistic model to decide whether two people will converse about a
particular topic based on their similarity and familiarity. Wang et al. [190] proposed
to use partial differential equations(PDEs) to characterize temporal and spatial pat-
terns of information diffusion over online social networks. Guille et al. [80] proposed
a practical solution which aims to predict the temporal dynamics of diffusion in so-
cial networks, which is based on machine learning techniques and the inference of
time-dependent diffusion probabilities from a multidimensional analysis of individual
behaviors. Myers et al. [141] presented a model in which information can reach a
node via the links of the social network or through the influence of external sources.
How to identify the influential spreaders in rumor dynamics is another research
problem attracting researchers’ attention [19, 31, 206]. Most studies of influential
spreaders have focused on their linkage with other nodes. Kitsak et al. [106] found
that the degree of a node is a bad indicator of its ability to spread a message to
a sufficiently large part of the network. Kitsak’s team argued that a better way of
quantifying influential spreaders is the node’s position in a k-shell decomposition of
the network’s graph, and verified this hypothesis in the context of disease propagation.
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However, subsequent research by Borge-Holthoefer et al. [30] proved that a node’s
spreading capabilities in the context of rumor spreading do not depend on its k-core
index. Later on, the same team [29] introduced two mechanisms with the aim of filling
the gap between theoretical and experimental results. The first model introduces the
assumption that spreaders are not always active whereas the second model considers
the possibility that an ignorant is not interested in spreading the rumor. In both
cases, results from numerical simulations show a higher adhesion to real data than
classical rumor spreading models.
7.2 Social-interaction based Model
In this section, we will discuss the social-interaction based model for information
diffusion in social networks. The goal here is to find the most close-to-reality social
graph model by exploring the real historical data from social networks domain.
7.2.1 Beyond Simple Graph
Due to limited resources, most of previous studies used simple graph model as the base
model. In the simple graph model, they assumed that the social graph is unweighted
and undirected. It means that the links of any user pair have the same strength
and are based on mutual relationships. But in reality, the assumption cannot stand
for most cases. Taking Twitter as an example, the links between any two users
have low chance to have the same weight considering differences of users’ properties
and relationships between them. Also, the relationships among users are not always
mutual such as the following relationship in Twitter. So if user A follows B, it does not
necessarily make B to follow A in return. Therefore, simple graph model is definitely
not a good model for our research purpose and we need a better model beyond it.
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7.2.2 FAST Model
Based on the discussion above, we realize that simple graph model is not enough for
studying problems in reality. A close-to-reality model should be a model taking the
social interactions among users into account. Social interactions define the strength
of the links among users and the directions of relationships. For instance, user A
is familiar with user B through many conversations in the format of comments and
replies. They follow each other to receive updates. But user A does not follow user
C and has no direct conversation with user C even though user C is following A.
Obviously, the link between user A and user B is stronger than the link between user
A and user C. Thus, the social-interaction based model could distinguish different
relationships among users by giving weights and directions to the links. Meanwhile,
social-interaction based model is a dynamic model since the social interactions are
not static but always changing over time. Based on the observations in real data, we
propose a social-interaction based model named FAST (shown in Figure 51) consid-
ering four major properties of social interaction: Familiarity, Activeness, Similarity,
and Trustworthiness. We will illustrate each of them in the following sections.
Figure 51: FAST Social Graph Model
7.2.2.1 Familiarity
Familiarity is the property to measure how familiar it is for a user toward the user’s
neighborhood. It is not mutual since you cannot say user A is familiar with user B
if user B is familiar with user A. For example, suppose that user B is a celebrity or a
famous expert in some fields and user A is a big fan of user B, user A is quite familiar
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with user B’s information such as interests and favorites. But user B may or may
not familiar with user A. Besides this, in the context of social networks, familiarity is
more related to the communication frequency between two users. The conversations
between two users will increase the familiarity as we have mentioned before. There-
fore, we quantify the familiarity property by using the number of contacts including
comments, replies and retweets (for Twitter) over the total number of contacts for
each user.
7.2.2.2 Activeness
Activeness is the property to measure how active it is for each user using the account
in social networks. It is hard to measure based on users’ log in time and log out time
since you do not know whether the user is really active during the whole time. Thus,
we use a different way to measure the activeness by counting how many days that
the user has sent out message or done any other action over a period of time. For
instance, if a user sends out a message, we will increase the count by one. But if the
user repeats sending out messages on the same day, we will not increase the count.
7.2.2.3 Similarity
Similarity is the property to measure how similar it is between two users. It is a mutual
property so two directed linked users share the same value on similarity. To quantify
this property, we need to look into the features of user demographical background.
The assumption is that if two directed linked users have the same gender coming
from the same geo-location, they probably have high similarity than other user pairs.
Simply speaking, if we only consider two factors : gender and location, the value of
similarity between two users will be increased by 0.5 if one factor is the same for
both users. If there is no common factor for two directed linked users, the value of
similarity will be zero.
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7.2.2.4 Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is the property to measure the level of trust for each user. Many
researchers have proposed reputation systems to rank users’ trustworthiness. But
here, we do not want to complicate our model by adopting an embedded reputation
system. Thus, we simply use the verified features of users to quantify the trustworthi-
ness. In our dataset from Sina Weibo, a user has a special feature named verified (also
called Big V) that means the user has been verified by Sina Weibo service provider
through specific procedure such as uploading ID card, portrait photos, and mobile
phone binding. Therefore, in our model, the value of trustworthiness will be one if
the user account is verified. Otherwise, it is zero.
7.2.2.5 Mathematical Model
In our FAST model, we use symbol F, A, S, and T to denote familiarity, activeness,
similarity and trustworthiness respectively. Suppose we give them equal weights in
the model, the final weight on each link denoted as W could be calculated in the
following formula:
Wij = Fij + Ai + Sij + Ti (9)
where, Wij is the weight of the link from user i to user j. Fi,j is the value of familiarity
for the link from user i to user j. Ai is the value of activeness for user i. Sij is the
value of similarity between user i and user j. Ti is the value of trustworthiness for
user i.
For each property, we have the following formula to calculate:
Fij = nc/nt (10)
Ai = td/tp (11)
Sij = fs/ft (12)
Ti = v (13)
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where, nc denotes the number of contacts between user i and user j through the link
from i to j and nt denotes the number of total contacts from the user i. td and tp
denote the number of days and the number of days in a period of time respectively.
fs and ft represent the number of factors with the same value and the total number
of common factors respectively. v is defined as boolean value whether the user i is
verified or not.
7.3 Influential Spreaders in Information Diffusion
In information diffusion process, it is critical to identify influential spreaders so that we
can perform some measures to prevent further information propagation. Social graph
model is the fundamental part to simulate the process and obtain the accurate ranking
information of influential spreaders. In the following sections, we will introduce our
new metrics Fractional and Directed Power Community Index (FD-PCI) based on
FAST to compare with existing metrics such as K-core index, µ-PCI, and PageRank.
Also, we will illustrate the performance of our FAST model comparing with simple
graph model.
7.3.1 Existing Metrics
Some researchers from physics and computer science graph theory areas have already
proposed and compared many existing metrics to identify influential spreaders in
information diffusion. For example, to define k-core index, we need to know the k-
core concept first. The k-core of a graph G is the largest subgraph of G for which
every node has a degree of at least k within the sub-graph. The coreness of a vertex is
k if it belongs to the k-core but not to the (k+1)-core 1. The approach has two major
shortcomings: one is significant computational overhead, rendering it unsuitable for
dynamic networks; the other is impossible to guarantee a monotonic relationship
1http://igraph.sourceforge.net/doc/R/graph.kcores.html
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between the k-core index and a node’s spreading capability.
Another metric called µ-PCI, which is short for µ power community index, is
defined as follows: the µ-PCI of a node v is equal to k, such that there are up to µk
nodes in the µ-hop neighborhood of v with degree greater than or equal to k, and the
rest of the nodes in that neighborhood have a degree less than or equal to k. This
method balances the principles of betweenness centrality and the transitive network
density implied by the coreness measure. Since the calculation of the metric only
depends on the neighborhood, it requires less computational overhead than k-core
index.
Moreover, PageRank is an algorithm used by Google Search to rank websites in
their search engine results, which also can apply for ranking user influences. Here,
we will use those algorithms as the baselines to evaluate our metrics. One thing we
should mention is that k-core index and µ-PCI currently can only apply for simple
social graph model that does not consider the weights of each edge. Thus, we have
to generate simple social graph by ignoring the weights and directions.
7.3.2 FD-PCI: Fractional and Directed PCI
We create a new metric based on µ-PCI by extending it to weighted and directed
social graph model FAST. And we named it as FD-PCI that is short for Fractional
and Directed PCI. Fractional means the weight on each edge may not necessarily be
integer type. It is actually a floating number with fraction part in our model. Thus,
we define our metrics as follows:
The FD-PCI of a node v is equal to k, such that there are up to k nodes in the
1-hop neighborhood of v with weight greater than or equal to k, and the rest of the
nodes in that neighborhood have a weight less than or equal to k. Here, the weight of
a node is the sum of all weights of edges connecting to this node. And k is an integer
by rounding the value of weights.
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7.3.3 Spreading Capability
Spreading capability of a user is the spreading influence that a use can reach. We
used the average size of the network’s infected area as a performance measure. To
quantify inf(s), the influence of a singe spreader s, we use the average size of the
network infected from the spreader. It is computed as the average ratio between the
number of users joining propagating the same information and total number of users







where, n is the number of information spreading process simulation. areai is the
influence area of a single spreader s.
In the context of microblogging services, when a use posts or retweets a message
to its neighborhood, there exist different probabilities that the neighboring users will
retweet or continue to propagate the message. Therefore, we use probabilistic model
to simulate the information spreading process with single information source.
In the probabilistic model, we take the retweeting probabilities as the information
propagation rates for links among users. The retweeting probabilities are computed
by the following formula:










denote the number of user i’s messages retweeted by user j and the number of user
i’s messages received by user j respectively. The calculation is based on the real
dataset from Sina Weibo in the year of 2012.
The detailed steps to compute the spreading capabilities are as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the retweeting probabilities for all links.
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Step 2: Iteratively compute each user node’s spreading capability taking each
user node as single information source.
Step 3: Repeat step 2 for 100 times to achieve statistically unbiased results.
7.3.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we will illustrate the Sina Weibo dataset first. And then we will
talk about the results of simulation and compare our FD-PCI metric with baseline
metrics.
7.3.4.1 Dataset
The dataset we used is collected between January 1 and December 31, 2012 from
Sina Weibo (microblogs in English) which is one of the largest microblogging service
provider in China. It contains around 200 million Weibo messages and 14 million
users information. We obtained the dataset from Weiboscope project hosted by the
University of Hong Kong [182]. They made use of the Sina Weibo Open APIs to
access the microblog data. Through User Search API, they constructed a list of
popular microbloggers who have 1,000 or more followers. For those followers, they
also generated a list of about 350,000 microbloggers. All the messages posted by
those users are collected through the User Timeline API function. You could find
more details about data collection in their work.
7.3.4.2 Comparison Results
Upon finished downloading the Sina Weibo dataset, we are able to compare our metric
FD-PCI on the FAST model with three major baselines including k-core index, PCI,
and PageRank.
Figure 52 shows k-core index, PCI and PageRank metrics on simple social graph
model. For k-core index, it has two different trends: one trend is monotonic increasing
trend as the increasing of k-core index; the other is no correlation with the value of
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(a) User Influence vs. K-core Index (b) User Influence vs. µ-PCI
(c) User Influence vs. PageRank
Figure 52: Performance of Metrics on Simple Social Graph Model
k-core index. For µ-PCI, it also has two trends as the increasing of µ-PCI and one
trend has higher slope than the other. However, PageRank shows very low correlation
with the user influence.
Next, we performed the same comparison with PageRank and FD-PCI on our
FAST model. The results are shown in Figure 53.
(a) User Influence vs. PageRank (b) User Influence vs. FD-PCI
Figure 53: Performance of Metrics on FAST Model
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Figure 53 shows the results of user influence versus PageRank score and FD-PCI
index on FAST model. For PageRank, it shows better correlation with user influence
than the result on simple social graph model. For FD-PCI, It outperforms all other
metrics in terms of correlation with user influence.
Therefore, the experiments demonstrate two major points: one is that FAST
model is more practical and closer to the reality; the other is that FD-PCI is a better
metric to identify influential spreaders in social networks compared with the baselines.
7.4 Influential Features in Rumor Detection
Previous section shows that our social graph model FAST is more suitable for usage
in reality. We try to explore the influential features in rumor detection based on
FAST model. Before that, we need to collect rumor information from Sina Weibo
dataset. Thus, we will talk about the process of rumor collection, followed by influ-
ential features introduction.
7.4.1 Rumor Collection
Sina Weibo provides one special service named ”piyao” that announces rumors in
Sina Weibo acting as a rumor remover. Due to this service, we are able to extract
many rumors with high impact from the dataset. Since the dataset covers the whole
year of 2012, we looked into the announcements in 2012 from ”piyao” service and
categorized the rumors based on topics (shown in Table 41).
Table 41 shows 21 rumors identified by ”piyao” service in the year of 2012. Based
on the announcements and the original messages, we categorized the rumors into 5
major topics: Politics / Law / Government, Crime, Celebrities, Disaster, and Food
Safety. We found that more than half of them contain fakery images which are either
real but irrelevant images or fake images. Meanwhile, we approximately counted the
lasting times of rumors on different topics. It is easy to observe that only topic Food
Safety lasts more than 5 days and the others are all less than 2 days. The main
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Table 41: Categories of Rumors




Politics / 10 5 24
Law /
Government
Crime 9 6 36
Celebrities 2 0 36
Disaster 1 1 12
Food Safety 1 1 120
reason is that the rumor on food safety requires more investigation time by officials
for verifying the information. Based on the samples from those rumors, we will talk
about the influential features which shows difference between rumors and real news.
7.4.2 Influential Features
To distinguish rumors from real news, we need to figure out influential features to
do classification and labeling. Our FAST model specifies four major properties of
social graph which could be used as features for rumor detection. We listed possible
features for testing on examples in Table 42.
Table 42: Notations and Descriptions of Possible Features
Notation Description
Cs Count of information sources/users




Here, information sources means independent users who have sent messages orig-
inally not retweeted others’ messages. Meanwhile, users in the information sources
are not direct connected. In data processing, we extracted the information sources
based on the type of messages and independence with existing information source set.
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If the message is not a retweeted message and has no ”RT” in the body, we consider
it as original message. And the sender, who has no direct relationship with existing
information source set, will be included in our information source set. Due to that,
we do not use average familiarity as one possible feature.
After selecting possible features, we extracted example rumors from 21 rumors
identified by ”piyao” service and also took real news from Sina Weibo dataset as
control. The criteria for selecting examples are: one is that it should have more than
500 relevant messages; the other is that it should be propagated more than 2 days.
Since the original messages are in Chinese language, we list a few examples of their
translations in English language as follows:
Example rumor: Attention! Friends who like eating ShaXian steamed wonton
or dumplings. Some netizens saw those people made wonton or dumplings stuffing
with pork tumor. It is the tumor lesions or lymph nodes in pigs with the virus, which
is not edible. In fact, more than ShaXian, many stores use pork tumors for stuffing
because of low cost and high interest! Dirty money! (No wonder ShaXian food is so
cheap yet while the prices are soaring).
Example real news: February 6, 2012, the former vice mayor of Chongqing,
Wang Lijun entered the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. He stayed there for a day and
was under investigation by China government afterwards.
Based on possible features, we calculated the feature values of example rumors
and real news (shown in Table 43).
Table 43: Comparison results between example rumor and real news






Table 43 shows the results of comparison between example rumors and example
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real news. It shows that rumor has fewer information sources and verified users. Addi-
tionally, rumor has lower value on the average trustworthiness feature than real news.
But it has higher value on average activeness and average influence area features.
They does not show much difference on average similarity feature. Since average
influence area requires computing based on the whole social graph which is not prac-
tical in reality, the potential influential features for rumor detection should be count
of information sources, count of verified information sources, average activeness and
average trustworthiness.
7.5 Conclusion
We have proposed a new social graph model called FAST by considering the four ma-
jor properties of social interactions: Familiarity, Activeness, Similarity and Trustwor-
thiness. Through the experiments on real dataset from Sina Weibo, we demonstrated
that our social interaction based model FAST outperforms simple social graph model
in terms of closeness to reality. Meanwhile, we create a new metric called FD-PCI
based on PCI index to identify influential spreaders on weighted and direct social
graph. Taking k-core index, PCI, and PageRank as baselines, we showed that FD-
PCI has high correlation and monotonic relationship with users’ information spread-
ing capability. While k-core index and PCI are not suitable for weighted and direct
social graph model. PageRank has low performance in terms of correlation with users’
information spreading capability. Moreover, we have explored possible features to dis-
tinguish rumors from real news and found that information source features including
count of information sources, count of verified information sources, average activeness
and average trustworthiness show big differences for rumors and real news. Thus, we




In this dissertation, I have provided viable approaches to analyze and detect low
quality information in social networks. More specifically, I have contributed in three
major parts: analytics and detection framework of low quality information, evolu-
tionary study of low quality information, and detection approaches of low quality
information.
In Part I, I have proposed a social spam detection framework for multiple social
networks. It deals with various types of objects in social networks by transforming
them into uniform schemata. Through the uniform schemata, we are able to per-
form cross-domain classification and associated classification to significantly improve
the performance of social spam detection. The results of experiments based on real
datasets show that our classification improved accuracy and F-measure by 7% - 10%.
In Part II, I have performed evolutionary study of web spam and email spam.
The reasons why I choose web page spam and email spam are as follows: 1) web
page spam is the most popular and common spam on Internet. And it is still popular
in social networks appearing as URL link spam. 2) email system is the fundamental
communication system supporting social networks and the trend of email spam shows
the direction of low quality information to some extent. Through intensive study
on large-scale and long term real spam data including content analysis of spam and
behavior analysis of spammer, it shows that content and topics changes over time, and
spammers become more sophisticated and capricious. Only one particular analysis
such as content-based analysis is not sufficient to detect spam any more. We need
evolution-resistant spam detection approaches.
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In Part III, based on observations in real data, I have designed three novel de-
tection approaches to detect low quality information in social networks: click traffic
analysis of short URL spam, behavior analysis of URL spam and information diffu-
sion analysis of rumor. They involve monitoring and analysis of collective activities of
legitimate users and malicious users in social networks using machine learning and in-
trusion detection techniques. Click traffic analysis shows that URL spam has different
click traffic patterns from legitimate URLs. And it also demonstrates that random
forest algorithm has the best performance in the classification comparing to other
popular algorithms. Behavior analysis investigates users’ sending message behaviors
in social networks. By modeling users’ behaviors based Markov Chain model, we are
able to classify URL spam through the event traces of URL links. It indicates that
spammers have abnormal behavior patterns being captured by our classifier. Com-
paring to two baselines: SVM machine learning algorithm and TrustRank link graph
analysis algorithm, our approach outperforms both of them in terms of accuracy and
F-measure. Thus, BEAN approach is considered as a good complement to existing
URL spam filtering techniques. Information diffusion analysis creates a new social
graph model FAST based on four properties in person-to-person communication in-
cluding familiarity, activeness, similarity, and trustworthiness. Also by simulating the
user influences in the information propagation based on real data from Sina Weibo, we
are able to compare our new metric FD-PCI to existing metrics µ-PCI, K-core index,
and PageRank. Our metric shows higher correlation to user influences, which implies
it has better performance in identifying influential spreaders. Meanwhile, FD-PCI is
suitable to weighted and directed social graph model that cannot be applied by some
other metrics. Furthermore, I have demonstrated useful features in distinguishing
rumors from real news in terms of information sources.
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